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## INTRODUCTION

During the late seventies and early eighties the threat of nuclear war has become the gravest problem facing the world. This extremely dangerous situation is basically the result of the United States and its NATO allies trying to achieve both military superiority over the Soviet Union and the fulfilment of their hegemonist desires through an unprecedented arms race, through the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe and reliance on military might as the main means of achieving global domination. The arms build-up presently being carried out by the United States and NATO countries is on a scale unknown since the war.

President Reagan and his advisors have tried to promote the idea that nuclear war is permissible and can even be won. In particular Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, has frequently stated that neither he himself nor President Reagan are in agreement with the view that a nuclear war cannot be won. Today this thinking is not just a matter of propaganda; it has become a very real fact, a fact which has been given a material and highly functional base—war. The occupation of Grenada and the continuing undeclared war in Central America are only the most obvious examples of US military policy

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of aggression practised round the world.

Thus it is hardly surprising that the most acute problem facing the world today is the choice between war and peace. The 26th Congress of the CPSU thus determined the main long-term objective of Soviet foreign policy—to “safeguard peace—no task is more important now on the international plane for our party, for our people and, for that matter, for all the peoples of the world”.<sup>1</sup> In February 1984 K. U. Chernenko, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, noted that the Soviet Union had always been pursuing a “policy aimed at removing the threat of a world nuclear war hanging over mankind. This Leninist policy of peace ... accords with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people, and actually also of the other peoples of the world. And we firmly declare: we shall not deviate by an inch from that policy.”<sup>2</sup>

The main reason for the increased aggressiveness on the part of imperialism is a profound weakening of its positions throughout the world. And all its difficulties have been somehow concentrated in the unprecedentedly severe crisis that has gripped the leading imperialist power, the United States. The US economy is now no longer the all-powerful instrument it was in the capitalist world, and US policies have suffered one defeat after another all over the globe. The present situation is characterised by fierce rivalry between the three main imperialist centres—the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The economic and political hegemony of the US in the capitalist world has now been replaced by polycentrism, although the USA with its world-wide system of nuclear bases and occupational forces retains its military superiority.

It is understandable that this qualitatively new situation is a cause of grave concern to many influential members of the American ruling class. They are ready to do anything to slow down these changes and turn

back the implacable clock of history. It is these reactionary and military factions in the US, therefore, that represent the greatest danger at the present time inasmuch as they threaten the socialist world with nuclear war and are ready to gamble away the vital interests of mankind in the name of their own selfish pursuits.

And it is this kind of people that are now in power in Washington. Their goals and objectives have been openly stated: they are out to tip the scales of the military and strategic balance and gain military superiority over the USSR. They are ready to bring economic, political and military pressure to bear on the socialist countries in order to force concessions to imperialism out of them. And they are aiming to throw back the forces of the national liberation movement. The overall strategy of the Reagan administration is aimed at winning back the positions America has lost. In thus turning the blade of nuclear confrontation against the socialist community Washington is ignoring the interests of its allies and forcing their policies to fall into line with its own hegemonistic plans.

Reagan and his supporters have declared force to be the basis of US foreign policy. According to the thinking of the Reaganites this build-up of military might is to be accompanied by an all-out campaign to increase anti-communist hysteria. But military might is not the way to solve the complex problems that affect the world today. The Reagan administration ignores the fact that security in a nuclear age is only one of the aspects of foreign policy and cannot be considered in isolation from the other problems. Furthermore, it has even been forgotten in Washington that a state which relies on military might as its first and only option in any situation is doomed to face continuous difficulties. Vietnam showed that the use of military force was not sufficient to gain victory. Increasing amounts of military aid to the Shah of Iran were not enough to keep him in power. The presence of US forces in the Indian Ocean and the

Persian Gulf could do nothing to free the American hostages in Teheran. Gambling on military power produces a boomerang effect with the reverse consequences for US interests.

Just as limited are the Reagan administration's attempts to give its foreign policy an ideological thrust completely in line with its aims of combating communism. Washington's own inconsistent actions throughout the world cause serious doubts even among its allies. The questions immediately arise: "Is it not precisely US support that makes it possible for most highly reactionary regimes to remain in power?", "Are not the mining of Nicaraguan ports in peacetime, the bombing and shelling of Lebanese villages and the overthrow of regimes like that in Grenada which are not to the liking of the US administration clear evidence that it is rather the Reagan Administration that has elevated international terrorism to the level of state policy?"

Mankind has already lived through the period known in history as the cold war. This cold war was conceived and put into practice by those ruling circles in the United States which saw in the exceptionally favourable political and economic situation that existed after the war (particularly at the time when the US possessed complete monopoly over atomic weapons) an opportunity for their country to achieve world domination through crushing the main obstacle that stood in their way—the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. During the cold war, which lasted more than two decades, numerous bloody conflicts were fought as a result of the aggressive policy of the United States. Today many prominent American political scientists believe that the coming to power of the "Reagan team" was not just the usual replacement of one party by another at the helm. As Stanley Hoffmann put it, "American foreign policy since the end of the Second World War has gone through two full cycles—that of the Cold War and that of détente. ...Today we are apparently back at square

one."<sup>3</sup> Hoffmann admits that Reagan's coming to power was a sort of reaction by the ruling circles to the vast changes that had taken place in the world in recent years. Never before has the United States been through such a serious and all-embracing crisis as it faces at the present moment when, in Hoffmann's words, "America is in trouble at home and abroad".<sup>4</sup>

The United States is no longer the same economic dictator and leader of its allies that it once was. The hitherto unprecedented arms race that that country has embarked upon has brought results completely opposite to those intended—for US territory is now just as vulnerable as the territory of other countries. For the first time in two hundred years the US is faced with the prospect of experiencing itself the horrors of war, the horrors furthermore of a thermonuclear war, not a conventional one.

Recent historical experience would seem to leave no illusions as to the fatal consequences of pursuing a policy of permanent confrontation with the Soviet Union. The decade of detente, on the other hand, has shown the fruitfulness and constructiveness of a policy of peaceful coexistence and its "profitability" for all countries and peoples of the world without exception. All this is even more important in an era of nuclear weapons, which present an equal threat to states with different social systems and could even call into question the very existence of life on earth. For this reason the Soviet Union is demonstrating its peace policy and the humanism of socialist society, a humanism that is of significance for the whole of mankind, by concentrating its efforts on averting the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and implementing such a policy of peace and cooperation as was embodied in detente.

It has only become possible to achieve this, given the realities of international relations today, on the basis of a change in the correlation of forces and the achievement of approximate military parity between the social-

ist world and the NATO countries. This was the most important objective factor making detente a practical proposition. An exceptionally important role was also played by a number of subjective factors, particularly the consistent peace policy of the USSR which not only paralyzed those who were bent on military adventure, but laid a firm foundation of confidence in the Soviet state among broad social strata. Another positive subjective factor was the presence among the capitalist rulers, particularly in that citadel of capitalism, the United States, of a number of realistically minded members of the ruling elite who were beginning to understand that a new correlation of forces existed and that given the threat of nuclear holocaust hanging over mankind there was no alternative to peaceful coexistence. This realistically minded section of the ruling class made itself felt on the political arena in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Here it should be realized that the American ruling class was formed at the time when capitalism was developing into imperialism in the late 19th century. It thus absorbed all the characteristics of capitalist development in the United States together with its historical and national traditions. These characteristics and traditions, as well as the geographical position of the United States, are directly reflected in the thinking of the American ruling class, in the way they look at the world outside, and in their actions both at home and abroad. One cannot help recalling the words of Lenin to the effect that the present has its roots in the past. "If any social phenomenon is examined in its process of development, relics of the past, foundations of the present and germs of the future will always be discovered in it..."<sup>5</sup>

If we look at American history we can see that a characteristic feature of the behaviour of the American political elite is their rallying together in more or less broad political coalitions to achieve whatever goals were considered important at any given moment of the country's

historical development. The peculiarities of the country's political development meant that these coalitions became effective through either the Republican or Democratic parties and it was these coalitions that ultimately brought the one or the other party to power. In tackling the main problems affecting the country at home—the strengthening and development of capitalism, and abroad—confronting other states, particularly the socialist community countries, the members of the ruling faction differed only in their choice of tactics which depended on the current political situation and the correlation of forces. Conflict within the ruling elite also had its effect. On those occasions when the more aggressive elements, particularly those connected with the military and industrial complex who were reluctant to take account of the realities of the world, came out on top, the situation became more acute and events approached the danger level. However, on certain extremely rare occasions the realistically minded elements, who were aware of the catastrophic consequences of a military conflict with the socialist world, gained in influence over their opponents. Thus the specific orientation of the foreign and military policy of the United States has been formed as a result of the conflict of these two basic trends within the US ruling class and so it is often of a highly contradictory nature.

In the political life of the United States there have been periods in which groups have been in power that have been fairly unanimous in their support of one line or another. But the homogeneity of these groups and the unambiguity of their policies are only relative, since American political life is characterised by the interaction of opposing factions. "The divergence of interests even in *the same* class stratum is so great in that tremendous area that wholly different strata and interests are represented in each of the two big parties, depending on the locality, and to a very large extent each of the two parties contains representatives of nearly every partic-



ular section of the possessing class..."<sup>6</sup> They contend with each other, but also stand in need of each other. The relative balance between them and the predominance of one faction over another is reflected in the foreign and military policies pursued by each different administration.

But it must be noted this is a complex, highly involved and far from unambiguous process. An integral part of the functioning of American capitalist society is the various levels of power—the executive, the judiciary and the legislative. They were thought up by the founding fathers to provide a system of checks and balances for the state apparatus. The main principle underlying the whole state machinery in the United States is to preserve balance in the capitalist system and prevent the absolute domination of one or another monopoly group which could threaten the stability and development as a whole. As Engels defined it, there is a confluence into "an aggregate mean, a common resultant..."<sup>7</sup>

Ruling circles in the United States have various means at their disposal for achieving political objectives. But the main method is the use of military force. Throughout the whole of the country's history Democrats and Republicans alike have taken an equal share in building up the war machine. This is reflected in the general orientation of the American bourgeoisie towards approaching all their problems from a position of strength, looking at the world through the sights of a gun and seeing in the arms race a means of bringing pressure to bear upon and intimidating an enemy.

At all stages of their history the US Armed Forces were built up in accordance with objectives set by the ruling class. This at first meant adapting them to assert the domination of the American bourgeoisie in the Western Hemisphere and then gradually developing them into an instrument of global American expansion. At the turn of this century, when capitalism in America was moving into its imperialist stage (particularly after the

defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War of 1898), work was begun on the formation of what is now known as the American war machine.

The concept of war machine includes, besides the armed forces which constitute its nucleus, leading officials in the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and its apparatus, the "think tanks" which serve the military and political leadership and the congressional committees and subcommittees that are concerned with military matters.

Modern American militarism came into being at the turn of the century. As Lenin defined it, "modern militarism is the result of capitalism. In both its forms it is the 'vital expression' of capitalism—as a military force used by the capitalist states in their external conflicts... and as a weapon in the hands of the ruling classes for suppressing every kind of movement, economic and political, of the proletariat."<sup>8</sup>

The emergence and development of the American war machine took place in the course of armed conflicts with the forces of other nations and with national liberation and revolutionary movements. The growth of the US war machine was accompanied by the formation and development of strategic concepts that reflected the thinking of the American ruling class.

The modern US war machine, which was given its final form after the Second World War and constant campaigns to propagandize the power politics have resulted in a distorted attitude to problems of war on the part of the mass of the American people. The size of the war machine in the US today is colossal and, what is more, it is continually being increased, turning, it would appear, into some superorganism that is capable of influencing the whole functioning of the American state apparatus. The fact that the US war machine has during the last decades grown out of all proportions is especially alarming.

The whole history of the United States since the war

shows that the ruling class and its political elite seriously influenced all decisions to enlarge the war machine and use its power for the achievement of aggressive objectives.

The gigantic growth of this machine, which was accompanied by an integration of interests on the part of the military hierarchy and the American ruling class, made it possible for the appearance of a so-called national security bureaucracy, which also included non-governmental organisations.

The American war machine has its own distinctive features which set it apart from European models. The latter, being the product of generations of militarists, were based on respect for the military profession and various kinds of ceremony and loyalty to superior officers. But in the United States the prestige of the soldier was low, at least until the Second World War. The majority of ordinary Americans looked upon war not as a road to glory, but as an unfortunate necessity which had to be done with as soon as possible so as to be able to return to normal civilian life. It was therefore only with difficulty that the American ruling class was able to inculcate militarist ideology in the individualistic consciousness of American society.

After the Second World War the majority of Americans wanted a return to peaceful civilian life, and this meant that the American war machine had to be reduced to at least its prewar size. This in turn required overcoming resistance from the military and dismantling the enormous military apparatus, whose influence had reached into all spheres of American life. Furthermore, as time went on, this resistance on the part of the military gained increasing support in political and legislative circles throughout the country despite the mood of the people as a whole. Finally a kind of merger took place between the ambitious plans and objectives of the military and of the politicians that was considerably strengthened through the "alluring" prospect of America having monopoly control over nuclear weapons.

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As has happened many times throughout American history, the ruling class reacted to the changing world situation by putting in power those who demonstrated their readiness to resort to a wide set of measures, and predominantly force, in pursuit of its own narrowly egotistical interests.

Thus after the Second World War the American ruling class took steps to use its war machine to achieve new global and hegemonistic objectives. Most important among these was the decision to increase that part of the GNP which the bourgeoisie was ready to allocate to the building up and operation of the war machine under the conditions which then existed. Not that there were no opponents of this policy. The unrestrained increase of military expenditure was strongly criticised by those realistically minded politicians who wanted to maintain a certain level of cooperation with the Soviet Union. The policy was also opposed by those who advocated what was called "cheap defence", by which was meant achieving US hegemony throughout the world largely with the aid of nuclear weapons.

These differences reflected a characteristic feature of US postwar foreign policy—the conflict between those whose views were aggressive and whose only objective was great-power chauvinism, and those whose outlook was more realistic, being based on an understanding of the objective changes that had taken place in the world, and who were therefore ready to adapt the country to these changes. In the immediate postwar period it was the first of these trends that was predominant. The result was the formation of a modern war machine based on a merger between the three armed services (Army, Navy and Air Force) and the development of a national security system consisting of numerous government bodies. A distinctive new alliance was formed between the civilian-military bureaucracy and big business. This alliance, which grew rich on preparing for war, subsequently developed into what is known today as the military-in-

dustrial complex. In its turn it became a kind of directorate controlling the enormous state machinery of the US and at certain times having decisive influence over the formation and implementation of US foreign policy.

The well-known American sociologist, C. Wright Mills, was fully justified in noting that this directorate lies outside the democratic process even in the bourgeois interpretation of the term. The members of the directorate are appointed, not elected to their positions. Consequently they are not only responsible to themselves but to those who have appointed them. Congress, according to Wright Mills, has almost no power over them, and public opinion—none at all.

But the ruling class has had to pay for the creation of this giant. Because of its size and the enormous share of the national wealth it consumes, and the fact that military and political interests are totally and completely interwoven, the upper echelons of the military have been able to exert direct influence on the country's politics even at the expense of the civilian political elite. Thus the war machine has gradually taken on the attributes of an independent political force.

Nevertheless, the ruling class has managed to retain strict control over the military establishment. The aim of this control is to ensure the optimal functioning of the military and political machinery, to prevent any undesirable hitches in its work and rivalries between the armed services and keep a firm check on military leaders with excessive political ambitions. For precisely this reason the upper echelon of the war machine actively cooperate with the civilian political leadership in the task of exercising control over the armed forces, for this is in the interests of both the military and the politicians, and strengthens the military and political machinery they control.

\* \* \*

In the present situation Engels's comment on the situation in the United States seems particularly apt:

"But of course who can count on *tranquil* development in America? There are economic leaps over there like the political ones in France, and they do indeed produce the same temporary retrogressions."<sup>9</sup> This is true not only in relation to the economy but to politics as well. The change to global confrontation which marked the coming to power of the Reagan administration has had an extremely negative effect on the development of today's international relations and world politics as a whole. And the situation has got increasingly worse due to the international policies of American imperialism which have once more been exposed for their adventurism and readiness to gamble away the vital interests of mankind in the name of their own selfish objectives. Today, just as after the Second World War, this policy remains based on the vicious and senseless ambitions of the imperialist politicians. Once again they have set themselves the task of achieving the unachievable—to put a barrier across the road of progressive change and act as arbiters of the destiny of nations.

All in all, throughout the whole history of the United States military force has been used by the ruling circles as the main policy instrument and it has served and continues to serve the most aggressive goals of imperialism. The central postulate of this policy remains the strategy of deterrence, which militarist propaganda justifies by the "need" to contain the "Soviet threat". In fact, however, deterrence has done nothing to avert war; on the contrary, it prepares war and thus is an aggressive rather than a defensive strategy.

America's loss of the nuclear monopoly and subsequently of military superiority put US ruling circles into a state of shock. The signs of a new realism began to appear in their political thinking. But their main reaction was seen in the traditional form of increased aggression and the search for sophisticated tactical solutions. The 1960s were marked by the feverish elaboration of such war scenarios that would, in the opinion of the Ameri-

can strategists, guarantee success in a nuclear war. But all these scenarios were based on the illusory supposition that the US administration could contain a nuclear conflict within certain planned parameters and bring it to an end whenever they wished. These illusions were based on the erroneous belief that the Soviet leadership would restrict itself to the levels of escalation suggested by the Americans, in other words, that the USSR would yield the initiative to the US without offering any resistance.

Today the doctrine of deterrence amounts to nothing more than adventurism. And adventurism in its turn shows that military thinking among US ruling circles has plunged into a severe crisis. The dangerous conclusions of War Party in the White House, which is headed by President Reagan, boil down to one thing: that a nuclear war can be concluded in the traditional way—with the victory of one side and the defeat of the other. And this without any thought for the fact that there is no objective chance for such an outcome. Unlike previous wars, the use of nuclear weapons could only lead to global catastrophe, to the virtual annihilation of the human race.

Of course, suicide does not enter into the War Party's calculations. Having proclaimed a crusade against socialism as a social system, reactionary forces in the United States are out to crush it. But what is particularly dangerous is that illusory hopes of destroying socialism by military force are backed up by nuclear missiles that are only too real. Hence the obstinate desire on the part of adventurist elements to depict a nuclear war in such a way that its price from a political point of view appears acceptable. Hence the mad chase after the spectre of military supremacy which is shaking the already fragile building of the modern world.

For more than thirty years the American policy of readiness for a nuclear war, which is allegedly meant to avert such a catastrophe, has been nothing more than a

propaganda screen, behind which ruling circles in the United States have been forcing ahead the arms race and building up their capability for conducting and "winning" a nuclear war. Knowledge of the military might of the Soviet Armed Forces—a powerful factor in restraining the nuclear ambitions of the War Party—has in recent decades led the theoreticians of a nuclear world to reassess the concept of intimidation. They began to look upon it as being two-way, in other words as mutual deterrence. The fallaciousness of this concept, like many others, lies in the idea that it is necessary to be continually ready to block the "Soviet military threat", which, of course, does not in reality exist. Aggression and plans of unleashing a nuclear war are alien to the basic principles of Soviet politics. X

On the other hand, it is significant that all US administrations, from Truman to Reagan, have declared their commitment to deterrence. But in terms of actual military planning the recommendations of the American theoreticians are put into practice quite differently. Thus the theoreticians talk about retaliation to a first attack, while the military doctrine of the United States, and of NATO as a whole, is orientated towards a preemptive nuclear strike. The theoreticians talk about the balance of terror, while the political and military leaders strive for military superiority. The theoreticians talk about the political impossibility of a nuclear war, while President Reagan dreams not only about wars on earth, but in outer space as well. In military planning and the practical deployment of its armed forces the United States is primarily concerned to destroy opposing Soviet strategic forces so as to prevent the inevitable retaliation. President Reagan's War Party supplements the strategy of "intimidation" by the doctrine of conducting a nuclear war, should deterrence not work and a Soviet nuclear attack become a reality. The fallaciousness and absurdity of this is obvious. The threat of nuclear war emanates only from the ultra-reactionary groups among



the American ruling class. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has pledged itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and is committed to a similar obligation in respect of conventional warfare. The military doctrine of the USSR is totally defensive in character. The Soviet leadership has frequently and unambiguously condemned the idea of the acceptability of a nuclear war. The doctrine of conducting a nuclear war is aimed at upsetting the military and strategic balance. The War Party members now talk about what they call reliable deterrence, which is in fact only a mask to cover their own policy of increasing the nuclear danger and justify their own adventurist policies. Washington is trying to bring about a situation in which it can impose a one-sided intimidation—which to all intents and purposes amounts to nuclear blackmail—so as to force the Soviet Union and other states to make concessions.

Aggressive and reactionary circles in the United States have always looked upon nuclear war as an instrument of furthering their own policy and they continue to believe that political goals can be achieved by the use of nuclear pressure. [The USSR, on the other hand, despite what the transatlantic strategists have to say to the contrary, has consistently implemented a policy of peaceful coexistence and averting the threat of a nuclear holocaust, of war. Peaceful coexistence is a multifaceted process.] It implies both competition and cooperation, it is both a condition of class struggle and a means of achieving compromise. Peaceful coexistence in a nuclear world is the only reasonable and realistic way for mankind divided as it is to continue its existence. The point is that a nuclear war would be far worse than even those wars that had irreparably tragic consequences for whole nations. A nuclear war would threaten not only the existence of individual countries and whole continents, but the entire human race. Nuclear missiles, which by their very nature are weapons of mass destruction, cannot be directed against a government, a class or a

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social system of a country. They destroy the life-support systems in their entirety, and to think otherwise is to be grossly mistaken.

The Soviet Union rejects the false strategy of intimidation and its variation, deterrence, believing rather in the constructive and positive principle of a military and strategic balance of power and equal security. This today is the fundamental principle of preserving peace and security throughout the world. Balance of power is not an aim in itself, but a means of averting war. It means the potential capability of delivering the kind of retaliation to aggression as would make an aggressor to abstain from committing that aggression in the first place. The aim is then to maintain this balance at a gradually reduced level so that the balance itself becomes a major precondition of disarmament, because balance that is maintained at an ever increasing level is ultimately fraught with the danger of war. In the historical perspective, of course, thinking in terms of any balance of power is fruitless. The process of building up arms has its own limits and it is these which can be particularly clearly seen today. The only way to avert the threat of war is by political means, by establishing control over weapons, by disarmament and by creating an atmosphere of confidence and cooperation.

The level of the Soviet Armed Forces today is sufficient to demonstrate to the adventurist elements in the United States and NATO that it is fruitless to attempt to decide the historical dispute between the two social systems by military means, or to count on profiting at the expense of the socialist community. It is the policy of the United States to "intimidate the USSR by threatening to punish it". So there is no question of containment or deterrence, it is pure intimidation, an attempt to hold the Sword of Damocles over the Soviet Union. And this "threat of punishment" must obviously be backed up by "enforcement", which today means all-level military (i. e. nuclear) superiority together with global

political domination. In its relationship with the United States the Soviet Union is committed to genuine "containment", i. e. preventing aggressive American circles from resorting to the use of military force to bring pressure to bear on the socialist world. In essence this Soviet "containment" is directed towards averting war. Therefore the practical military potential of the Soviet Union acquires considerable significance in restricting the aggressive forces of the US and NATO. Of course there has to be mutual recognition that both sides are capable of doing "unacceptable damage" to each other in the event of a nuclear war. But this does not mean that the Soviet Union is accepting the position of a hostage and is thus deprived of any initiative, even should the demand be made for its unconditional surrender.

The historical experience of the USSR and the frequent attacks that have been made on it from the West show that it can rely on no rational behaviour or "goodwill" from potential enemies. Furthermore, it is equally sceptical of such concepts as reciprocity, since it sees neither sufficient historical evidence nor current practical actions in US policy to believe that it can depend on them one iota for its security. The idea of reciprocity is also doubtful for the fact that, while continuing to declare their commitment to "*mutual* guaranteed destruction", ruling circles in the United States have in fact been conducting an arms race aimed at increasing their own counter-capabilities with the development of such systems as MX, Trident 2 and improvements in the medium-range missiles deployed in Europe which are capable of delivering a pre-emptive strike. Thus the only side that is "guaranteed destruction" is the Soviet Union.

As the Prague Political Declaration, which was adopted in January 1983 by the Warsaw Treaty member states, and other disarmament proposals show, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries as a whole offer a genuine alternative to the doctrine of

intimidation. What this essentially amounts to is setting up a structure for international relations that would be based on the principles of collective security and peaceful coexistence and not on the threat of military force, and that would prepare the ultimate dissolution of all military alliances.

The subject of this book is the American war machine, its evolution and its interconnection with politics. It considers the historical, ideological and political traditions that have influenced the formation of this war machine in the United States, the mechanisms of its functioning and laws governing its development. Particular attention is given to the way in which the US war machine is modified and prepared for the use of nuclear weapons against the USSR and the elaboration of the corresponding nuclear strategy.

## *Chapter I*

### **The Traditions of American Hegemonism and Their Role in Forming the Theory and Practice of US Militarism**

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#### **1. The Historical and Ideological Traditions of American Hegemonism**

Militarism, that is the cult of force and violence, on which the most aggressive imperialist circles in the United States rely, rests on definite historical and ideological traditions. The degree to which the various members or groups within the ruling elite subscribe to these traditions depends on whether they belong to the aggressive or the moderate trends in politics. Throughout American political history it is the more aggressive schools of thought and, of course, the policies based on them that have dominated the ruling class. Those periods that have been marked by adaptation to the realities of the international situation due to a degree of understanding of the new correlation of forces between socialism and capitalism and recognition of the role of the nuclear factor in politics have been rather the exception. Even the more realistically minded members of the ruling class have never completely renounced the position of strength policy, particularly in relations with the USSR, or given up trying to change the balance of strength in their own favour by enlarging their military capabilities.

These fluctuations in policy have only served to weaken the position of the more realistically minded members of the ruling elite in clashes with the more aggres-

sive factions, which hiding behind the phraseology of so-called true Americanism have often come out on top due to their reliance on the chauvinist mentality of a certain section of the American public and their interpreting historical events in such a way as to further inflame this nationalistic mood. Their views on questions of war and peace have gradually ousted those of the more realistic politicians, forcing them to take a back seat, especially at times when the more militant factions have been in power in the White House. The distinctive feature of this political thinking is the refusal to recognize the objective realities of the world we live in and the desire to change them to their own advantage. It amounts to an extremely subjective view of the world, seeing it in an inverted image in which the desirable is taken for the actual.

It needs to be stressed that the senseless and adventurous policy of these most aggressive forces of imperialism and their militarist ideology are directly linked with the historical and ideological traditions of American hegemonism. As Lenin noted " 'world domination' is, to put it briefly, the substance of imperialist policy of which imperialist war is the continuation".<sup>1</sup> Obviously the specific historical circumstances of our age give different colouring to the traditional hegemonism, but they do not alter its essence. Furthermore, attempts to adapt hegemonism to the realities of our times only serve to emphasise its complete incompatibility with those times, i. e. that it is a hopeless anachronism.

Hegemonist policy has always been the source of international conflicts and wars: this after all is the essence of Lenin's remark to the effect that an imperialist war is engendered basically by the desire for world domination. But it goes further than that. While imperialism was dominant in world politics, the clashes between the great powers prompted by hegemonism were considered more or less the norm in international relations. The desire to subjugate or control other states and peoples and to

impose limitations on their equal rights and a sovereign freedom to choose their own political system and carry on their own social development were all organically part of the theory and practice of hegemonism. But today, the situation in the world has changed. "The time has come," said A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, "for all states ... to take an unambiguous position in relation to hegemonism, to condemn it and to prevent any, even the slightest moves towards it anywhere in the world. It should be a principle that is inflexibly observed that hegemonism is something that is not to be tolerated."<sup>2</sup>

That hegemonism is incompatible with the realities of the present world can nowhere be seen more clearly than through the example of the hegemonist aspirations of American imperialism. And here it is important to realize first, the historical roots and characteristics of American hegemonism and, secondly, the extremely aggressive and extensive character of its pretensions and practices today.

The traditions of American hegemonism are not only and not so much a matter of purely academic interest. They are in every sense of the word living history whose lessons affect us today. The two centuries in which the American state has been in existence are literally permeated with the desire for expansion and territorial gain, for domination and for economic, political, military and even cultural superiority. And as a kind of ideological common denominator there is the myth of American exclusiveness, the idea that the United States has almost the moral right to rule over other countries.

Though throughout American history specific political aims and methods have changed, the basic desire for world hegemony has remained. And behind it have always been uncritical glorification in the country's strength and willingness to use it, even without any justi-

fication. Thus the only limitation of the United States' hegemonistic aspirations has been its strength itself, or to be more precise, the understanding and evaluation of its strength given by the theoreticians and practical exponents of American expansion.

Only their occasional failures have forced the American global strategists to take a more sober view of their capabilities and the realities of the international situation. But the basic trend to hegemony and world domination has remained unchanged and always managed to appear among each generation of American politicians. And its cult which has lasted two centuries is felt just as strongly today.

What then are the characteristics of US hegemonism that predetermine its present-day aspect? The answer to this question is particularly important because the traditions of hegemonism are closely linked with the whole history of American capitalism, in which the classic writers of Marxism-Leninism saw—and gave sound scientific grounding for their conclusion—the fullest and clearest manifestation of the laws of capitalist development, particularly at its imperialist stage.

It is of course common enough for the most varied "arguments" to be put forward in support and justification of the desire for hegemony. For example, the United States justifies itself as being a model of social and economic development, of democracy, of a peace-loving nation and of respect to other nations (supposedly for the fact that it never took part in the colonial plunder which all the other great powers engaged in). It also justifies itself with a whole lot of moralistic "arguments", including the semi-mystical messianic ideas of America's "predestination" and "preordainment". "Americans have long understood themselves as having a mission to save the world,"<sup>3</sup> was how the American sociologist, Peter Berger, put it. According to the well-known American historian, Henry Commager, Americans have always cherished the belief that they live in the best



of all possible worlds.

Here it is worth noting that this kind of moralizing led in practice at home to the McCarthy witch hunts and abroad to Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, which masked behind a moralistic façade a shameless programme for US world domination. The vitality of the messianic tradition can be seen in the comparatively recent experience of McCarthyism and the very recent "human rights campaign", when the United States took it upon itself to pose as the "moral gendarme" of the world. As the American writer, James Petras noted in this connection: "The 'new morality' is not new, the morality is not consequential. The purpose is to consolidate US hegemony...."<sup>4</sup>

Hegemonist aspirations, including territorial expansion, have characterized all stages of American history. In his article, *Empire Begins at Home* American scholar, Walter Lafeber writes with complete justification (i.e. with the destruction of the Indians and the enslavement of the Negroes) that "since its birth ... the United States has been an interventionist power".<sup>5</sup> US expansion began the moment the country won international recognition and expansionist plans virtually preceded the Declaration of Independence.

In fact, when the founding fathers of the American state were discussing the Declaration of Independence, armed American units were heading north to subdue neighbouring Canada. In 1803 the United States doubled its territory with the acquisition of Louisiana. And expansion was always achieved through force of arms. Against the legend of "peaceful development" one can quote the findings of American researchers who list 114 wars the United States fought in the 19th century alone, including the war with Mexico (1846-1848), which resulted in the United States annexing two-thirds of Mexican territory.

And yet territorial seizure is only one aspect of US hegemonist aspirations. Claims to world domination,

and at the time this meant primarily rivalry with Britain which then "ruled the waves", drove the United States first to look to the Pacific to make it an inland lake, and only later to the Atlantic. The seizure of the Hawaiian Islands and the Philippines followed as a matter of course and the war with Spain in 1898 made the US the first country that was openly beginning to struggle for the redivision of an already divided world.

The most militant proponent of the ideology of US world domination at the time was Admiral Alfred Mahan, who wrote fiercely in support of building up US naval power as an instrument of furthering foreign policy. His idea that "ruling the waves" meant ruling the world was embodied in the building of the largest navy in the world that was capable of seizing control of any ocean.

It should be added here that some decades later the American hegemonists were just as enthusiastic about what might be called the "twin" of this aggressive military doctrine, i. e. the theory of aerial warfare which in the United States is linked with the name of General William Mitchell, who believed that the use of aviation as a weapon of attack could only be effective on a world scale. It is hardly necessary to add that this idea outlived its author to become the cornerstone of the US military doctrine adopted immediately after the Second World War. Thus whereas Pax Britannica was based on the destroyer, Pax Americana depended on the bomber.

And a bomber today means a strategic nuclear bomber, the destructive potential of which has warmed up old hegemonist ambitions which appear to be boundless when one considers the number of military bases, the development of more and more weapons of mass destruction and the formation of military blocs all over the world. Much hope was placed on the technical competence of the armed forces,<sup>6</sup> i. e. the quantity and effectiveness of the weapons. Equally characteristic were the ideas on the use of military force which were clearly

stated by the US military leaders with respect to the war in Vietnam. They "were committed to the notion that the only way to win the war was to kill a sufficient number of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers and that every other goal must yield place to this one".<sup>7</sup>

It must also be realized that US hegemonist policy has never been limited to just using military force, although it, of course, plays the major role. US foreign policy is also put to the service of its desire for world domination. Clear testimony to this can be seen in the formula "dollar diplomacy" that was introduced by President Taft. Probably no one expressed its aims more frankly than the American hegemonists themselves, who declared that the Americans would be the first nation in history not only to create grandiose enterprises in the sphere of financial control but also to strive at the same time for absolute military domination on land, sea and air.

The facts of American history refute one of the most tenacious myths of the imperialist apologists, which claims that the United States never took part in colonial plunder. At the turn of the century the American historian, Foster Rhea Dulles, noted that the United States had always censured imperialism, while at the same time creating its own empire.

The US imperialists first tried to carry out their global plans after the First World War. Perhaps their most characteristic feature was their rabid anti-Sovietism. The US imperialists directed their main thrust against Bolshevism, being ready to literally tear the new Soviet Republic into shreds and separate Russia from the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Baltic States, the Caucasus, the Crimea and Central Asia. More than 12,000 American marines tried to implant American "ideals" on Soviet territory right up until 1920.

This attempt was repeated again but with incomparably more ardour in the course of and after the Second World War. After 1945 the military and political

leadership in the United States openly pursued a policy of hegemonism and total confrontation with the socialist countries. Furthermore, they reconsidered their own role in governing their own country and with it, of course, the importance of the military-bureaucratic apparatus. The rising cost of global expansion (from 1 per cent of the GNP before the war to 5-13 per cent during the postwar period) led to important changes. USCIB-2  
First, the idea of national defence was replaced by the all-embracing aggressive doctrine of national security. DPR

An essential part of this doctrine is the concept of vital interests. American bourgeois politologists include in this category those interests which the United States is ready to defend with the use of military force up to and including a full-scale war.<sup>8-9</sup> But among them there are certain differences of opinion as to what should be considered US vital interests. Here, according to Bernard Brodie, there is complete arbitrariness of choice depending on which administration is in power at a given moment.<sup>10</sup> This arbitrariness results from the fact that the category of vital interests includes a wide range of issues that essentially reflect the global aspirations of American imperialism to world domination. But although these so-called vital interests are an integral part of the doctrine of national security as such, in most cases they are not directly related to anything connected with security. The fact is that they simply embody the imperialist ambitions of the United States. Strictly speaking, vital interests in international relations are those which affect the life and security of a state, particularly security against military attack. That, at any rate, is the way the concept of vital interests is regarded by countries that have no aggressive designs. DCE

But a state that is ready to commit acts of aggression enlarges its understanding of vital interests. The United States arbitrarily invents and interprets threats to its security. Furthermore, these threats lie far beyond that country's geographical borders, and as a rule have

no direct bearing whatsoever on its security. The United States has accorded itself the right to interpret the concept of security on a supposedly legal basis as something over and above national defence. It is interesting to note that this attitude to other countries began to be formed during the Second World War. It developed from the blatantly hegemonist formula: "Though we will not insist that the world around us be entirely to our liking, neither are we inclined to accept anything considerably worse than need be if our efforts can prevent it."<sup>11</sup> Such is the enlarged interpretation of the doctrine of national security—to arbitrarily demand conditions that are considered "acceptable" by the US.

Gradually the whole of Washington's foreign policy has begun to be justified by the needs of security, which are in fact of a frankly expansionist nature. In January 1950 the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson defined in a speech made in New York the perimeter of US defence, which included large areas of the world considered to fall within the vital interests of the United States. President Lyndon Johnson was the third president who considered the outcome of the war in Vietnam to be vitally important for the United States. At the end of his period in office Jimmy Carter added to the two vitally important strategic zones of Europe and the Far East a third, the Persian Gulf. Thus the American hegemonists completed their carve-up of the world in the name of those same notorious vital interests.

When the United States became leader of the capitalist world after the Second World War, it spent some time in creating an additional "stability reserve" (in the military sense), i. e. a bid for military supremacy. This was aimed not only against the Soviet Union, although aggression against that country took prime importance. In the context of US vital interests and its policy of hegemony, military superiority was needed with respect to absolutely everyone.

The variations and practical attempts to implement the obsessive idea of a Pax Americana, i. e. the formation of a world empire with its centre in Washington, were dismissed one after another and then revitalized whenever the powers that be in America believed they were strong enough to reshape the world to their own advantage. But these attempts, whether they were in the jungles of Indochina, or in the Bay of Pigs, when the CIA attempted an unsuccessful invasion of Cuba in a bid to crush the national liberation movement there, have all ended in utter failure.

Being an anachronism from the point of view of international politics today, hegemonism not only has not been written off, but rather still continues to poison the minds of influential circles in the United States, and that poison is the more dangerous the more sophisticated modern weapons become.

Today that danger is primarily determined by nuclear weapons, the catastrophic effects of which for mankind and for civilization itself the hegemonists, blinded as they are by anti-communism, are inclined to grossly undervalue.

This kind of flippant attitude towards nuclear weapons only serves to encourage certain circles in America to adopt a military solution to disputes and conflicts. It builds up an atmosphere of tension and uncertainty and stretches what have become on the basis of international experience, the "permissible boundaries", to include the use of nuclear weapons. In other words, it amounts to gambling on brute force and to being ready to tip the balance of power that exists between the two social systems in favour of capitalism, which in particular means breaking the approximate military and strategic equality between the USSR and the United States. Hence the policy of American imperialism to increase the arms race and the attempts to achieve the military superiority of the United States and NATO so as to impose their diktat and interfere in the affairs of

the socialist countries and other states. As B. N. Ponomarev, Candidate Member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU noted, "the hegemonist 'philosophy' of American imperialism, which serves the interests of the military-industrial complex, is based on the cynical principle that what is necessary or considered necessary for the United States (its so-called vital interests), should be good for everyone else, and those who do not agree can expect to face the military power of the United States together with economic and other forms of pressure".<sup>12</sup>

In both words and deeds the US administration today is dominated by the desire for world hegemony. It is thoroughly imbued with nuclear arrogance. But particularly worrying is the fact that the opponents of detente and the protégés of the military-industrial complex are seriously discussing the possibility of victory in a nuclear war with the Soviet Union and the conditions under which the United States might begin and win such a war. In this context hegemonism has acquired an even more dangerous character.

The new revival of global ambitions among US imperialist circles, which occurred at the beginning of the 1980s, clearly points to the loss of political stability and the reluctance to adapt to the new situation in the world and to the new norms of international relations. As Academician Georgi Arbatov noted in this context, "despite the long period of detente the American ruling class was never able to completely overcome its past global pretensions and the cold war".<sup>13</sup>

Also of importance here are the basic inertia of US political thought and inveterate ideological prejudices and the hegemonist mythology of American "exclusiveness" with its characteristic double standards—on the one hand, the claims to messianism and world supremacy and, on the other, the reluctance which has been firmly inculcated into the man-in-the-street in America to understand the other side, i. e. respect the culture, cus-

toms, social system and national and other traditions of other countries and peoples. In addition to this, there is the powerful influence on anti-communist propaganda stereotypes and cold war psychology. The long years of the cold war left their mark upon the consciousness of many Americans, not only professional politicians. What this amounted to was prejudice, suspicion and reluctance to know the true position of others. This trend became especially strong among those more militant factions, whose class hatred of socialism got the better of their awareness of reality and at times of even their common sense.

The stability of anti-communist propaganda in the forms it assumed during the cold war lies in the fact that it claims to find simple solutions to the complex problems of the present day and that it is literally forced upon Americans. There is no need for them to think or to look for difficult solutions—communism is to blame for all troubles and difficulties. The danger of this kind of logic is obvious even to many sober-minded people in the United States. According to the historian Oliver Clubb, "complex realities in distant societies are viewed through ideological prisms, and are frequently distorted by artificial, prefabricated interpretations that replace objective analysis. Prejudice often rules in the place of experience."<sup>14</sup>

As Carl Marcy, one of the heads of the American Committee on East-West Accord, the organisation that supports detente and the normalization of Soviet-American relations, put it: "Myths grow like weeds; unlike facts, they need no nurturing."<sup>15</sup> These kinds of myths and prejudices include the very widespread "cult of violence" which has long been the source of the jingoist and chauvinist trends in American imperialist politics. As the historian, Stanley Hoffmann stresses, "there is in the land a belief that every event is a test of American will and virility. There is an addiction to a kind of High Noon-style of international diplomacy, a nostalgia for



big sticks and heroic strikes, for a world policed by America's sheriffs or marshalls."<sup>16</sup>

In looking at the root causes of the present move towards hegemonism in the policy of the present US administration and US imperialism as a whole, one cannot help being reminded of Lenin's warning about the susceptibility of reactionary bourgeois forces to military adventurism. The imperialist crusade against detente and the vicious anti-Soviet campaign that has been launched in the United States are simply expressions of irritation and even fear at the strengthening positions of socialism, at the increasing scale of the national liberation struggle, at the success of those forces that support peace and the normalization of the international situation and, finally, at the worsening general crisis of the capitalist system and the weakened position of the United States in the world due to objective conditions.

Certain American writers have expressed the opinion that US foreign policy of the 1980s has turned back to the hegemonist adventurism and militarist intervention of the 1960s. It does, of course, appear that the past is being repeated. But there are also new factors to be taken into consideration. Today, too, the claims to world domination are masked by the myth of the Soviet military threat and the drums of the cold war are beating for more arms and more power to "save the West". "Without enduring American strength, Western civilization will not survive,"<sup>17</sup> proclaimed former Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, a well-known "hawk". Nevertheless, as distinct from the situation in the 1950s and 60s, when at least the attempt was made to mask American diktat by demagogic claims to the effect that it was saving "Western community", paramount importance today is given to the need for the "defence of US national interests".

When the present leaders in Washington use cold war-style anti-communist rhetoric and call for the defence of the "free world" from "international terrorism" and the

"international communist conspiracy", their prime motive is concern for their own interests.

Masking global expansion under the guise of national interests cannot conceal the pernicious nature of the hegemonist policy of US imperialism. Ruling the world may be the imperialists' goal, but it can hardly be a secret that this goal is unattainable, not only because of resistance from other imperialist competitors, but mainly because of the existence of the Soviet Union, the formation of the world socialist system and the rise of the national liberation movement.

Unable to rid itself of this obstacle, the United States is steadily striving in one way or another to get the better of it. It increases the arms race, inflames military conflicts on the perimeter of the socialist world and tries all the time to prove that communism is the main threat to mankind. If tactics of this kind utterly failed during the decade following the war, then it is obvious that they are pointless now.

Essentially all ideological manoeuvres of this kind are designed to distract attention from those aspects of the present strategy employed by US imperialism in its bid for world supremacy that are really new.

First, this clearly reveals an increase in the pressure exerted on America's West European allies and the desire to trample on them, to force them to show "Atlantic solidarity", to get them to join in the anti-Soviet campaign and with their aid to pose as world leaders. There is considerable doubt expressed in Western Europe today about the need for the United States to play a leading role, about the competence and consistency of its policy and about its ability to understand its allies, let alone its enemies. More and more people there are coming to believe that the United States is intolerant, unwilling to hear objections and ready to see every West-European as a potential deserter. When NATO was formed over thirty years ago, there seemed to be no doubt among the allies as to America's leadership. But now they are by no

means willing to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of what is demanded of them by their senior partner. The response to these changes by imperialist circles in the US is increased pressure to make them fall in line with Washington's policy.

Since hopes for substantial aid from the allies in resurrecting the Pax Americana are continually frowned upon by the US allies despite strict injunctions from across the Atlantic to be more "compliant", the American imperialists are for ever looking for new support.

Secondly, the present round of the struggle for world hegemony is characterized by the fact that more and more new obstacles, particularly in the field of economics, are forever getting in the way. During the 1970s the belief became generally held in the West that the solution to the acute economic crisis in the United States and throughout the world was impossible if the arms race was going to continue contrary to the spirit of detente. But the present American leadership decided in the face of these problems to choose another way, which was both anti-social and contrary to the interests of the people, by calling on the latter to "tighten their belts" and put up with all the sacrifices that the drive for world leadership entailed. Obviously, these appeals to accept sacrifice were primarily directed to the American working people, who were asked to bear the heavy burden of military expenditure and who for this reason were made to fear a mythical "Soviet military threat".

All these considerations brought out with particular emphasis the inappropriateness and fruitlessness of American imperialist aspirations and the whole force of the danger which they present today. The more imperialism loses its ability to dominate other countries and peoples, the more furious is the reaction of the aggressive and the short-sighted. Therefore it is enormously important today to uncompromisingly expose and struggle for the eradication of all manifestations of the chronic illness of American hegemonism in international relations.

## 2. The Development of Military and Political Thought and Militarist Ideology in the United States

The traditions of hegemonism considered above have always played an extremely important role in the formation of American military and political thought and militarist ideology. The exposure of this role is a matter of great scientific and political significance. The point is that in American historiography and propaganda considerable effort has been made to conceal the real nature of military and political doctrine and distort military history. To this end on the one hand certain myths have been cultivated that are designed to show the attitude of bourgeois America to war and peace in a favourable light; on the other, attempts are made to intimidate America's opponents by representing that country as an omnipotent giant before whose power they can do nothing but tremble.

Most common among these myths are the following: that before the Second World War the United States showed little interest in strategic problems and the military and political leadership of the country was largely "ignorant" of such matters; that American strategic thought over the last twenty years has been characterized by excessive theorizing; that the Americans do not know when their country is really in danger; that the Americans avoid thinking in peacetime in military terms; that the government leaders do not allow political considerations to interfere in the course of war; that the American approach to strategy is straightforward, i. e. they use no tricks, disinformation or deception to win a war, but only strictly military means; that the principles governing their conduct of a war are based primarily on technological factors; that the military leaders are not overly bellicose or brutal in their conduct of war; and that strategic matters are considered in absolute terms, i. e. as to whether they would lead to victorious conclu-

sion of a conflict, or to the reverse.<sup>18</sup>

Frequent attempts have been made in American historiography to represent the United States as a peace-loving country to which the European tradition of military strategy is alien.<sup>19</sup> This of course is purely to disguise the aggressive character of the US war machine and hide the fact that enormous time and effort is expended upon developing new military conceptions and theories. For example, an enormous number of books have been published in the United States on military strategy, including such major works as: **Military Art and Science** (1846), **Modern Warfare: Its Art and Science** (1860), **The Influence of Sea Power upon History. 1660-1783** (1890), **Principles of Strategy** (1906), **The Fundamentals of Military Strategy** (1928) and **Strategy** (1928).

These works played a considerable role in forming the military thinking of a whole generation of military and civilian leaders in the United States,<sup>20</sup> although their authors (Walter Halleck, E. B. Hunt, John Bigelow, G. J. Fiebeger, Oliver Robinson and George Meyer) are less well known than European theoreticians like Ferdinand Foch, Julian Corbett and General von der Goltz. The most prominent US military strategists who have noticeably affected the thinking of the military and political elite of their time are Alexander Hamilton, Alfred Mahan and William Mitchell.

Contemporary American strategic thought has traversed a highly distinctive, complex and contradictory path. Its evolution has been affected by circumstances both of an objective and subjective nature that resulted from the historical development of the country and in particular from the fact that the United States, as the classics of Marxism-Leninism were frequently wont to point out, had virtually no knowledge of feudalism developing from its very beginning as a bourgeois society. And this could not but reflect upon the military thinking of the American leaders. Furthermore, their military

and political outlook was formed at a time when it was necessary to oppose the European monarchies and defend the republic. Also important is the fact that the United States grew up surrounded by "big oceans and weak neighbours".<sup>21</sup>

Four main stages can be traced in the evolution of American military thought corresponding to particular events in the country's history. The first runs from the formation of the United States to the Civil War, one of the first wars in which massive armies fought to achieve broad, cardinal objectives instead of limited objectives with the use of limited means. The second stretched from the end of the Civil War to the Spanish-American war, led with the aim of recarving the world, and the annexation of the Philippines (1899-1901). The third covered the activation of US imperialism in the Western Hemisphere and the country's participation in two world wars. The fourth began from the development of nuclear weapons and was characterized by a change to a policy of world domination and global hegemony.

Even before the Second World War a broad conglomerate of persons representing the most aggressive imperialist circles, the military and the academic community which served their interests had begun to develop the fundamentals of modern militarist ideology. This ideology embraced not only the military sphere, but the socio-economic sphere as well and even penetrated the cultural life of American society. The ruling elite who espoused the ideas of militarism and helped combine different parts of the military mechanisms into a single war machine believed that it was just this that could create the image of the United States as a "great power". The very fact of the existence of a vast military force was, in their opinion, the best evidence for the ability of the state to play an important, even major role in international affairs. By spending a considerable amount of the country's resources on stockpiling armaments the United States demonstrated its ability and readiness to fulfil its

mission in the world.

It is noteworthy that the summit of US strategic thinking was the doctrine of national security, which lay at the foundations of the country's global strategy in the postwar period.<sup>22</sup> The role of this doctrine in American global strategy has been growing continuously. It determines the choice of ways and means to ensure the global interests of the American rulers in times of both war and peace. Under the pretext of concern for the interests of other states it masks an aggressive imperialist policy. By its very design it interacts closely with military doctrine, functioning largely as the connecting link between the latter and foreign policy. The whole of the country's security system rests, as it were, on this doctrine<sup>23</sup> and it aids in the planning and adoption of important government decisions on foreign policy and the use of military force.

After the Second World War a military doctrine was needed in the United States which would justify the stake the country had placed on achieving world domination and hegemonism by rolling back socialism with the aid of military force. Therefore ruling circles in the United States mobilized their propaganda machine for the mass indoctrination of the American public with the ideas of militarism. As a result there was an avalanche of militarist literature surpassing anything in the Kaiser's or Hitler's Germany. This literature, of course, concealed the real causes of war, the fact that wars are rooted in the very nature of imperialism, in inter-imperialist rivalry and in the desire to crush socialism by force.

All these trends were embodied in the doctrine of national security, which was formulated in an Act passed in 1947 and defined as "the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security".<sup>24</sup> A supplementary clause to the 1947 Act in-

structed the National Security Council to "assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith...."<sup>25</sup> In this way a doctrine, which made military force the component of national security, was given the force of law.

The idea of those who drew up the Act, in particular Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal, was not simply to allow the military to influence foreign policy, but to wholly subordinate it to considerations of a military nature.<sup>26</sup> Foreign policy was left with the task of determining the scale and forms in which military force was to be used, for in a class society force exists for political purposes, it is not a neutral entity.<sup>27</sup> In the final analysis, the doctrine of national security which still determines US policy established the special role of military force as the central and continually active factor in foreign policy.<sup>28</sup>

Extensive literature has been published in the United States on matters of national security. And yet there is still no agreed definition of this concept. The point is that the 1947 National Security Act only set out the essential characteristics and contours of the doctrine. Furthermore, after the war the meaning of national security was continually enlarged as the imperial ambitions of American ruling circles expanded.

The current understanding of this concept in the United States amounts to this: national security is a policy of territorial defence not only against enemy attack, but also of "protection" "of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state".<sup>29</sup> The increasing economic and political independence of the developing countries and their striving for equal economic relations with the West has, as American scholars note, given a new dimension to the definition of national security. This dimension



amounts, in their opinion, to the special need at the present time to guarantee the principles of free trade and ensure an easy access to energy and raw material sources.

The greater role played by the economic factor in the concept of national security is due, according to American politologists, to the emerging problem of the country's economic vulnerability from abroad which in turn results from the dependence of the industrially developed capitalist countries on raw materials. They claim that the required level of production can only be guaranteed through unlimited access to the raw materials which are for the most part found in four regions of the world: Latin America, the Middle East, a part of Africa, and the southwest of the Pacific Ocean. According to the prevalent assessment in Washington, the greatest danger to American values lies today not only in the "ill intentions" of the Soviet Union, but in the situation of political instability which obtains in many regions of the developing world. These "new realities" have meant, in particular, that the Persian Gulf has become equal in strategic importance to Western Europe.

This, however, does not mean that the new economic dimension has replaced the more traditional elements of security, like military force. The inclusion of economic factors in the concept of national security is now broadly accepted among ruling and academic circles. In respect of the vital interests, which today refer to mainly economic interests, the current doctrine of national security is essentially directed against the whole world. The arbitrary enlargement of the sphere of US vital interests means that the Americans are ready to use force for their defence.<sup>30</sup>

The doctrine of national security gave paramount importance to military force among the means guaranteeing the security of the United States. Not that the cult of military force was a new phenomenon there—it was the direct result of American militarism,<sup>31</sup> which underwent its fullest development under imperialism. Contemporary militarism is blatantly counterrevolutionary and reactionary in essence. Today it is directed primarily

against existing socialism and the forces of social progress and national liberation.

We have already mentioned above that the myth of the "lack of strategic knowledge" on the part of the US military and political leadership is very far from reality. Until the end of the Second World War the United States did indeed have no independent "national security policy" based on clearly formulated interdependent objectives, the achievement of which could be affected through the coordination of military and non-military means. But at that time strategy was conceptually divorced from politics in the majority of capitalist countries. However, this separation was not characteristic of US policy in the Caribbean or in Latin America as a whole, where they tried to combine crude military pressure with political flirtation.

Highly influential in the formation of the military and political thinking of the US rulers was the book published in 1914 by Edward Mead Earle and entitled **Makers of Modern Strategy**. However, it tended to reduce American strategic thought to just a few authors, completely ignoring dozens of others who had concerned themselves with this subject since 1846.

The traditional American approach to questions of strategy is very similar to the European—even more so than is usually believed. As in the other Western countries, American writers on strategy were mainly professional soldiers, and like their counterparts in Europe they tended to look at strategy more from the technocratic and historical point of view than from the purely theoretical. As in other countries, strategy as an independent subject of study was ignored since most American scholars were of the opinion that military leaders were insufficiently trained to make the necessary level of analysis. Nevertheless, although American writers were not in the forefront of strategic thinkers, the United States did not lag far behind in this sphere. Indeed, they had a number of first-class military reformers and thinkers like Rear-Admiral Stephen

Luce and Major-General Emory Upton.\*

As for the theoretical problems of military strategy, it was always professional soldiers who dominated the field, their arguments and conclusions being in the final analysis conclusive. Of course, they were joined by the civilian strategists who, like the military, reflected the interests of the ruling class. But their task was to "enrich" the purely military approach with the tools of their analytical thinking and to create a certain balance between this purely military understanding of a situation and its political evaluation. Ultimately they were there to improve the ways and means by which the objectives of American foreign policy could be achieved.

A notable role in the development of military and political thought in the United States was played by the think tanks and the universities. It was during the Second World War that American scientists first began the extensive study of military matters, particularly such new lines as creation and use of strategic bombers. Scientists participated in determining the choice of objectives and in working out ways to break through the enemy's anti-aircraft defences. Towards the end of the war the prestige of the scientists, particularly the physicists, rose with the making of the atomic bomb. It was this which convinced Chief of the Army Air Force General Henry Arnold of the necessity to maintain permanent contact with the scientific world so that the latter could aid the Army in achieving its tactical and strategic objectives. The Americans were also influenced by scientific developments in Hitler's Germany, which they believed in many cases to be technologically superior to their own, partic-

\*However, as often happens in military history, those who were gifted as teachers turned out to be poor practitioners. Thus Walter Halleck, author of *Military Art and Science*, which was the first American book on the principles of strategy, was a very mediocre general on the battlefield. Likewise Admiral Alfred Mahan, who was given an unsatisfactory recommendation for his command of the cruiser *Chicago*, became well-known only after he began teaching at the naval college.

ularly in relation to the invention of the jet engine. In fact, if the latter had been used in fighters instead of bombers, as Hitler demanded, the Anglo-American air assault could have been completely smashed.<sup>32</sup>

The first and most influential of the think tanks was the RAND Corporation set up by the Air Force high command. This was followed by a whole network of consultative organizations, which were largely funded by the Department of Defence. In recent years these consultative organizations have developed into training centres for non-military strategists who often go on to hold high posts in the Department of Defence.

The research centres at a number of American universities also undertake government contracts, but as distinct from the consultative organizations mentioned above they openly publish their findings for any one who wishes to read them. The first of these centres, which were set up at Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University and Princeton University, cooperated closely with the military establishment, particularly professional soldiers.

With the growth of the anti-war movement in the university campuses during the 1960s these centres often criticized military policy and even broke contracts with the Pentagon. During the 1970s they began to issue a series of research publications, financed by the Ford Foundation, on arms control. But at the same time a number of other universities like Georgetown, Miami and Stanford continued to publish studies supposedly proving the inevitability of a conflict with the Soviet Union and the importance of a continuous arms build-up.

As time went by the staff of many universities were given important posts in just those departments of the administration that were responsible for military and strategic matters. The request then came out from the military to make significant increases in the number of non-military disciplines taught at the military colleges, inasmuch as it had grown continually fewer since the 1960s.<sup>33</sup>

The think tanks, the University centres and the various lobbyist organizations represent a kind of superstructure over the military-industrial complex through which campaigns are organized and undertaken in support of an aggressive and chauvinistic foreign policy and of greater appropriations for military purposes. And this superstructure suffers from no lack of funds, while the lobbyist groups are well organized and usually achieve their desired goals in the Defence Department and Congress.

A distinctive characteristic of the lobbyist groups is the enormous access they have to information, including secret information on military and political matters, which they largely receive from the appropriate branch of the armed forces. The lobbyists themselves tend to be comprised of reserve officers, veterans and representatives of military and industrial circles. As a rule they play a leading role in public debates on military and strategic problems and publish and disseminate numerous books, brochures and pamphlets.<sup>34</sup>

Alongside the openly militarist organizations that are part of the military-industrial complex and functioning as it were parallel to them, there exist groups of another kind which frequently oppose the extremism of the "hawks". In current American political jargon these are known as the "doves". Essentially they are bourgeois-liberal organizations, which contain a large number of realistically minded members of the ruling class who are continually looking for ways to adapt to the new realities of the world. The contradictory nature of the line pursued by these groups, as distinct from the lobbyists of the military-industrial complex that bow down to the cult of military force, lies in the fact that, while they cannot bring themselves to renounce the traditional military methods of struggle against the Soviet Union, they draw back from extremism in fear of a nuclear catastrophe. These "doves" support arms control, but they are doubtful about the idea of disarmament.

In principle they support detente, but they are incon-

sistent, for under pressure from the right they are often ready to retreat from their positions. It must be stressed that these groups represent a concentration of high intellectual potential, considerably higher than that which exists among the right, but this potential is frequently used ineffectively. Before Reagan came to power the military and industrial complex used to claim that the "doves" were running the whole federal government. But now the fire of the right has been concentrated against those activities of the liberals, which cast doubt on the militarist programme of the present administration, its high military expenditure and its policy of increasing the arms race. Among those groups and organizations that fall foul of the Conservatives and the right wing there are a number of religious groups that support peace and even such organizations as the United Nations Association, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Ford Foundation, the Atlantic Council, the Federation of American Scientists and the Arms Control Association. A number of reactionary newspapers in California, the South and the Middle West also conduct a struggle against the liberals; these frequently use retired army officers as special commentators to discredit the critics of the military establishment as being incompetent to pass judgement on military matters.

In addition the high-ranking military frequently criticize the non-military strategists. For instance, the opinion is often expressed that if the RAND Corporation, the Hudson Institute and the whole "think-tank industry" were eliminated, many strategic problems would be eliminated with them. At the same time the military and political leadership of the United States considers that "whatever grain of truth there may be in this argument, it is heavily outweighed by the palpable fact that the use and threat of military force will continue to exercise the attention of governments for the foreseeable future. Strategy will continue to be a deadly business, demanding considerable attention from those responsible for or

interested in the security of nations. And academic strategists will remain one of the few defences against the complete domination of military thinking by the professional specialists in violence."<sup>35</sup>

Some Western writers claim that the United States has never been sufficiently clear about its real strategic interests and reacts belatedly to threats against its security. American history, however, shows that the ruling class in the United States has, on the contrary, always striven to achieve overkill in the matter of its security interests.

In the 19th century the United States, being surrounded by oceans and having no serious opponents on its borders, possessed unprecedented security among other sovereign states. But even then the country's rulers raised the alarm,<sup>36</sup> which was in fact only a mask to hide their desire to maintain at any price the state of super-security through extending their spheres of influence and domination which they believed was the best guarantee of this security. The wish to maintain the privileged position of the United States in the world was both the incentive and the justification for the US government's pursuit of a policy of unlimited expansion.

West European scholars have revealed the tendency on the part of US imperialism to belittle its own interest in the affairs of other regions of the world, showing Latin America as an example. In fact Washington has always jealously guarded its interests in the Western Hemisphere and is extremely sensitive about attempts to affect the position of American imperialism in that area.

Let us stress once more that the entry of the United States into the era of imperialism and the development of capitalism on American soil determined from the very beginning the attitude of that country to events in the outside world. The year 1890 brought great changes into the consciousness of the American ruling class. President Theodore Roosevelt, for example, characterized the Spanish-American War in Cuba in 1898 as a "beauti-

ful little war", and this was a war that was of a blatantly imperialist character.

The point is that in 1890 the director of the Bureau of the Census reported to the administration that there was no more free land available in the West of the United States. The frontier had closed. Three years later, in 1893 an American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, read a paper to the Historical Association entitled the "Frontier in American History", which was to influence a whole generation of American historians; in it, Turner tried to find the roots of the American national character. However, he ignored the social and political factors of capitalist development in the United States, considering only geographical characteristics to be determinant. According to Turner, the abundance of free and cheap land and its continued presence in the West together with the long period involved in occupying this land were the most important factors conditioning the way the American people thought and its attitude to political and social institutions and military problems.

What this American military thinking amounted to can be clearly seen in a note from Secretary of State Richard Olney, to Robert Salisbury in July 1895, which well expressed the "new temper of a continental power which was now actually flexing its muscles", as was noted in a work devoted to the US attitude to wars on foreign territory.<sup>37</sup> This note to Salisbury announced to the whole world: "Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."<sup>38</sup>

The 1890s are the key to the understanding of American interventionism and power diplomacy. The war with Spain in 1898 ended in the latter's defeat, but this only meant that one colonial power was replaced by another—the United States. The subsequent Treaty of Paris brought the United States Puerto-Rico, Guam and the Philippines making it now a colonial power. In 1904 President Theodore Roosevelt made an amendment



(later known as the Roosevelt Amendment) to the Monroe Doctrine, according to which the United States had the right to act as an international gendarme if it were considered necessary to prevent European interference in the American sphere of interests. This amendment was invoked in particular to justify US intervention in Santo Domingo and it is characteristic that the European powers did not even question the USA's right to do it.

During the 1890s two important changes took place in Washington's understanding of the United States' role in the world. In the first place US imperialist interests and its, so to speak, preoccupation with events in the world, particularly those of an economic character, dictated that that country should maintain a continuous "presence". Secondly, the United States was becoming increasingly involved in world politics and more actively proclaiming its so-called "global responsibilities". Thus the Roosevelt Amendment was both an economic and a strategic doctrine.

As for the highly developed feeling of "insecurity", which has frequently been used to disguise what is nothing more than straightforward aggressive intentions, it must be understood that it is a very short step from this so-called high sense of "insecurity" to the readiness to make a preemptive strike. Furthermore, the geostrategic position of the United States has always made it possible for its government to make a sober evaluation of the real situation regarding national security, though it has rarely done so.

In this connection Ken Booth, the well-known British specialist on American affairs, was quite right when he pointed out: "When US policy-makers did adopt a more urgent outlook, when they did inject a greater degree of strategic thinking into their policy-making, and when they did believe that they knew what were their 'vital interests', the outcome was the falling domino concept and the strategy of defending San Francisco on the

Mekong."<sup>39</sup> This strategic "supersensitivity" on the part of the United States which has no real justification is, given the enormous military might of the country, extremely dangerous, and in so far as it affects the country's nuclear planning, fraught with catastrophic consequences for all. Here one can agree with Thomas Schelling that military planning based on hasty decisions leads to war.<sup>40</sup>

The claims which one frequently hears from across the Atlantic that the policy-makers in the United States look upon peace as the normal condition of interstate relations have always sounded false. In fact, the ruling class in the United States has continually believed that peace means only the temporary absence of war, that it is a kind of transition stage to the next war: "Peace meaning the absence of war has been the characteristic condition of American foreign relations."<sup>41</sup> The calls which rang out after the First and the Second World Wars, "Bring the boys back home!" were far from meaning support for the idea of complete and universal disarmament. The ruling class has always brainwashed the American public into thinking that for the United States peace is more or less acceptable so long as it can be accommodated within the policy of enlarging US hegemony through the build-up of armaments. It has also brainwashed them into expecting that war could break out almost at any time. And this in turn has facilitated the arms build-up, the waging of so-called preventive wars and a high level of the militarization of society.

American imperialism has gradually, but insistently nurtured the forces of militarism, according them an ever greater place in the state system. US military expenditure has become one of the largest articles in the federal budget. At one time the growth of militarism into a social and state structure was so extensive that President Eisenhower considered it necessary in his farewell speech to warn his fellow countrymen of the danger of the increasing power of the military-industrial complex.

Those members of the administration who speak in Congress in support of a programme of economic aid know that they have a better chance of success if they join up with programmes of military aid.

As early as 1815 professional soldiers began to make their appearance in the higher echelons of the US administration when General Andrew Jackson, who won the Battle of New Orleans, was elected President of the United States. During the first century of the Republic's existence six generals (George Washington, Andrew Jackson, William Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce and Ulysses Grant) and one colonel (Theodore Roosevelt) occupied the presidential office. After the end of the war with Spain in 1898 General Nelson Miles and Admiral George Dewey both tried to get elected to the White House. In more recent times General Dwight D. Eisenhower restored this tradition. Furthermore, all contemporary candidates for the presidency love to remind their electors of their own military service, the latter frequently being considered an essential requirement in a president. American scholars note that after the end of the Civil War in 1861 former officers began regularly to take public office.<sup>42</sup>

It is frequently claimed that the Americans are reluctant to think in military terms during peacetime. Western authorities refer to the well-known American writer, Walter Lippmann who believed that the American people love peace too much in peacetime. This point of view is based on his assessment of the events of 1941 which culminated in the Pearl Harbour catastrophe. Undoubtedly here the unhealthy rivalry between the armed services, the confusion in the administrative agencies and the lack of the proper services for collecting and analysing information all played their role. But the main cause of that catastrophe was shortsightedness on the part of US ruling circles, who dreamed of turning Japanese expansionism against the Soviet Union. In this sense the tragedy on the Hawaii was an exception

and can in no way be considered the result of the American people's excessive love of peace.

Those whose responsibility it was to ensure US interests were nowhere near so peaceloving when it was a matter of defending the interests of American imperialism. Of course, a certain amount of unpredictability is inevitable in the early stages of any war, but the readiness of the United States to wage war was in the majority of cases very high, certainly no lower than among the European countries.

The mobilization campaign, which until 1917 was linked with the name of Leonard Wood, and the intervention against Mexico made it possible for the United States to send its troops into the Old World to take part in the First World War in large numbers and with comparative ease. Subsequently quality of the officers trained at military colleges and the professional competence of the military planners was such that in peacetime they could work out "adequate doctrinal frameworks ... for total war".<sup>43</sup>

Let us also note that if the Americans really were peaceloving, as they claim, this ought to presuppose that practical steps would be taken in the direction of disarmament. But this was never the real aim of the US ruling circles despite their excessive rhetoric. The policy in the field of armaments which developed in the 1960s can to a certain extent be considered as a renunciation of the ideal of complete and universal disarmament.

The most aggressive political circles in the United States attack the military and political leadership for not taking clear political advantage of their military strength in a nuclear age. But this is not because of the peaceloving nature of the powers that be or their strategic "incompetence". The reason lies in the correlation of power in the world and in the existence of the Soviet Union, which is both powerful and peaceloving, whose policies hold in check such a development. Also there is the fact that the Americans are faced with enormous expenditure

as a result of their use of military force, which has risen vastly over the last decades. Furthermore, the value of those objectives which have been achieved with the use of military force has fallen due to the colossal damage inflicted by its use. But even here the military and political leaders find advantage for themselves in the development of the so-called concept of containment. It is precisely under the pretext of this concept as the history of the postwar international crises has shown, that the United States has resorted to "power diplomacy" and at times achieved, if only for the short term, certain results.

The hypocritical assertions that the American rulers are "peaceloving" and reluctant to think in military terms in peacetime have been completely refuted by the aggressive policy of the United States in Latin America. In countries like Mexico, Haiti, Guatemala, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and Grenada military intervention and interference in internal affairs with the use or the threat of force have been characteristic features of US policy. True, this force has been used carefully and in measured doses in Latin America, but the way in which it has been applied is "more reminiscent of a protection racketeer than of the archetypal idealistic, impulsive and absolutist American Strategic Man."<sup>44</sup>

Significant in this connection was the policy pursued by President Woodrow Wilson, who had the reputation of being a "pacifist" and an "idealist". But despite this image which was cultivated by the bourgeois historians, he was nevertheless a hardened realist in his attitude to international politics. His policy in the Western Hemisphere was a clear refutation of all tendentious claims to the effect that the military and political leaders of the United States are peaceloving. They have always looked at the Western Hemisphere as a priority area for American military interests.

Here another point requires some elaboration. American and West-European historians would have us believe

that the military and political leaders of the United States do not permit political considerations to enter into military affairs. In other words they try to show that these leaders are opposed to the idea that war is just the continuation of politics by other means. They even go as far as to assert that seeking victory in war the American leaders tend to forget the real, i. e. the political purpose for which that war was waged.

But such assertions are very far from the truth.

Throughout the two hundred years of US history the American military and political leaders have clearly realized the need for achieving political goals through military means. The 19th century in particular provides many examples of this, but the most striking is the US-Mexican war of 1846-1848, as a result of which a monstrously exorbitant treaty was foisted upon Mexico.

The policy of the United States at a later period, for example during the Second World War and particularly towards its end, was characterized by the desire to use military means to weaken the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Europe, i. e. to achieve a political goal. This was clearly demonstrated by General Wedemeyer, Director of Plans and Operations Division at the Department of War. Under the pretext of containing the so-called growing Soviet threat, he proposed a breakthrough into Central Germany via North-Western Europe and made no bones about the political anti-Soviet motivation for this proposal.

The whole policy pursued by the United States in relation to opening the Second Front shows the high level of "politicizing" military problems. Later, during the wars in Korea and Vietnam that were waged by US imperialism two particular political aims were pursued—the "containing and rolling back" of communism. These serve as yet another refutation of the false claim on the part of the American leadership to concern itself with purely military operations. These wars, however, did not bring about the desired political aims; moreover, they

actually resulted in military and political defeats for the United States.

The idea that the American military were apolitical is also popular among certain American scholars who maintain that General McArthur often ignored instructions and orders from the political leadership. This is given in evidence to support the contention that the American military always rejected political interference in their affairs and did not consider war as the continuation of politics by other means. But even here the essence of the matter has been purposely distorted. General McArthur disputed the White House's orders only when he considered them to be incompetent. Furthermore, he was playing his own game, which was far from being politically unmotivated, and at the same time getting considerable support from certain circles, who extolled him as both a commander in the field and a military strategist and thereby encouraged him to show a degree of insubordination. On the other hand, General Ridgway, who replaced McArthur as C-in-C, Korea, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, closely coordinated the conduct of the war with political directives. Thus General McArthur was nothing more than an exception.

Bourgeois historians also claim that the US military establishment prefers the direct approach to strategy as opposed to the indirect approach favoured by the military in other countries. According to the well-known British military historian, Basil Liddell Hart<sup>45</sup>, the category indirect includes diversion, misinformation, and propaganda.

Liddell Hart estimates that 300 wars have been fought in past and recent history by various nations and peoples through the exclusive use of direct strategy. Consequently the United States is no exception. It has waged wars, to use Liddell Hart's terminology, employing both direct and indirect strategy. American military history knows of generals that have made use of either one or the other

principle: the former including General Joseph E. Hooper, General William C. Lee and General Dwight Eisenhower; the latter including General George Washington, General Nathanael Greene and General Charles Scott. A great lover of indirect strategy was General William T. Sherman. This latter category also includes Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who favoured surprise blows most. At the same time there were other American generals, who were ready to adopt both direct and indirect strategy. One of them was General Ulysses Grant.

General McArthur summed up the American direct approach in a statement made during the Korean War in 1950: "There is no substitute for victory." But judging from his well-known views, what McArthur had in mind by this, was that military means were preferable to talks or other non-military ways of solving conflicts and that only by the use of military force could the international situation be controlled.<sup>46</sup>

Another characteristic aspect of the traditional American approach to warfare contained in the US militarist ideology is the total reliance on technology. The very nature of bourgeois society with its absence of ideals for which a soldier would be ready to lay down his life has resulted in the US Armed Forces personnel believing more in their weaponry than in any feelings of patriotism. At the same time both the military and the politicians in the US have frequently voiced concern over the state of the morale and loyalty of the armed forces of their West European allies.

The experience of two world wars resulted in the widespread belief in the United States that military superiority is achieved by the overproduction of military technology and materiel. And this idea is linked with the characteristic inclination among the country's ruling quarters to see military superiority as depending on the presence of resources and the state of technology.<sup>47</sup> According to the US military and political leadership the constant factors that determine success in war are: the



technological sophistication of armaments, the quantity and quality of available forces, the capabilities of the commanding officers, the morale of the troops and, finally, the stability of the rear.

A number of scholars<sup>48</sup> have noted that the American attachment to highly developed weapon systems spells out in the final analysis the most inhuman ways of waging a war. In this sense the Vietnam War was typical, for there the Americans used highly sophisticated weapons (like pellet bombs, etc.) capable of causing immense human and material losses. It has also been noted that the United States, allegedly, gives priority to the massive use of weaponry for saving as many American soldiers' lives as possible. But the determination of the military and political leadership to emerge victorious at a given moment which far outweighs their concern for the lives of their soldiers, is probably even more noteworthy. The country's military history knows of many battles which took an extremely heavy toll, a characteristic example being the Pacific Campaign of the Second World War.

As to the impact the tradition of American hegemonism has had on the formation of the ideology and practice of militarism, one should realize that in a bid for military superiority the United States has initiated the development of such destructive weapon systems, whose appearance has resulted in the destabilization of the international situation today. This particularly relates to the development of the MIRV warheads (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles), submarine-launched IBMs, and the continued improvement of ICBM homing systems designed to achieve preemptive strike capability. In a word, there has been a continuous technical and technological improvement of weaponry and of the military and strategic doctrines designed to help the United States win any kind of war, including a nuclear war.

The United States and several of its allies spend considerable effort in projecting an image of America as a

country so powerful that no one can stand up against it. References are frequently made to the march through Georgia in the Civil War, the barbaric bombing of Dresden and the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima. Also part of this kind of intimidation is the claim that US military thinking is conducted in "absolute terms", and in relation to the socialist countries and the national liberation movement this is quite true. The US military and political leadership believes that it can only treat with these latter from a position of brute military force, or through the exertion of pressure or imposition of sanctions. Though the White House to this day sticks to its habit of thinking in absolutes, Washington has been forced to reckon with the changed correlation of forces and to bring its hegemonist ambitions into line with the real situation, particularly in this nuclear age. Even when the doctrine of massive retaliation was current and the United States could rely on its nuclear supremacy, its leaders were compelled to introduce into it elements of flexibility. Indeed, the period from the mid-1950s until 1966 was characterized by America's use of its armed forces for the achievement of political goals.<sup>49</sup>

There is also a trend among Western historians to represent the military and political leadership of the United States as almost incapable of waging limited, "controlled" wars preferring rather to turn them into crusades. This is to a considerable extent true. The Americans have always looked upon their own participation in war as the fulfilment of a mission and consequently they have always dressed it up in moralist phraseology. Furthermore, for the American rulers the crusader spirit was never simply a matter of ends and objectives. It was also concerned with the means for achieving these ends, the ways to get the American people to fight arms in hand for interests that were alien to them, the interests of their politicians and their capitalist bosses. "Modern wars have to be nationalized, even in the citadel of free enterprise. Once a conflict becomes 'Mr. Truman's War' or

'Mr. Johnson's War' it is too late. Americans cannot stand private enterprise in this area of life and presidents know it."<sup>50</sup> It is here that the crusader spirit is necessary to turn the American people into aggressive, merciless warmongers.

But in what else do American military traditions and American military and political thinking consist and how are these related to the traditions of American hegemonism?

Specific military traditions began to be formed in the United States even before independence. Here of primary importance was the geostrategic factor—the USA was surrounded by great oceans and weak neighbours. The War of Independence and the War of 1812 encouraged a feeling of strategic exclusiveness among the American people, since being surrounded by oceans protected them from the threat of foreign invasion. They came to the conclusion that if Britain—the most powerful nation on land and sea at the time — could not defeat its much weaker colony, then no one could.

Unlike his counterpart in the European monarchist armies, the American soldier did not look upon war as a professional activity, but rather as a temporary distraction from his normal life. Consequently the country's military history is interpreted in American prose and poetry as a continuous chain of victories of the American "amateurs" over the foreign professionals. Furthermore, the wars in the story-books always finished with a quick victory for the Americans. Thus it is hardly surprising that the idea took root that mobilization and demobilization should be carried out with extreme rapidity. The "boys" should be rushed off to war and just as quickly rushed back home after it to be rewarded with land and in later times with pensions. Soldiers who had served only three months were according to the standards of the day considered veterans and given awards.

The American people won their independence in a bitter struggle, and the militant spirit continues to occu-

py an important place in their life. The majority of the nation's heroes are those who bore weapons and knew how to use them well. The list of wars, big and small, runs through the whole of US history. The southerners are particularly proud of their military prowess. The country has a large number of military colleges, one of the most famous of which, the Virginia Military Institute, was founded in 1839. Thus militarist traditions are deeply rooted in American ideological and political life.

A prominent role in encouraging militarism is played by the US top brass. This is particularly true of the former commanders of the Strategic Air Command, which has control over the United States ground and air nuclear strike force. Generals Curtis LeMay, Thomas Power and Nathan Twining vied with each other in their memoirs in striking fear into the American people and calling for the use of nuclear weapons in preventive wars against the Soviet Union.

Particularly hawkish in this respect was General Twining who in the spirit of ultra-militarism inveighed in his book against the "anti-nuclear intellectuals" and "arm-chair strategists" who, in his opinion, were betraying their country and American freedom. According to Twining even some of the officer corps had allowed themselves to succumb to their pernicious influence. And all because of "insufficient defence expenditures". Twining saw the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as unilateral disarmament on the part of the United States. According to Bernard Brodie, in a section of his book devoted to analyzing the state of US militarism after the Second World War: "After World War I it was fashionable to quote the German generals, Colmar von der Goltz and Friedrich von Bernhardi, and later Erich von Ludendorff, who was to glorify 'total war'... But now the phenomenon is ours... The other and major difference is of course nuclear bombs, and part of Twining's fury is directed particularly at the fact that some people are trying to defuse them."<sup>51</sup>

The postwar period saw a new stage in the development of military traditions in the United States. This was marked by the transition (after 1945) from a relatively small and inexpensive army, levied on a voluntary basis, to an enormous and expensive war machine. This transition was accompanied by a growth in the role of the military, the rejection of rapid mobilization and *blitzkrieg* and the appearance of a new attitude: long-term conflicts and constant semi-mobilization, no concern for thrift and the general belief that money was no obstacle.<sup>52</sup>

At the same time the military history of the United States has much in common with that of other European continental powers. But the distinctive characteristic of American military history is the fact that domestic policy has always played as important a role as foreign policy, especially when the latter was being conducted by the use of violence. In this respect US presidents, like the two-faced Janus, had to look as it were in two directions.<sup>53</sup> The mood inside the country was rather unstable, especially when a long and bloody war was in process. This instability was to a considerable extent the result of the clash of interests that existed among the various groups within the ruling class. But in no smaller degree it came from the fact that for a long time the United States was geographically isolated from any kind of danger. To all intents and purposes all wars have been experienced by the American people both physically and psychologically as taking place a long way away from their own country. It is these circumstances that partially explain the desire on the part of the US leadership, alongside long-term conflicts, to prepare for and wage wars of the shortest possible duration.

As for the belligerence and ruthlessness of the Americans, this cannot be explained and understood without reference to the amount of violence that characterizes so many aspects of social reality in the United States, to the racist feelings that are rooted in American society

and to the moralistic opinions that distort the average American's view of the world around him.

The specifics of American military and political thinking should be approached, as was noted above, through consideration of national historical traditions. Of course, its formation has been influenced by European thinking. But the strategic criteria of continental Europe took shape in an atmosphere of relatively equal and active relations between states or in situations where the traditional enemy lay across the river or beyond the nearest mountains. But this kind of criteria was of no use to a country like the United States, which was unique from the point of view of its power in the Western Hemisphere, its distance from international conflicts, its natural security and its industrial potential. In this sense the well-known comparison of the United States and its role in the Western world to Gulliver among the Lilliputians is extremely apt. Hence the abuse of power becomes the norm. As Ken Booth noted ironically: "Instead therefore of berating Americans for sometimes behaving in an imperious way—for Gullivers will be Gullivers—perhaps we should be praising them for the general steadiness of their moderation."<sup>54</sup>

As can be seen, hegemonist aspirations, which have deep ideological and historical roots, have exerted a very considerable influence on the formation of American military and political thought and on the ideology of militarism. It is therefore clear why military might has become the main means whereby the United States exercises its policy of hegemonism and militarism.

### **3. Military Force as a Means of Implementing the US Policy of Hegemonism and Militarism**

According to American historians themselves, military force and the country's military capabilities have been

traditionally looked upon as the most important component of the nation's might. A number of prominent scholars note that war as a means for achieving political aims has always been rated highly by the US ruling class. It is enough to remember that during the first hundred years of its existence the ruling class of the new bourgeois republic waged a continuous series of wars with the Indians for the purpose of siezing their lands. And these wars were often more akin to plain genocide. American historians hypocritically present this genocide against the Indian population as merely "clearing up operations" designed to gain profitable territory.

The specific parameters for the use of military force have changed according to the American strategists' and politician' evaluation of the subjective and objective factors in each specific international situation. But at the same time the country's history has shown a deeply rooted trend to continuous military build-up. According to the American historian, Michael Sherry, "... never after the war of 1812 had Congress allowed postwar strengths to sink to prewar levels. After each later war permanent army strengths, mirroring but more often outstripping population growth, increased fifty to one hundred percent. The growth of the peacetime Navy and Marine Corps was just as rapid. The army and navy, which together numbered only about 40,000 men in the years before the Spanish-American War, more than trebled in size by the time of the Taft administration, and nearly doubled in peacetime strength by the 1920s... The army's personnel in the 1920s and 1930s numbered from 135,000 to 185,000, far above the average figure of 81,000 during the 1902-14 period."<sup>55</sup>

During the first hundred years of its existence America fought three major wars—the War against Britain (1811-1814), against Mexico (1846-1848) and the Civil War (1861-1865). The real nature of these wars (the first two in particular) has been intentionally distorted in the understanding of the average American. For example, in

school textbooks the War of 1812 has been made to look like a second War of Independence, while the Mexican War, although it was fought against a sovereign state, is treated in the official history books as a simple incident in the conquest of the West.

It was in fact in the Mexican War that US expansionist policy became for the first time blatantly apparent. The overwhelming majority of those who were in favour of the war came from the South and they sought to extend their system of slaving over the newly conquered territories. In this they were opposed by the Northerners, who were against slavery, not for any sympathy towards the slaves themselves, but because that system clashed with their interests. This clash of interests among the two groups of the ruling class, as was often to happen later in American history, was interpreted as a clash of principles. The Northerners claimed that the new territorial acquisitions contradicted the ideals on which American political philosophy was based. But it did not stop the implementation of an expansionist policy, which in its most cynical form was grounded in the concept of manifest destiny.

This concept is the American version of militant messianism, an idea analogous to that of the Spanish conquistadors who justified their territorial conquests by spreading the "Word of God", or to that of the British colonialists, who tried to present their foreign acquisitions as the "white man's burden", i. e. the need for the white man to "civilize the savages", or, finally, to that of the German imperialists who claimed they were spreading culture.<sup>56</sup> It was designed to persuade everyone that those parts of the continent that in accordance with their "manifest destiny" had become subject to US expansionism had been brought not a yoke of cruel oppression, but the benefits of American freedom.

Subsequently, after the seizure of Mexican territories the concept of manifest destiny was used by the American bourgeoisie as a means of forcibly redividing



the world on the American pattern. In particular the United States wanted to "revive" Mexico as a country "inspired" with American energy.<sup>57</sup>

After the war with Spain statements in the spirit of this concept became hypocritical and overconfident. Senator Albert J. Beveridge said: "And we will move forward to our work... but with gratitude for a task worthy of our strength, and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the world..."

"The Pacific is our ocean... The power that rules the Pacific, therefore, is the power that rules the world, and with the Philippines, that power is and will forever be the American Republic."<sup>58</sup> America's entry into the First World War was justified to a certain extent by this same destiny and the messianic idea can be seen in the professed aims of that war—"to make the world secure for democracy".

But though the direct use of military force was always the main, it was never the only means of implementing the American policy of hegemonism and militarism. Another tried and tested method was the creation of alliances.

Alliances and allies were traditionally looked upon by the military and political leadership of the United States in the context of *realpolitik*, which according to Hans Morgenthau's definition, was based on the categories of military force and national interest.<sup>59</sup> Thus the allies themselves and the obligations accruing under alliances, as they have always been understood in the United States, are determined by considerations of expediency and not principles.<sup>60</sup> To illustrate this *realpolitik* American historians often quote the attitude of the United States towards its alliance with France. In 1778 American aims were clearly defined—to defeat Britain and to defend national independence. America and France concluded an alliance on the basis of their anti-British interests. America's goal was to pool the

military capabilities of the colonies with the might of France. According to American historians this alliance was a classic case of an alliance based on war. Once the war was over the USA lost much of its interest in an alliance with France.

The subsequent development of events showed American pragmatism at its most blatant. After the monarchist coalition in Europe had declared war on the French Revolution, Washington's first administration was faced with the problem of giving aid to the French in accordance with the terms of the alliance. But for Washington the granting of this aid would only have served to complicate the US government's position. It therefore decided on a compromise which amounted to refusing to abide by the terms of the treaty, without openly abrogating it. Washington simply declared America's neutrality in relation to events in Europe, which was in line with US interests but meant that the obligations entered into under the alliance with France were consigned to oblivion.

In a speech delivered in September 1796 President George Washington warned the American government against maintaining any permanent alliances with anyone. He looked upon all alliances as "good" and "bad" depending only on how they served US interests at a given moment. The Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton asked a similar question: "Must a nation subordinate its security, its happiness, nay, its very existence to the respect for treaty obligations?", and answered it with emphatic "No".<sup>61</sup>

After independence and more or less right up to the outbreak of the Mexican War the new and still relatively weak United States of America did not really need alliances to build up its military strength. Even after the War of 1812, being geographically far from the "world power centres" the United States showed little interest in forming alliances. It had certain common interests with Britain and made use of its position as that coun-

try's younger partner. Britain was ready to pay the cost of defending the Western Hemisphere so as to maintain the European balance of power and protect its commercial interests. The situation was such that by entering into an alliance with Britain, the possibility was practically excluded for the United States to once again come under its domination. Furthermore, the United States was able to make full use of the advantages of British diplomacy and the British Navy for strengthening its own security.

US historians note that in principle their country had the chance of building up its strength by making alliances with smaller states, particularly those in Latin America, but as the American conservative international historian, George Liska, wrote, "...small-state alliances have not been prominent, nor have they been signally successful in dealing with the international instability or external insecurity of lesser states."<sup>62</sup> According to the US theory of alliances, in the distribution of the various political and economic benefits, the gains and losses, the side that is militarily stronger comes off better.

Since the United States at the time considered itself a weak state, it saw no special benefits for itself in forming alliances with the Latin American countries and for this reason maintained for a long time a policy of non-participation in alliances and political coalitions. In the 19th century America also tried to avoid taking part in European conflicts, which was fairly easily done in view of the country's geographical position and the current state of technology.

The advantage and interest of the bourgeoisie have always lain at the basis of US policy on the world arena. And here the desire for flexibility towards other countries dominated its attitude to alliances. Certain periods of US foreign policy have been marked by excessive rhetoric and isolationism. But according to some American historians,<sup>63</sup> the term isolationism is quite insufficient to explain the American alliance policy, particularly its

military alliances during the early period of the country's existence. The mysticism that enveloped the ideology of isolationism in fact served to conceal and justify the policy of hegemonism and militarism pursued by the self-seeking US ruling class. Also the American understanding of isolationism was made deliberately vague and various interpretations were allowed to creep in. This made it possible for the American leaders to use this policy in their own interests.

According to the narrow interpretation of the concept of isolationism, it is expressed in the refusal to enter into military alliances that could drag the United States into war. In relation to the early period of the country's foreign policy, when the Americans did avoid alliances of this kind, a number of Western historians have interpreted the concept as the "instinct for maintaining one's independence or protecting the nation's sovereignty".<sup>64</sup> Isolationism meant not only the refusal to enter into alliances with European powers, but also the refusal to participate in the European diplomatic system as a permanent member. Trade relations were considered acceptable, but international political ties were looked upon with caution, since they could result in dragging the United States, while the country was still relatively weak, into wars that were waged for the interests of the European and particularly the monarchist states, whose interests were alien to the American bourgeoisie. It is noteworthy, however, that interference (even of a limited kind) into the affairs of other states was also considered an acceptable policy within the framework of isolationism. In this connection the American historian, Paul Seabury, noted that: "In the American political tradition, isolationism did not represent a passive attitude towards politics. Rather it was one aspect of America's territorial growth and its cultural and economic expansion."<sup>65</sup> Another scholar, Harvey Starr noted with some justification in summarizing a series of analyses of isolationist policy presented by a group of

Western historians that: "... the United States was never isolationist in any general sense of the term, but only in the narrowest sense of peacetime alliances. The critics of the term are reacting to its dual nature. They question the utility of a term which is presumed to indicate aloofness and withdrawal, but is also said to indicate both commercial interactions and diplomatic and military intervention in the affairs of non-European nations. This duality derives from an American self-image of moral and political uniqueness, or 'exceptionalism', which called for the protection of the singular American democratic experiment (i.e. bourgeois society—*R.B.*). This was to be achieved both through avoidance of European power politics and war, and a missionary expansionism in non-European areas."<sup>66</sup>

Their distance from Europe and the conviction among Americans that they were somehow "exceptional" lay at the basis of their strong desire to redraw the map of the world according to the American pattern. Isolationism in this context was just one more manifestation of the policy of national security.

In this connection some American scholars have advanced the hypothesis that American politics are subject to a specific law, according to which passive and active cycles operate in relation to US expansion and intervention into the affairs of other countries. The definition given by Frank L. Klinberg<sup>67</sup> speaks of introvert and extrovert cycles, the former referring to greater America's concern with its own affairs (continental policy), the latter to more active expansion and intervention into those of other countries. But in both cases the prime interest was to ensure national security—only the ways and means of achieving this differed. According to Klinberg the extrovert periods meant expansion and the spread of US influence, whereas the introvert periods were characterized by the consolidation of forces and preparation. During the introvert period the ruling class particularly concentrated on internal problems.<sup>68</sup>

Analyzing a number of indicators that characterize US foreign policy (treaties, wars, military interventions, annexations, diplomatic threats, IMF budgets, presidential speeches and messages, etc),. Klinberg distinguishes four periods of the introvert cycle of approximately 21 years each and three periods of the extrovert cycle of approximately 27 years each.<sup>69</sup>

*Table ·*

The International Cycle

Introvert	Extrovert
1776-1798	1798-1824
1824-1844	1844-1871
1871-1891	1891-1918
1918-1940	1940-1966(67)
1966(67)-...	

Some scholars note that Klinberg relates the beginning of the last extrovert period to the 1940s. Twenty-seven years later comes the "beginning of the end" in Vietnam and the acceleration of this cyclic process marked by Lyndon Johnson's refusal to stand for a second term and Nixon's arrival in the White House. Furthermore, according to Klinberg US interest in building up alliances is exclusively characteristic of the extrovert cycle. From 1821 to 1967 the United States participated in a number of formal military coalitions—the crushing of the Boxer Uprising in 1900, the First World War, intervention against Soviet Russia (1918-1920), and three coalitions formalized by agreements—the Second World War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War.

The various agreements signed by the United States after the Second World War come within the extrovert period but are beginning to fall apart, according to Klinberg, by the beginning of the last introvert period, i.e. 1966(67). He believes that the introvert periods are necessary for rest after times of great tension and for inter-

nal consolidation after excessive external expansion. The war in Vietnam in particular was a manifestation of that tension at the final stage of the most expansionist period in the history of the United States. The period from 1967 to 1968 and the events which followed it marked a reaction in the form of consolidation and concern with the internal problems and difficulties that had arisen as a result of an active expansionist policy.

American scholars who share Klinberg's opinions have noted that the introvert phase is characterized by uncertainty as to foreign policy priorities and doubt over American "exceptionalism". They see the role of the United States as leader of the "free world" becoming too burdensome, and believe that the introvert period makes it possible to "... reduce the burdens of involvement without losing the confidence of allies or weakening the credibility of American commitments."<sup>70</sup>

Of course, Klinberg has not discovered some magic formula for the cycles of US foreign policy. His hypothesis contradicts the objective laws of social development revealed through historical materialism. US imperialism has its ups and downs according to the laws of cyclic development and it is quite natural that these processes should affect the country's foreign and domestic policy. Numerous facts could be adduced that do not fit neatly into Klinberg's scheme, but which on the contrary refute it. In this case, however, it is necessary to stress one point: Klinberg's theories, though completely untenable from a theoretical and methodological point of view, nevertheless indicate the presence of very real and objectively conditioned zigzags in US foreign policy. The fact that he himself is unable to fathom the causes and trends that give rise to these zigzags is quite another matter.

The United States like the other capitalist countries is governed by the law of the uneven development of capitalism. It has its booms and recessions and these appear also in the sphere of foreign policy. Furthermore, this

process today takes place at a time when the correlation of forces in the world is changing in favour of socialism and military power has reached approximate parity. These new conditions only serve to increase the difficulties experienced by imperialism, restrict its room for manoeuvre and make it increasingly harder for the imperialist powers to restore their positions.

An analysis of US foreign policy shows that the periods of isolationism are characterized not so much by a literal withdrawal from world affairs as by a kind of unilateral participation in them involving the refusal to enter into binding alliances. In fact the security of the state can be ensured both by its active participation in international affairs and even more so through more "restrained" conduct. In the 19th century the United States' involvement in, for example, Europe, was somewhat limited. In the 20th century it adopted a more active imperialist expansionist policy and intervened on an extensive scale in international politics, trying in the final analysis to rely only on its own forces and resources in order to ensure the more advantageous position for itself and win freedom of action. For this reason in all its alliances and coalitions of recent times the United States has aimed to become the "chief partner" dominating all the others.

In this connection Hans Morgenthau noted that securing American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere has always been the aim of US foreign policy.<sup>71</sup> Territorial security and the maintenance of economic interests have always been connected with the undivided sway of US imperialism in the New World. Furthermore, this domination could only be contested by a European power. Thus US foreign policy has tried to bring about such a situation in Europe in which no one country or group of countries could threaten American domination in the Western Hemisphere. And the main mechanism for implementing this policy has always been the balance of power.



The United States has tried to create and maintain in Europe a balance of power, but without undertaking any commitments of its own or losing its political flexibility, which is the inevitable result of a formal alliance. Moreover, the US leaders have never excluded war as an element in the mechanism of maintaining a power balance. The Monroe Doctrine, for example, embodied a balance of power policy while maintaining the flexibility and unilateral nature of American foreign policy. As has already been mentioned the identity of Anglo-American interests during this period allowed the United States to avoid concluding a formal alliance with Britain. In this sense the United States acted unilaterally and set one European state against the others though encouraging British trade interests and exploiting British naval power against the possible recolonization of Latin America by the continental European powers. In addition the United States advanced a number of doctrines endorsing its claims to the Western Hemisphere. Later corollaries by Presidents James Knox Polk and Theodore Roosevelt continued the unilateralist and hegemonial themes.

A number of scholars<sup>72</sup> have noted the relationship that exists between the current strengths of the United States Armed Forces and how the US government formulates its interests. This relationship is shown in the fact that a build-up of the armed forces has always led to an enlargement of interests, while a growth of military power has always led to a thirst for new acquisitions in the name of "security". Then it became necessary to defend these new acquisitions and in so doing acquire more and more territory and create new balances of power against "external threats". For instance, after the War of 1898 the United States became the strongest power in the Pacific Ocean. And this in turn resulted in the fact that American interests could now allegedly be "threatened" in the Pacific Ocean as well as in the New World.

The policy of balance can also be seen in operation

during the First World War. As soon as the United States felt its strength and that it could play the role of the "chief partner", it began to get actively involved in European alliances. A similar policy of power balance was pursued against the Axis Powers during the Second World War. But this time the balance required American military involvement in that conflict in Europe.

After the war the United States found itself in a polarized world. Its policy was fully aimed at rolling back and as far as possible destroying the socialist world, though it never lost sight of the main goal—world domination. The expression of and justification for this policy was the Truman Doctrine which demanded that America should "contain the Soviet threat" in Europe. The postwar presence of the United States in Europe also reflected its traditional aim of defending its imperialist interests in the Western Hemisphere.

The web of alliances set up by the United States in the postwar period in which it played the role of "chief partner" allowed the US government to pursue a policy that was in America's best interests and implement the traditional principles of the American ruling class. Here the only new element was probably the concept of vital interests, which were henceforth considered by the military and political leadership of the United States as global and universal.

But American aggressiveness grew not only because of the desire to ensure and defend the expansion of American interests practically throughout the world. There was also the belief held among the American rulers that the balance of forces in the world was like a game of heads or tails where one state's win (the Soviet Union) automatically meant the other state's (the United States) loss. This belief was encouraged by the United States' opinion of itself as an imperial power, which, in the opinion of George Liska, assumed foremost responsibility for shaping and maintaining the necessary world order. For the first time since the treaty with France the

United States felt the need to conclude formal alliances.

As we have already mentioned, one of the aims of an alliance, according to the American understanding, consisted in bringing about an international situation favourable to the security and interests of the country that organized it. But the postwar alliances of the United States had another objective—to create conditions under which the unilateral policy of ensuring US interests and US security could be effectively implemented. Thus for the United States an alliance was designed to serve primarily its strategic goals—the acquisition of territory that could be used for aggression against the USSR and that would in the event of retribution save the United States or at any rate weaken a retaliatory strike directed against it.

In the postwar period the United States moved the forward line of its defence from the Western Hemisphere to the European continent. In so doing it also transferred there the whole risk contingent upon the pursuit of its aggressive adventurist policy. And this risk grew seriously after the Reagan administration came to power with its foolhardy idea of “limited” nuclear war. The military alliances or “defence agreements” (bilateral and multilateral) which the United States concluded with 42 countries after the war, were designed to exert pressure on the socialist world at the least cost. They included the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio de Janeiro, 1947), NATO (1949), the ANZUS Security Treaty (1951) and SEATO (1954), all of which were multilateral agreements, and bilateral agreements with the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953), Taiwan (1954) and Japan (1960). The United States also promoted the conclusion of the Bagdad Pact (1955) in which it took part on an unofficial basis. This pact became CENTO in 1959 after Iraq left.

This web of military alliances testifies to unrestrained American expansion aimed at achieving world hegemony. In all these alliances the United States is the “chief

partner" in view of its dominant strength. That is why it was able to retain a considerable amount of freedom of action. At least in the early period these alliances put 'no restrictions on US unilaterality and were not burdensome. And at the same time they served Washington's strategic interests.

An important part of US participation in the alliances was its attempt to control the internal policies of the allied governments. They were strongly encouraged to crush revolutionary and liberation movements and "friendly governments" could always rely on US military and economic aid. This was clearly demonstrated in Latin America and South Vietnam where brutal anti-popular governments existed through the fault of the US. Finally, these alliances served to legalize the US unilateral policy and the global presence of American troops.

US participation in alliances made it look as though the United States was considering the interests of other countries. Even in those cases when it pursued an unambiguous unilateral policy of defending its own security interests against invented threats, Washington tried to give the impression to the world and even to the American people that this policy was the result of multilateral or regional decisions and was the unanimous reaction of all members of the alliance. This happened most frequently in Latin America and the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is a clear example. "The control of allies," declared Harvey Starr, "has simply been one aspect of an overriding American foreign policy goal, namely the establishment and maintenance of a world order amenable to American national security interests, particularly dominance in the Western Hemisphere."<sup>73</sup>

The role of the United States as the "chief partner" of an alliance is also seen from the fact that its interests have always borne a global character, whereas the interests of the allies have as a rule been local and regional. The alliances that were concluded on US initiative in the late 1940s and early 1950s should be looked upon as

instruments of that country's unilateral policy. They did not fulfil the classical function of an alliance—to increase the common might by unification. They were mainly intended to provide bases for aggression against the Soviet Union and were at the same time used to strengthen America's economic, political and strategic positions in a given area.

By the end of the 1960s certain new elements were beginning to creep into US attitude to forming alliances. These were primarily due to recognition of the fact that the USSR had reached strategic nuclear parity and that possibilities for the USA to use military force had therefore radically shrunk. Certain realistically minded politicians of the period began to understand that the world required a policy that would lead to a relaxation of tension and a limiting of such conflict situations as might lead to mutual nuclear annihilation. Although the alliances were maintained as before as a means to intimidate the Soviet Union and put pressure on it, steps were nevertheless made to weaken their military aspects.

We can draw the conclusion that even in periods when America's global imperialist aggressiveness was on the increase the unilaterality of US interests remained the pivot of that country's foreign policy. Furthermore, the military and political leadership of the United States consistently used and applied those instruments and means of foreign policy, which in its opinion corresponded most closely to US interests at a given moment.

Another important means by which ruling circles in the United States implement their policy of hegemonism and militarism is the use of counterinsurgency warfare, by which is meant activity directed at combatting revolutionary transformations throughout the world, particularly the national liberation movement whose progress is a constant source of fear and anxiety to Washington. In his book entitled *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*<sup>74</sup>, which has had a considerable influence on the thinking of the US military and political leadership, John S. Pustay

compares the national liberation wars to a progressive disease affecting the whole world. According to Pustay these wars can be defined as "a cellular development of resistance against an incumbent political regime ... which expands from the initial stage of subversion-infiltration through the intermediate states of overt resistance by small armed bands and insurrection to final fruition in civil war."<sup>75</sup> He recommends rapid action to nip the revolutionary process in the bud: "The sooner a Communist insurgency can be recognized and the earlier counter-insurgency operations can begin in earnest, the greater will be the chances of success for the incumbent regime."<sup>76</sup>

For Pustay the "incumbent regime" is any group in power irrespective of whether it is there by legal means or not and which actively opposes social change of a kind that is unacceptable to the United States. On the other hand, any legal power that upholds national liberation should be considered, according to Pustay, as "insurgent".

The military and political thought of the United States is imbued with the spirit of hegemonism and militarism. Dominant is a view of the world in which "might is right" and war is the only means to solve conflicts between states. International relations are seen as a continuous battle for extending the spheres of influence of one state at the expense of others, where any state can be an obstacle to other states in achieving their objectives and where neighbouring states can be a continual source of trouble.

It must be stressed here that the development of atomic weapons and the fact that initially the United States had a monopoly over them were a very sharp stimulus to the hegemonistic ambitions of the American leaders. They realized that nuclear weapons were the key to the US domination of the world. Theoretical works on the subject of nuclear war published soon after not only made no attempt whatsoever to condemn it as a crime

against humanity, but they stressed on the contrary the strictly technical aspects of waging a nuclear war so as to draw attention away from its terrible consequences. Fear of such consequences would, according to the ideologists of the military establishment and more aggressive circles among the US ruling class, paralyze the will of the United States and make it less "energetic" in pursuing its goals. Furthermore, these publications created a definite ideological and psychological climate conditioning public opinion to "live with the bomb" and the prospect of a nuclear war.

Particularly interesting in this connection are the works of Herman Kahn, Director of the Hudson Institute and a fervent anti-Soviet hawk. These writings have done much to get Americans used to the idea that nuclear war is inevitable. The whole generation of today's "nuclear hawks" were brought up on them and encouraged through them to believe in the feasibility of waging nuclear war. In his book entitled *On Thermonuclear War* Kahn describes the weapon systems to be used not only in the third world war, but in all subsequent world wars. This approach in itself testifies to Kahn's conviction that the third world war would not be the end of civilization, a theme which he takes up in his book *On Escalation*.

Kahn would speak before large audiences of Americans and ask them the purposely provocative question how in their opinion the President of the United States should or should not act if a nuclear bomb was dropped on New York without warning. Usually the audience was shocked. But more recently significant changes were noted in the moods of his audiences and these changes can be put down to the influence of the military establishment ideologists, particularly Kahn himself. Following his question a discussion would be held as to the right response to this fabricated act on the part of the Soviet Union, a discussion which amounted to looking into the ways of conducting nuclear war. Here Kahn noted with

satisfaction that Americans were learning to "think intelligently about the 'unthinkable'".<sup>77</sup> The style of other writings on military problems is not so "intellectual" as Kahn's, but the sense is identical—war may not be a pleasant thing but it is a necessary adjunct to foreign policy.

In the late 1950s when it became clear that the doctrine of massive retaliation as a means for rolling back communism, if applied at a time when the Soviet Union was strengthening its nuclear capability, was fraught with disastrous consequences for the United States itself, the military and political leadership of the country began to pay more attention to the concept of a so-called limited war. This deviation from the concept of massive retaliation was the result of searches for ways of waging war that were less dangerous to the United States and of bringing pressure to bear upon the socialist world and the national liberation movement. The military and political leadership of the United States believed that a limited war made it possible for the scale of operations to be controlled, and this in their opinion increased the trust of America's allies and clients that the United States would fulfil its commitments. Account was also taken of the fact that the concept of a "limited war" would be received with less hostility by the American public opposed to using force in achieving political aims. But this was not the case. The protest from public opinion all over the world against the "limited war" in Vietnam was one of the main reasons for the United States defeat in Indochina.

Thus the "limited" use of military force to implement hegemonist and militarist policies has not in practice brought about the desired results. It must be admitted that all these means—from the actual use of military force to the threat to use it—have been incapable of achieving the desired results. Nevertheless, the set of such methods still dominates the thinking of the US military and political leadership and forms the basis



of its militarist ideology. Their solution to international problems in the nuclear age consists in "embellishing" the image of war and seeing it as just another instrument for furthering policies. Hence the main problem for the American military and political leadership: "How can the United States utilize its military power as a rational and effective instrument of national policy?"<sup>78</sup>

The methods contemplated by the military and political leadership of the United States to further their hegemonist and militarist plans are today a threat not only to world peace, but to the very existence of life on earth.

## *Chapter II*

### **The US War Machine — The Main Means for Furthering the Postwar Policy of World Domination**

#### **1. The USSR — Target No. 1 for the Aggressive Designs of American Imperialism**

In the final stages of the Second World War the military and political leadership of the United States had already come to the conclusion that in the postwar world its main obstacle to world domination and therefore its main opponent would be the Soviet Union. The American vision of the world was determined by the unique combination of historical circumstances that resulted from the collapse of Hitlerism in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia as well as the fact that the economic potential of both vanquished and victors alike, with the exception of the United States itself, had been seriously weakened. The destruction wrought by the war had affected all countries, particularly the Soviet Union, but had completely bypassed the United States. Furthermore, it had become the sole possessor of a new weapon—the atom bomb—which fed the hegemonist ambitions of its rulers. These ambitions were also stimulated by the fact that the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States had at the time amassed 68 per cent of the world's gold reserves. The result of all this was that the world, battered and bled white by the war, had now become the alluring goal for the spread of Pax Americana. In this situation emphasis on military force—though in varying

degrees at various times—became the distinctive characteristic of the policy of hegemonism.

This bid by the United States for world hegemony was strengthened by certain qualitatively new trends in the political situation of the postwar world. The war had resulted primarily in the destruction in both Europe and Asia of the traditional balance of power. Britain, which had once been looked upon by the United States as a first line of defence for its interests and dominant position in the Western Hemisphere, had become a second-rate power, and the Royal Navy which had once "ruled the waves" was no longer such a force to be reckoned with. In this situation Washington hurried to fill the vacuum, to recreate and strengthen the political and economic structure in Europe so as to secure its own imperialist interests and thereby further its bid for world hegemony.

It is an indisputable fact that neither at that time nor at any time in the foreseeable future was there any real threat to the security of the United States. The ruling class in that country was faced with a choice. Either on the basis of the anti-Hitler coalition and the positive experience of military cooperation with the Soviet Union, together with recognition for the latter's security interests, it could start promoting mutually beneficial cooperation with the USSR for the good of mankind in the postwar period, or it could use US nuclear supremacy and economic expansion to make a bid for world hegemony. In the final analysis the American leaders chose the second path—the path of global confrontation with socialism.

In March 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff published a memorandum entitled "A Security Policy for Post-War America"<sup>1</sup> which stated that the changes occurring were "more comparable indeed with that occasioned by the fall of Rome than with any other change occurring during the succeeding fifteen hundred years." The memorandum went on to say that with

Germany and Japan devastated and demilitarized and Britain reduced to second-rate status, the United States and the Soviet Union would be the superpowers. During the war the US leadership had considered it necessary to give strictly dosed out amounts of aid to the Soviet Army so as to reduce its own losses and weaken the Hitlerite armies. But after the Battle of Stalingrad and the summer campaign of 1943 US ruling quarters became increasingly concerned over the Soviet Union's successes. It began to be mooted that "a sudden German collapse... might allow Stalin's forces to sweep across Europe before the democracies establish their presence on the continent." In the summer of 1943 the Office of Strategic Services weighed the merits of an Anglo-American attempt at "turning against her (the Soviet Union) the full strength of a Germany still strong",<sup>2</sup> instead of opening a second front. The possibility of this had already been mentioned in passing by General Marshall at the Quebec Conference in 1943. In the same year Admiral Leahy, chief of staff to the Commander-in-Chief proposed that the Western countries should join together in a war against the USSR.

The attitude of the US military towards the USSR was in many respects contradictory. Sharing the hegemonist ambitions of the political leadership they began to prepare for intrusion into the postwar world. But in the summer of 1944 the Joint Chiefs of Staff were still inclined to believe that winning the war was the primary objective and that nothing should be done to weaken the resolution of the Soviet Union to aid the United States in war against Japan in the Pacific. How necessary this help was is shown by, for example, the fact that in August 1944 General Arnold, who was always anti-Soviet, declared in favour of sending the Soviet Union B-24 aircraft to form the "nucleus of a Russian heavy bomber force" and "provide transport capability for the Pacific War".<sup>3</sup> The US military, as distinct from many politicians, supported lend lease in the belief that

"generous aid" to the USSR would encourage the Soviet Union to help the Americans in the Pacific theatre of operations. Thus in a number of cases the short-term military considerations outweighed long-range political objectives.

But at the same time the summer of 1944 saw more blatant attempts on the part of the US political leadership to foist its will upon the USSR and encroach upon the latter's legitimate interests. This was particularly seen from attempts at crude intervention into Polish affairs when the United States supported the exiled anti-popular Polish "government" in London. Although American politicians admitted that US interests in Eastern Europe were "not weighty", they believed that US indifference to Poland might "encourage Russian penetration further west".<sup>4</sup> It was during this period that the idea began to be mooted that the Soviet form of government was "incompatible" with peaceful relations between the great powers. US War Secretary, Henry L. Stimson, stated his belief that aggressiveness was rooted in the nature of the Soviet regime.<sup>5</sup> Thus a year before the end of the war the ideological foundations were already being laid among American ruling circles for the cold war. In December 1944 Stimson, who was kept fully informed of the US atomic weapon programme, told President Roosevelt that the atom bomb could give the United States the necessary power to bring pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union. In talks with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Navy Stimson spoke in favour of using US postwar credits to the Soviet Union as another means of getting that country to follow the American line.

At the Yalta Conference the USSR set the time for its entry into the war with Japan. But by then anti-Soviet moods were beginning to grow among US political circles. The US embassy in Moscow and particularly the leader of the US military delegation, General Deane "kept up a stream of advice urging reprisals,

economic pressure, and stern words" with Moscow. The embassy warned that the United States faced "a barbarian invasion of Europe".<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, in view of American advances in the Pacific it was claimed that the value of Soviet participation in the war against Japan had been considerably reduced. And therefore it was not necessary to consider the interests of the USSR.

In the last months of the war the British Prime Minister, Winston S. Churchill, proposed to the Americans that the Allies should be the first to take the capital cities of Central Europe. But General Marshall and General Eisenhower were against this proposal. They believed that action of this kind could affect Soviet participation in the Pacific and hold up American operations there. Nevertheless, on April 23, 1945 President Truman called a special conference of American military and political leaders at which he cast doubt on the advantages of agreements with the Soviet Union since they were supposedly of benefit only to the Soviet side. It was here that Truman essentially announced his intention of embarking upon confrontation with the Soviet Union.

At the April conference, the military, however, warned the White House against increasing confrontation with the Soviet Union, though, of course, they had their own reasons. They believed that the untimely conflict of the two powers would only serve to prolong the Pacific War and increase the number of American losses. There was general agreement among the US top brass that a harsher line should be taken against the USSR, particularly through the reduction of aid. In the first half of 1945 certain experts in the Pentagon were already proposing the creation of a West-European-American power bloc to counter the Soviet Union. The documents of the period increasingly refer to "Soviet expansion" and "Soviet aggression".

Furthermore, the most aggressive among the US political leadership pressurized the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their unconditional support for a policy of

"resistance to Soviet expansion". They believed that Japan could be defeated without Soviet help and recommended that the US government renounce the commitments made at Yalta for a postwar settlement in the Pacific. The US Navy supported this, since they were reluctant to share the glory of a victory over Japan with the USSR. On the other hand, the US Army and War Secretary Stimson rejected Churchill's request and the line pursued by the State Department chief Edward Stettinius and his Under Secretary Joseph Grew, for increasing resistance to Soviet policy in Europe.

Churchill wanted the joint Anglo-American command to be maintained until unilateral concessions were wrested from the Soviet Union. But General Marshall declared that Soviet aid was essential if peace was to be achieved.<sup>7</sup> Even the successful testing of the atom bomb at Alamogordo was not enough to convince the American military command that the war with Japan could be won without an invasion of the islands.

At the same time some of the military and the majority of the politicians were trying to end the Pacific war as quickly as possible and preferably without the direct participation of the Soviet Union. They were worried that Soviet entry into the war against imperial Japan would have substantial bearing on the subsequent development of events in North China and Korea and show that Soviet aid was indispensable for defeating the Japanese aggressor. They also believed that an unaided US victory would show clearly to the Soviet Union the suremacy of American military power. And here the use of atomic weapons was given paramount consideration.

Nevertheless, the Army insisted that only a landing in Japan could bring about capitulation. But the defeats and losses the Americans had sustained in fighting with the imperial Japanese forces convinced the US military command that such a landing would cost them dearly. Therefore the timely entry of the Soviet Union

into the war was of critical importance. The Joint Chiefs also feared that the American public would not take another Okinawa, where US troops had suffered huge casualties during the landing. Insubordination in the ranks was also considered to be not out of the question.

On June 18, 1945 the President and the commanders of the arms of the service examined plans for the war with Japan. Marshall reviewed the options open to the US in order to secure Japanese capitulation. They included: blockade, bombing possibly with the use of atomic weapons, invasion and the entry of the USSR into the war. He made it unambiguously clear at this conference that Soviet entry into the war remained vitally important for American plans. True to their allied commitments Soviet troops began the liberation of Manchuria on August 8 and Japanese documents now show that it was this entry of the Soviet Union into the war and not the use of atomic bombs which forced the Japanese government to capitulate. ✓

After atomic bombs were dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima the US military leadership came out finally in favour of confrontation with the USSR. For many months previously the State Department and a number of chiefs in the War Department had been arousing passions over the growth of Soviet influence in the world. War Secretary Stimson, Admiral Leahy and above all Navy Secretary James Forrestal were openly sympathetic. Although General Marshall continued to show his "faith" in possible postwar Soviet-American cooperation, the mood of confrontation, despite certain variations of accent, gathered increasing strength.

In autumn 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved two directives: JCS 1496/2 and JCS 1518, the essence of which was that the US Armed Forces should be "ready when necessary to take military action abroad to maintain the security and integrity of the United States". The aim of this was the "maintenance of world peace



under conditions which insure the security, well-being and advancement" of the United States. In fact, of course, this was merely pursuit of that same policy of hegemonism. It is no accident that the commentaries to directive 1496/2 point out that it was designed to show that the United States had moved from a traditional policy of passive defence to an active defence policy with emphasis on preventive action.

Thus the Navy planners moved to insert into JCS 1496/2 an explicit reference to striking the first blow and insisted that "this point should be emphasized to make it clear that this is a new concept of policy, different from the American attitude toward war in the past".<sup>8</sup> Although General Eisenhower assured Congress that the United States would not strike the first blow, the secret plans had a different story to tell and even in their public statements certain military commanders made transparent references to the expediency of preventive strikes. This policy was officially affirmed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also developed a contingency strategy in the event of a "major war" breaking out with particular regard for the conduct of military operations on foreign territory if they should prove necessary. It was believed that an extended system of military bases and the mobile armed forces would protect the United States itself from invasion. As General Lincoln explained at a session of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "we will have to intervene militarily in Europe or Asia because we certainly don't envisage getting set back on our heels where the military operations are going to start in the United States."<sup>9</sup>

In the documents published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in autumn 1945 the Soviet Union headed the list of enemies of the United States. They "designated 'the USSR and its satellite states or a coalition of the USSR and other powers' as the only force with 'the capacity' to threaten us militarily".<sup>10</sup> The aims

of the Soviet Union were described as "progressive expansion". The position of the military leaders was to a large extent explained by the changes which had occurred and by the increasingly aggressive attitude displayed by President Truman and his advisers leading ultimately to a breakdown in the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in London in September of the same year.

The problem of postwar demobilization in the United States only served to inflame anti-Soviet hysteria and encourage belligerence. The country wanted rapid demobilization and a return to normality, but this was a mood which seriously threatened the future plans of the military and political directorate.

Their efforts were concentrated rather on avoiding rapid demobilization, the intention being to draw the process out so that ultimately a regular army might be formed. Demobilization was to be phased and universal military training introduced—an important innovation. To quell the general mood for demobilization and preserve the basis of the war machine that could one day bring the United States world domination, US leaders began to overdramatize the situation and increase the tension in Soviet-American relations to deceive the American people into believing that a "Soviet military threat" really did exist. It was a situation in which internal political causes and foreign political objectives intertwined and motivated the US military and political leaders to inflame passions over the "Soviet threat".

A generally characteristic feature of US politics is the at times highly whimsical intertwining of inter-departmental egoistical aspirations and foreign policy adventurism. For instance, in late 1945 the US Navy was extremely worried that Congress might reduce its budget. It was being said among those political circles in the country that considered the Navy a highly expensive luxury that according to the Mahan Doctrine the Navy only existed to carry out military operations against a

rival power. Since with the war ended there was no such rival powers in view, it followed that there was no reason to maintain a large navy. Thus at a time when this sort of attitude was widespread, the development of the aircraft carrier fleet was looked upon by the naval chiefs as the one factor which "saved" the US Navy.

The aircraft carrier commanders who returned from the Pacific Ocean in the autumn of 1945 declared under the influence of Forrestal and Admiral King that the Navy should no longer be limited to a purely aquatic role. In the future it could with the aid of aircraft carriers be used to strike tactical and strategic blows deep into the heart of enemy territory. Though they recognized the value of the regular navy, these commanders nevertheless saw its strategic value to lie in the fact that it could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. "Their conception also allowed the navy at last to identify an enemy against which its weapons might be useful and whose existence would justify its schemes." The logic behind this thinking was this: "The Soviet Union with its relatively short shoreline and modest navy, was impervious to conventional naval attack, but carrier aircraft might tear at the vitals of the former ally. Thus self-interest encouraged the navy to magnify the Russian threat."

In planning military action against the Soviet Union, the military and political leadership of the United States pursued far-reaching aims from the very beginning (September 1945). Draft directive JCS 1518 indicated doubts about the desirability of attempting full conquest or destruction of a major enemy like the Soviet Union. For example, General Lincoln argued that the objective in a war with Russia "should not be to drive her back within her frontiers but to destroy her war making capabilities; otherwise a long war or a stalemate would result". General Marshall had even stronger views: "The nature of war," he point-

ed out in his biennial report, 'is such that once it now begins it can end only as this one is ending, in the destruction of the vanquished.'"11

A secret report prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Joint Intelligence Committee in November 1945 and entitled "Strategic Vulnerability of the USSR to a Limited Air Attack" analyzed the desirability of a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. The committee recommended delivering such an attack not only in the event of an imminent Soviet attack but in the contingency that enemy industrial and scientific progress suggested a capability for an "eventual attack against the United States or defence against our attack". Thus the concept of first strike was unconditionally accepted by the US. The committee added that A-bombs really would be useful only for mass destruction of urban targets.<sup>12</sup>

It is worth noting that from the very beginning the development and production of nuclear weapons was looked upon by ruling circles in the United States as the means by which they could dictate their will upon the Soviet Union and achieve American hegemony throughout the world. The development of nuclear weapons began in 1940. In 1942 control over their production passed into the hands of the army. Gregg Herken quotes War Secretary Stimson as saying that "at no time from 1941 to 1945 did he [Stimson] ever hear it suggested by the President or any other responsible member of the Government that atomic energy should not be used in the war." Stimson emphasized that "it was the common objective throughout the war 'to be the first to develop an atomic weapon and use it.'"13 From the beginning of 1943 the atomic bomb was already being regarded as the future means for pursuing American diplomacy. Furthermore, the United States realized that "the atomic bomb is par excellence the weapon of aggression, that it weighs the scales overwhelmingly in favour of surprise attack".<sup>14</sup> Therefore ruling circles in

the country considered that possession of the bomb meant that the "cards" were "in American hands" and that the President intended "to play them as American cards".<sup>15</sup>

And in the first place the military and political leadership of the United States intended to play these cards against the Soviet Union. That was preceded by the debate on the expediency of informing the Soviet ally that the United States had developed an atomic bomb. President Truman was "advised that the Russians not be told about the weapon prior to its use".<sup>16</sup> A similar internal debate was held on the expediency of divulging the "secret of the atom bomb" to the Soviet Union. This, of course, had a serious effect on both the letter and the spirit of Soviet-American relations.

In fact, concealing this qualitatively new type of weapon from its main ally could only give rise to considerable doubt as to the sincerity of the United States and call into question its subsequent intentions. The hullabaloo that surrounded the bomb at the Potsdam Conference had already demonstrated quite clearly to the Soviet leadership the future intentions of the US President. Certain members of Truman's administration, for example Stimson, the War Secretary, discussed the possibility of "exchanging" the secret of the atomic bomb for "internal liberalization" in the USSR, changing the nature of government in the East European countries and Soviet participation in an international control commission on atomic energy which was in fact just a means to further American nuclear hegemony.<sup>17</sup> This clearly showed the mercenary nature of American political thinking. The President, Stimson noted, was initially very receptive to this kind of approach.

The most resolute opponents of providing the USSR with information on nuclear weapons were the Treasury Secretary, Frederick M. Vinson and the Navy Secretary, James V. Forrestal. The latter considered that the Russians weren't to be trusted, since they had an "Eastern" way of thinking, i.e., like the Japanese who had

treacherously attacked Pearl Harbour. Resistance to the establishment of honest relations with its ally was based mainly on the assumption that the Soviet Union would need from ten to twenty years to make the bomb. In mid July 1946 the President asked Robert Patterson, the Secretary of War, for his recommendations on policy towards Soviet-American relations. The reply received was a blatantly aggressive programme of confrontation with the Soviet Union. It was based on the concept of US military supremacy and the permissibility of using nuclear weapons even for a preventive strike. With a few slight modifications this programme was followed by the military and political leadership of the United States for several decades.

There were several plans drawn up for making a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. These included the plan codenamed "Totality" (late 1945) which envisaged war with the USSR in Europe; the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee (November 1945); and Plan Charioteer (1948) for global war with the Soviet Union. Later there was a whole series of plans and recommendations—"Cogwheel", "Gunpowder", "Doublestar", "ABC 101", "Dualism" and finally "Fleetwood", which was the direct predecessor of Plan Dropshot (late 1949).<sup>18</sup>

Plan Dropshot, which was drawn up in three large volumes, was prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by President Truman. According to the plan the beginning of the war was provisionally fixed for January 1, 1957. "Dropshot" clearly reflected the aggressive character of US policy towards the Soviet Union. It is hardly surprising that American scholars considered it to be a "document of immense importance."<sup>19</sup> The plan was not only living proof of US intentions to launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, it also envisaged American occupation of the Soviet Union and, as the main political objective of the war, the liquidation of the Soviet social and political system and the destruction

of the USSR as a single state so that nothing could further stand in the way of US world hegemony. It was planned to divide the Soviet Union into separate zones of occupation —Western USSR; Caucasus-Ukraine; Ural-West Siberia-Turkestan; and East Siberia-Transbaikalia-Maritime. Control over the USSR and its allies and observance of the capitulation conditions were to be in the hands of occupational forces stationed at the key industrial and administrative centres.<sup>20</sup>

The planned war with the Soviet Union envisaged a US preemptive strike, a project which was given careful study in the Pentagon. After August 1949 plans for a preventive war with the USSR were given very close attention by the US military and political leadership. After the first nuclear test in the Soviet Union the Pentagon came to the conclusion that US supremacy in strategic nuclear forces was only temporary. The possibility was discussed of delivering a first nuclear strike while the United States was still the more powerful. After all in late 1949 the US strategic arsenal contained at least 300 atomic bombs and 840 bombers, while the Soviet Union, according to Pentagon calculations, had at best 200 strategic bombers and not a single atomic bomb. According to these calculations the USSR could have more than one hundred atomic bombs in the 1950s.

What did this mean for the United States? A study carried out on the effectiveness of the Strategic Air Command in 1950 stated that ten to fifty atomic bombs dropped on appropriate targets in the United States could seriously "impede our mobilization for war" and "our strategic atomic air offensive". The study went on to state that "this Government has been forced, for the purposes of the political war now in progress, to consider more definite and militant objectives towards Russia even now in time of peace, than it was ever called upon to formulate with respect to either Germany or Japan in advance

of the actual hostilities with those countries.<sup>21</sup> In these conditions and given the prevailing atmosphere the Pentagon considered that a preventive war was not only feasible, but desirable.

But at the same time the growth of the defence capabilities of the Soviet Union, which was provoked by the aggressive and hostile action on the part of the United States, had a sobering effect on many of the US military and political leaders. In 1982, Soviet Defence Minister, Dmitri Ustinov, noted that the champions of military adventurism were trying to crush socialism with force of arms. "By the late 1940s and early 1950s plans of this kind had already been drawn up by the United States. They gambled on making a sudden nuclear attack on the USSR. And only the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and the creation of our own nuclear weapons in reply to US blackmail held the United States back from aggression."<sup>22</sup>

But this sobering influence bore a distinctly relative character. The point is that the US military and political leadership never renounce its plans for using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union and even never excluded the possibility of using them first. For this reason research was stepped up with generous grants provided and the technological sophistication achieved for delivering a first decapitating strike. The numerous concepts and doctrines that sprang up around the problem of using nuclear weapons were for the most part based on the following postulates: the achievement and maintenance of nuclear superiority over the USSR, the feasibility of a first strike and a limited nuclear war as a means of delivering American territory from nuclear retaliation.

And today certain political circles in the United States are insistently trying to convince the public that even the existence of military and strategic parity between the USSR and the USA is a threat to the latter and that observance of the principle of equal-



ity and equal security is impossible without American military superiority. This is once again an example of the traditional American philosophy of militarism and reliance on military superiority for supporting the morale and combat efficiency of the American soldier and making US generals more sure of themselves. This approach conforms at the same time with the traditional stereotypes of "Americanism", where having a dollar more than someone else gives a sense of superiority and readiness to hold talks is considered weakness.

The ruling class in the United States, as has already been noted, built up a gigantic war machine after the Second World War. The spending on the Army, Navy and Air Force during the postwar period reached fantastic proportions in comparison with what was before the war. The defence budget which between 1931 and 1940 had never exceeded \$650 million, jumped from \$12 billion in fiscal 1948 to \$80 billion in 1970 and to a staggering \$200 billion in 1982. The numerical strength of the armed forces which fluctuated in 1920 and 1930 between a quarter and a third of a million, never fell lower than 1.5 million after World War II and lower than 2.2 million after the Korean War. Congress refused to introduce universal military training, but until 1973 selective compulsory military service was used to fill the ranks of the Army. If before the war the United States had tried to maintain its strategic interests on a regional scale, after 1945 the US Armed Forces were deployed practically around the world. Today there are more than 15,000 US military bases and installations in 32 countries, all of which with their personnel in excess of half a million are footholds for aggression. And these forces have frequently been brought into action since the war.

The state of combat readiness of the American war machine in the postwar period, its plans for aggression and particularly the ideas of striking a preventive blow against the Soviet Union could only lead to tension and

a deterioration in Soviet-American relations. It is enough to remember what Major-General Curtis LeMay, commander of the US strategic air force, said some time after 1947: "The United States possessed the means to 'depopulate vast areas of the earth's surface, leaving only vestigial remnants of man's material works'."<sup>23</sup> The Soviet representatives at the United Nations and other international organizations have exposed the plans of the United States to launch a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. However, official representatives of the various US administrations have denied these accusations. Now there is documented evidence proving how hypocritical these refutations were.

Some American historians today have concerned themselves with the question as to how much information the Soviet leadership possessed on US strategic planning and how much this latter poisoned international relations and created a climate of increasing danger and confrontation. We may assume that the Soviet leadership was well enough informed on the aggressive intentions of the United States. In favour of this assumption is the fact that the Soviet intelligence agent Kim Philby held an important position in the coordinating apparatus of the Anglo-American intelligence services and therefore would have known about military planning in the Pentagon.<sup>24</sup>

But here the amount of information possessed by the Soviet government on US plans to wage nuclear war against the USSR is not so important as US policy itself. Its specific acts of aggression and refusal to make reasonable compromises were sufficiently eloquent signals in themselves of the true intentions of the men in the White House. If one looks from this angle at who must bear the historical responsibility for starting the cold war and the arms race, which has shown no signs of abating over subsequent decades, then it becomes immediately clear that it is the military and political leadership of the United

States that has headed the world towards a dangerous abyss at the bottom of which hovers the ghost of nuclear catastrophe.

There have been, of course, among the military and political leaders of the United States a number of more realistically minded persons. For example, Goldthwaite Dorr, an influential adviser to War Secretary Stimson, spoke out against a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. In a letter to John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner in Germany, Dorr wrote in June 1945: "I do not know how we can expect to receive from the Russians a tolerance for the existence of a capitalist system and for the freedom of any area to live under it or adopt it, if we cannot feel the same tolerance with regard to the socialist economy."<sup>25</sup> He also expressed doubt that the Soviet system threatened the West since "from its very nature the socialist economy may prove to be less aggressive than the capitalist..."<sup>26</sup> The greatest danger Dorr saw not in Soviet "expansionism" but in the miscalculations and misconceptions of the superpowers. He also noted with reference to American armed intervention against Soviet Russia in 1918-1920 that " 'if we had the eyes to see it' that American actions and statements, if seen 'against the background of Murmansk, Eastern Siberia, and the 'Cordon Sanitaire'" also frightened the Soviets".<sup>27</sup>

A group of specialists from the Joint Chiefs of Staff also directed the attention of the military and political leadership of the country to the need in Soviet-US relations to take account of the history of foreign invasions against the USSR. On the basis of this experience, they warned, "the Soviet leaders will probably overemphasize any British or American expansionist tendencies and exaggerate the possibility of aggression against the USSR from any quarter." Soviet reaction, they believed, might in turn cause American leaders to misread Soviet intentions and a "dangerous miscalculation" might result. At the same time to humour ruling

quarters, the experts suggested the usefulness of "large (military. — *R.B.*) capabilities and firm policies ... in discouraging wide Soviet expansion".<sup>28</sup> And in November 1945 the US military were already considering nuclear weapons as a means of mass destruction against an enemy.

The switchover on the part of the US military towards nuclear confrontation with the USSR nevertheless contained within itself a deep contradiction. The US military and political leaders unleashed an arms race which ultimately lead only to a weakening of their own national security. The most far-sighted among them admitted that nuclear competition would inevitably mean the erosion of American security and that therefore talks on nuclear energy control were highly desirable. But they themselves were unable to suggest an alternative to the arms race.

But these flashes of a more sober-minded approach were overshadowed by the dominant great-power imperialist ambition of ruling the world. Of considerable importance at the time was the well-known American worship of technology, the conviction that military problems could be solved by technology and political problems by military means and the belief that the United States was superior to all other nations. Hatred of the Soviet Union, fear of its influence in the world and understanding of the fact that Soviet influence was the only serious impediment to the creation of a *Pax Americana* were the foundations for the US policy of nuclear blackmail and position of strength diplomacy.

This policy had its own specific American characteristics which played a part in how it was implemented. At the end of the Second World War the military and political leadership of the country together with a number of scholars worked out the concept of combat readiness. It was based on the fact that the weakness of the United States induced the leaders of the

Axis Powers to contemplate aggression and the strong armed forces, therefore, would deter its potential enemy. The attack on Pearl Harbour and the preceding appearance of new types of weapons demonstrated that the country was defenceless against a surprise attack and, consequently, needed an unprecedented build-up of military might to stand up against a *blitzkrieg*. This concept did not contain many new elements. But it was a basis upon which the military and political hierarchy could come to agreement, since it justified spending on an extravagant scale to build up armaments and the armed forces and draw up adventurist plans.

Also important is the fact that politicians, scientists and businessmen also campaigned in support of "readiness" no less ardently than the military. Both President Roosevelt and President Truman spoke decisively in favour of it as did many congressmen. And it was on the basis of this blatantly aggressive and hegemonistic concept that the spirit and thinking of the cold war were formed. In this atmosphere what was needed was an enemy and in the eyes of Washington it already existed—the USSR. The fact that the Soviet Union even at the cost of enormous sacrifice had emerged victorious out of the Second World War and that the old alignment of forces on the European continent had changed and with it, as the American ruling class believed, the whole extended security system of the United States, was the cause of unusually grave concern to the US government. The concept of combat readiness also stemmed in no small degree from the fears of the American ruling class over a possible repeat of the Great Depression. Thus the cold war made it possible not only to avoid dismantling the military-industrial sector of the economy, but allowed its further development and strengthening. This concept also helped the United States establish its role as gendarme of the postwar world

and justified its aggressive actions. Furthermore, it encouraged atomic blackmail and intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

Thus the cold war and the arms race were the natural result of the extensive anti-Soviet military preparations conducted by US imperialism after the Second World War.

## **2. The Cold War and US Military and Political Planning**

The policy of containment, proclaimed in the well-known speech by President Truman in 1947, essentially amounted to the aggressive intention to destroy the Soviet Union and continually increase international tension to turn the cold war into a "hot" war. The cold war was begun by ruling circles in the United States on a virtually global scale—in Eastern Europe, Germany, the Balkans, Turkey, Iran, Japan and Korea. The aim of the policy of containment was not only to impede the deep objective social changes that were taking place in the postwar world. It envisaged not only preserving the capitalist system, but also "rolling back" socialism within its prewar boundaries. But the more aggressive champions of imperialism went even further, demanding the "liberation of the enslaved peoples" (i.e. the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union). Washington took active measures to restore the capitalist system in those countries that had begun establishing people's democracy and building socialism.

Here it is worth making the point that the military and political planning had begun even before the Second World War ended. And one of the most important factors was the rivalry between the US armed services, each of which tried to make its own contribution to the future Pax Americana.

Thus as early as 1943 the US Air Force had already

begun its planning on the basis of the need for separating the Air Force from the Army. It argued that a modern air force could independently tackle strategic as well as tactical objectives. For this reason the postwar air force planners concentrated their attention on the strategic doctrine of building up air power. They proposed a permanent air force of 105 air groups and one million active-duty personnel, on the basis of the doctrine that the aircraft was the "ultimate weapon for universal peacekeeping."<sup>29</sup> They came to the conclusion that the Air Force would play a dominant role in the postwar defence of the United States and that it should prevent aggression by striking preemptive blows on the potential aggressor before the threat of aggression reached menacing proportions.

On the orders of Admiral King the US Navy also began planning in 1943. The first proposal suggested a minimum fleet of a dozen battleships and twelve large carriers, plus twenty smaller carriers, five thousand planes, and lesser craft. To man such a large peacetime force the Navy would require up to 825,000 officers and enlisted men. Before the war the US Navy had been concentrated in the Atlantic and the Pacific, but the 1943-1944 plans envisaged its global role. In conformity with the new ideas it was intended to split the Navy into strike groups operating in most of the world's seas. Furthermore, the navy chiefs were in favour of delivering preventive strikes. For example, Vice-Admiral Frederick Horne said that "defence of our national interests... must envisage the desirability of being able to commence offensive operations without waiting for an assault and setback by any future enemy".<sup>30</sup>

The US Army in its turn planned to increase its strength to 1.5 million. It also proposed expeditional or strike forces capable of operating in any part of the world. General Marshall did not object to this kind of proposal from his staff, but refused to allow his generals to speak about it publicly, fearing undesirable po-

litical consequences. Thus the Army too in the person of General Marshall had drawn the conclusion that the US land forces also had "global responsibilities".

Planning throughout the armed forces was based on the assumption that postwar US commitments would be more comprehensive than at any time in the country's history, and that the United States would be part of definite system for ensuring international security.

Subsequently, right up to the end of the war, various correctives were made to this military planning mainly concerning the armed forces' numerical strength and the planners' assessment of how ready Congress was to support the proposed increases in the Army, Navy and Air Force. In March 1944 Congress formed a Committee on Postwar Military Planning.

In this context the position of the military commanders vis-à-vis peacetime military policy is rather interesting. The navy and the air force chiefs began to show the increasingly clear desire to possess forces capable of delivering a preventive strike against an enemy. The Army, and particularly General Marshall, believed that the postwar world would on the whole conform to America's wishes. In favour of maintaining the "less expensive" armed forces, he considered that it was also necessary to get public opinion in the country to fear the outbreak of another war. This line was made particularly clear in his report to Congress on June 30, 1945.

Predominant in leading circles in the United States, including President Roosevelt's own entourage, was the opinion that American national interests coincided with the interests of other countries. Or, to be more exact, that the interests of other countries ought to coincide with those of the United States. Based on this as well as on the interests of the "direct defence" of the United States and its overseas possessions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared in November 1943 the draft of Directive 570 which included a list of air bases that



Washington intended to build on foreign territory. In discussing this directive with President Roosevelt, General Arnold made the point that certain countries could attack the United States in the future, and therefore "we must meet such an attack as far from our own borders as possible to insure against any part of the United States mainland being visited by a sudden devastation beyond any 'Pearl Harbor' experience".<sup>31-32</sup> The President approved the list with certain minor changes and instructed Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, to work out the diplomatic aspects of acquiring these air bases as well as the land, naval and commercial installations on foreign territory.

Gradually the definition of the concept of security became more and more blatantly aggressive. Thus James Forrestal declared: "If we are to keep America safe from the horror and destruction of war we must hit our enemies at great distance from our shores."<sup>33</sup> Speaking at the Maryland Historical Society on May 10, 1943 he said: "There is no such thing as security..., and the word should be stricken from our dictionary. We should put in every school book the maxim that power like wealth must either be used or lost."<sup>34</sup> Speaking in September 1944 to a group of military commanders the then distinguished scientist, Edward Mead Earle, stated: "Given the enormous advantage afforded the aggressor by the techniques of Poland and Pearl Harbor ... 'defense' no longer has much meaning. Neither has 'peace.' Unless a nation is ready to strike before being struck, it may not be capable of effective defense."<sup>35</sup>

In 1943 and 1944 the military and political leadership of the United States had still not specified whom exactly it considered to be the future enemy, although at the time it was beginning to show elements of hostility and ill-will towards one of its leading allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, i.e. the Soviet Union. To

a certain degree what the United States had suffered at Pearl Harbour together with what it had learned from the sudden German invasion of the Soviet Union dictated what seemed to the US government to be adequate military decisions. On the wave of the victory in the Second World War and the realization of their enormous military and economic might the US military and political leaders began to look upon the world as a field for the application of American military power, where everything was permitted including preventive and selective strikes.

They justified their postwar incursion into the European continent and other regions of the world by claiming it was necessary for US security. Cold war politics gained a whole arsenal of ideological dogma and anti-communist stereotypes. But the cold war was not just a matter of ideological sparring. The United States began the greatest arms race in the history of mankind that was aimed at crushing all progressive forces in the world, intimidating the socialist countries and ruining their economies.

It is important to stress that the United States claimed that postwar rearmament (and later all subsequent arms improvements) was necessary because of the military superiority of the Soviet Union. For twenty-five years this myth was supported by the cold war and only in 1961 Washington was forced to admit that it had virtual military, and in particular nuclear supremacy. This partial admission, however, did not mean that the United States had now renounced the myth of the "Soviet threat" and Soviet "supremacy", which still continued to be spread by American propaganda. Furthermore, the United States went on to extend the cold war to the developing countries. Under the pretext of "combatting communism" Washington gave its support to the most reactionary, anti-popular regimes and conspired to overthrow governments that were suspected of being anti-American. Not only Europe

now, but Asia, Africa and Latin America became cold war zones.

The cold war that had been unleashed by the military and political leadership in the United States was ultimately due to the desire on the part of American capitalists to achieve world hegemony. In the name of this objective the United States tried to destabilize international relations, create a situation of extreme tension and give the impression that there existed an external threat from the Soviet Union. This is an evaluation of US policy during the postwar period which is now shared by many realistically minded American scholars.<sup>36</sup>

In analyzing the causes of the cold war and the means by which this policy was implemented we should always remember the fact that there existed in the depths of American capitalist society groups interested in furthering such a policy, which lived off it like parasites and gained from it direct economic benefit. These primarily were the captains of the war industry who had taken arms contracts from the government, but they also included various émigré groups that spread hatred of the Soviet Union and were in a position to influence the US administration in this vein, as well as the military and political bureaucracy, whose living standards and careers depended on the continued growth of military spending, and politicians who were out to win votes on the basis of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism. Finally, there were the professional ideologists of anti-communism, who formed a kind of cold war ideological establishment.

American scholars admit that the US bid for hegemony implied and even required changes in the whole postwar world order,<sup>37</sup> particularly the eradication of socialism, and support for and the strengthening of European and Asiatic capitalism as a counterbalance, although the latter, of course, was only to be within limits that would not threaten the imperialist intentions of the United States itself. American postwar expansionism

pursued both these objectives, trying to prevent any changes that could endanger its hegemonist ambitions.

Ruling circles in the United States looked upon the world as a game between two sides with only one winner. Victory for one meant defeat and loss for the other. And as a result of this approach, the United States made no distinction between its really important interests and those that were only secondary and it clearly overloaded itself with global commitments, particularly of a military nature. By trying to keep in existence the old orders and supporting anti-popular, dictatorial, fascist regimes, the United States functioned as an objectively counter-revolutionary, anti-progressive force in the world. In trying to enforce their Pax Americana they brought chaos to international relations and created crises which frequently brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.

All the postwar US administrations looked at international relations through the prism of hegemonism. And it was precisely for this reason that the United States began to build up its military power to achieve superiority over the USSR. On the basis of this superiority it began to pursue a policy of containing the USSR. What this meant in practice was exerting political pressure and intimidation. For example, the doctrine of massive retaliation which was a threat to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union whenever the United States considered it necessary.

By 1950 Washington had already formulated the basic military aspects of "containment" in Directive NSC 68.<sup>38</sup> What is significant is that even some American scholars have criticized this. They note that the striking thing about this is the "oscillation between symmetry and asymmetry" in the American reaction to the "Soviet threat" which had little "to do with what the Russians were up to at any given point. Without exception, shifts in strategies of containment since 1947 have coincided less with new Kremlin initiatives than with shifts in perceptions of means in Washing-

ton. Perceptions of means played a larger role than perceptions of threats in shaping US policy toward the Soviet Union."<sup>39</sup>

Turning to the facts of history we see that in September 1945 the Americans began their first open confrontation with their then ally, the Soviet Union, at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. Their intention was to disrupt the signing of peace treaties with the former German satellites. American scholars note that from approximately March 1946 the US administration was already looking upon the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, whose vital interests could not be recognized without threatening the vital interests of the United States. President Truman came to the conclusion that the United States should make no further compromises with the Soviet Union: "Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making... I'm tired of babying the Soviets."<sup>40</sup>

In forming the anti-Soviet thrust of US foreign policy an important role was played by an alliance of Republican legislators headed by Arthur H. Vandenberg, John Foster Dulles and other hawks within the Truman administration. The Republican leaders declared that any further compromises with the Soviet Union would make them start an open campaign against the Democrats' policy.

It is no secret too that US aggressiveness was to a considerable degree based on possession of the atom bomb. Secretary of State, James Byrnes, declared to his colleagues that "the New Mexico situation (the first successful test of the bomb.—R.B.) had given us great power".<sup>41</sup> The growing difficulties in relations with the Soviet Union were widely exploited by US military circles in a propaganda campaign to present the USSR as the enemy. Increased military spending was demanded and greater mobilization readiness from the armed forces. In December 1947 the

US Air Force commander in the Far East wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Spaatz: "I want to emphasize that I feel that there is grave danger of war with the USSR within a few months."<sup>42</sup>

In 1946, 1947 and the first half of 1948 the United States began the partial mobilization of its defence forces so that they should be in a continued state of alert. It also began the formation of a kind of military establishment which included large sections of industry and the academic world. The policy of hegemonism and the postwar building of the US war machine involved the signing of numerous agreements with other countries on the basis of anti-communism, American military aid and arms sales to the allies. The United States had begun general rearmament, and from now on the arms race became in the eyes of the military and political leadership the criterion of intensity in the political struggle against the Soviet Union.

It is worth pointing out, however, that the postwar internal political situation in the United States was not completely disposed towards this policy. The broad masses of the people, remembering the feat of the Soviet Union in the Second World War and tired of fighting in Europe and Asia were ready neither psychologically nor politically to make new sacrifices to achieve the goals of American hegemonism and the Pax Americana. Although the United States possessed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, its conventional forces were continually threatened with demobilization.

By the end of June 1945 more than 12 million were on active military service. Secretary of War Patterson and Navy Secretary Forrestal warned the cabinet as early as October 26, 1945, that the rapid pace of demobilization was threatening the American strategic position throughout the world. President Truman was in agreement with this opinion.<sup>43</sup> At the same time demands were stepped up for demobilization of the Army. A group of women literally besieged General

Eisenhower going into Congress and soldiers in the Far East stamped their letters home with the words: "No Boats, No Votes" hinting at the forthcoming elections to Congress. In January 1946 there were mutinies at a number of military bases.

In this situation the prospect that Congress would approve plans for creating a war machine seemed doubtful. In October 1945 Truman called for the continuation of selective service and the institution of universal military training. Both proposals aroused strong opposition in a nation which had never before known permanent conscription in peacetime. Moreover, with the war over many Americans hoped for relief from the crushing burden of taxation. By December 1945, *News-week's* editors saw little chance that Congress would extend the draft past its May 15, 1946, deadline, while "only dramatically menacing world developments" appeared likely to secure passage of universal military training.<sup>44</sup> This artificial dramatization of the situation helped to slow down the demob pace.

The contradictory nature of the political situation inside the United States was shown in the fact that aggressive forces which were encouraging a stronger anti-Soviet line were at the same time out to gain a reduction in taxation and maintain voluntary military service. The well-known American journalist, James Reston, wrote in early 1946 that the same congressmen that were loudest in their calls for an anti-Russian policy were the least desirous that money and men should be made available for the implementation of this policy. The American scholar, John Lewis Gaddis, noted that "under these circumstances it is not surprising that, despite their atomic monopoly, American officials felt very little freedom to maneuver as they turned to the problem of postwar relations with the Soviet Union."<sup>45</sup> In a certain sense this internal political factor had a restraining effect on the aggressive policy of the US government.

In 1946 and 1947 a struggle ensued between the Air Force and the Navy for the greater share of the military budget. In this struggle, which was ministerial and bureaucratic in character, both sides resorted to the myth of the "Soviet threat". For example, in December 1947 the Navy Secretary John Sullivan tried to intimidate Congress with the prospect of a "threat" from the Soviet submarine fleet which was supposedly five times larger than the German fleet in the Second World War. The stupidity of this kind of assertion was so obvious that it had to be refuted by none other than the director of air force intelligence who declared that the threat from the Soviet submarine fleet was a pure invention: "The present great Soviet bugaboo which is being promoted is entirely overmagnified and completely out of perspective."<sup>46</sup>

In a bid to spread the myth of the Soviet threat and mobilize anti-Soviet forces within the country and outside the United States, American reaction tried to use the events in Czechoslovakia in 1948 which, however, ended with the complete victory of the democratic forces. These events were a purely internal problem as the then US Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, Laurence Steinhardt, informed his government. In late April, 1948 he reported that there had been no concentration of Soviet troops on the Czechoslovak border in February and no threat whatsoever from the USSR. He noted that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia came to power following the retirement of the ministers representing the bourgeois parties. Furthermore, on February 24, 1948, US Secretary of State, Marshall declared that he was not unduly worried by the events in Czechoslovakia. "In so far as international affairs are concerned," he said, "a seizure of power by the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia would not materially alter in this respect the situation which has existed in the last three years... Czechoslovakia has faithfully followed the Soviet line in the United Nations



and elsewhere and the establishment of a Communist regime would merely crystallize and confirm for the future previous Czech policy..."<sup>47</sup>

That was how the US leaders evaluated the "Spring Crisis" among themselves. But for public consumption in their own country and abroad they made a gigantic propaganda show culminating in a fresh upsurge in war preparations. According to the American specialist in world affairs, Daniel Yergin, "the Administration exaggerated the extent of its apprehensions and outrage in order to win congressional support for four key programs: the Marshall Plan, universal military training, a restoration of selective service and an expanded budget for aviation. Spokesmen dwelt on the possibility of immediate conflict to prepare for what they saw as a long-term struggle. But also, the military services wanted money from Congress to promote their separate interests. The President was acting, as well to assert his own leadership in an election year."<sup>48</sup> The *New York Times* military affairs editor, Hanson Baldwin, wrote in May 1948 that the "Spring Crisis" was a "wholly Washington crisis".<sup>49</sup>

The imperial ambitions of Washington also found expression in intervention in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union in order to bring about changes in its social system. This was an objective that was pursued from various angles. It mainly, of course, relied on military power, but did not exclude the direct political and economic blackmail of a country that had suffered enormous losses in the most destructive war of all time. All this was considered essential to the policy of "containing" and "rolling back" communism.

Soon after the war Moscow was visited by a group of congressmen headed by William Colmer, Chairman of the Special Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning, House of Representatives. They had meetings with the Soviet leadership at which they learned that the Soviet Union would not object to receiving

a US loan of 6 billion dollars for acquiring industrial equipment. The Americans then asked for guarantees. The Soviet side pointed out that the United States was giving extensive aid to Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and not requiring guarantees from there. Since the Soviet Union was undoubtedly far more credit-worthy than he was the request for guarantees was nothing more than an expression of the political prejudice of the congressmen.

In their report to President Truman on their return the congressmen stressed the need to take a harder line with Moscow. As John Gaddis described it, "The Colmer committee was willing to approve an American loan to the Soviet Union, but only if the Russians met certain conditions. They would have to disclose what proportion of total production they devoted to armaments. They would be required to reveal vital statistics on the operation of the Soviet economy, and to provide an opportunity to check the accuracy of these figures." The Soviet Union would have to disclose the terms of its trade treaties with East European countries and to guarantee ... the right to distribute American books, magazines, newspapers and motion pictures, freedom of the press and free elections. In other words, as Gaddis summed up, "Colmer and his colleagues demanded that, in return for an American loan, the Soviet Union reform its internal system of government."<sup>50</sup> This kind of intervention in Soviet internal affairs to the point of issuing ultimatums and blackmail became the norm in postwar American policy towards the USSR. The Truman administration tried frequently, though fruitlessly, to use economic aid to the Soviet Union as a weapon in the cold war designed to achieve political concessions.

The final formulation of cold war policy in the United States took place amid a struggle between two factions that variously interpreted the intentions of the USSR. The first, which consisted of the more warlike and aggressive members of the ruling class, com-

pletely rejected the idea that the differences between the two countries could be ironed out, claiming that Soviet foreign policy was orientated to "broad expansion". More American concessions, they declared, would simply wet the Soviets appetite. In their opinion, the United States and its Western allies should unite their military and economic forces to contain Soviet "expansion" and restore the balance of power in the West's favour.

The second faction, which was also represented in the administration, insisted that the Soviet Union like the United States was also interested in establishing a system of international security that would prevent future wars. They recognized that there were serious differences between the two countries, but believed that they could be overcome given the willingness of both sides to enter into negotiations and make compromises. They were to a certain extent understanding about the security interests of the USSR and critical of discriminatory measures against their former ally.

Until autumn 1945 the Truman administration was under pressure from both these factions as they tried to incline the President to their own point of view. Particularly active was Admiral William Leahy who was a close and trusted friend of Truman. He was in favour of a hard line towards the USSR and came to regard almost anyone who would consider agreement with the USSR as an "appeaser".<sup>51</sup> Gradually the leaders of Congress and most of the military leaders went over to the hawks. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee demonstratively welcomed the hard line taken by Secretary of State Byrnes in Moscow, and Navy Secretary Forrestal recommended the President to publicly vilify the Soviet Union and whip up the "Soviet threat" campaign so as to oppose growing pressure for demobilization. Thus a united front of right-wing groups both within the administration and outside it, which had imperial ambitions and the desire to create

a Pax Americana, pushed American policy onto the slope of cold war down which it slipped with ever increasing rapidity.

The philosophy of the cold war and the plans which reflected the thinking of the ruling military and political faction during the decade that followed the war were formulated in two directives: NSC 68 (April 1950) and NSC 162 (October 1953). These documents were in operation for at least ten years and did much to determine the practical character of the US war machine. Although under President Kennedy both directives were renounced, there is no doubt that the philosophy outlined in them largely continues to dominate the thinking of ruling circles in the United States and determine the practical action they take. For this reason an analysis of documents NSC 68 and NSC 162 is far from being of purely academic interest.

Directive NSC 68 is entitled "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security". It was drawn up in February and March 1950 in reply to an instruction from President Truman to study the consequences from all angles of the development of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union (this was something the Americans expected to occur no earlier than the mid 1950s),<sup>52</sup> the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the decision of the United States to go ahead with the development of thermonuclear weapons. The study was prepared by a joint group from the State Department Policy Planning Staff and the Defence Department under the overall supervision of Dean Acheson and the direct control of Paul Nitze, who then headed the staff.

The directive was put before the President in April 1950 and approved by him on September 30 of that year, i. e. after the beginning of US aggression in Korea. "NSC 68 called for a substantial increase in defense expenditures... The problem was how to sell a substantial increase in the defense budget without an imminent

threat... The problem was solved on June 25, 1950..." (i. e. when the United States began the Korean War.—*R.B.*)<sup>53</sup> The document was declassified by former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in early 1975 to support the continuity of his aims and policy and the traditional line of the United States.

According to American specialists, "NSC 68 constitutes the most elaborate effort made by United States officials during the early Cold War years to integrate political, economic and military considerations into a comprehensive statement of national security policy".<sup>54</sup> The voluminous document (it runs into some 60 pages) is comprised of three main sections: analysis of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, an evaluation of the military, economic and political capabilities of both countries and conclusions and recommendations.<sup>55</sup>

The essence of the contemporary world crisis is depicted in the directive in the form of a total confrontation between the "free world" and the USSR, which is presented as striving for world domination. Aggression and expansionism are said to be inherent in the totalitarian political system and without radical changes in the latter there can be no changes in "Soviet behaviour" and consequently no end to Soviet-American confrontation.

To bring about the desired end pressure must be increasingly put on the USSR to stop its "expansion" without which, according to the same logic, the Soviet system cannot exist. Therefore, the main objective of the United States is the "policy of 'containing' the Soviet system", which requires inducing "a retraction of the Kremlin's control and influence" and fostering "the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior".<sup>56</sup>

The most important means for achieving these objectives were considered to be military superiority —

"without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of 'containment'—which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion—is no more than a policy of bluff". Talks with the USSR before achieving such superiority were considered as nothing more than a tactical ploy to win public support for a programme of military build-up and reduce the imminent risk of war. The purpose of such talks which the Americans would begin at their own discretion was to "record ... the gradual withdrawal of the Soviet Union".<sup>57</sup>

According to the directive the United States was faced with the following strategic courses:

1) *Continuation of current policies.* This was fraught with the serious possibility of an upset in the balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union, which after gaining the ability to make an atomic and then a thermonuclear strike could disarm any strategic means of containment and use its superiority in conventional weapons to occupy Western Europe through war or the threat of war. The period of maximum danger was seen as 1954 when the Soviet Union would have 200 atomic bombs. (We note here that this seems all very similar to the present thinking of Nitze, Kissinger and others on the change in the strategic balance in favour of the USSR—the period of maximum threat being the first half of the 1980s — and on the unavoidable consequences of this in view of the prospect of "military blackmail" by the USSR and the "Finlandization" of Europe, if the United States should fail radically to alter its policy and adopt a new line for rearmament.)

2) *Isolation.* This was unthinkable as it would lead to the encirclement and capitulation of the United States.

3) *War.* This was not feasible because of: a) the correlation of forces (a heavy blow could be struck on the Soviet Union, but this alone would not compell or induce the Kremlin to capitulate: "the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to domi-

nate most or all of Eurasia"); b) political considerations (the difficulty of justifying such a war to the American people and of subsequently creating a stable world order).

4) *The Rapid Build-Up of the Political, Economic and Military Power of the "Free World"*. This was looked upon in the directive as the only realistic policy. It would require military superiority including the rapid development of thermonuclear weapons (it was believed that if the United States developed thermonuclear weapons before the USSR, then it would be able to exert growing pressure on that country) and being better able to conduct "local wars". Furthermore, as the directive pointed out, it was important to maintain "innocence" for a time, for any report on this recommended course of action would be used by the Soviet Union in its peace campaign and have a psychologically negative effect on certain areas of the world. American politicians could only announce their real aims after they had built up sufficient power. What was to be stressed at the time was the purely defensive character of any military and political operations undertaken.

The directive also noted that in relation to building up political and economic might a whole system of measures would be required including: making considerable increases in military spending, expanding military aid, waging open psychological war against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, conducting more and more secret operations in economic, political and psychological warfare, encouraging discontent and even insurrection in the socialist countries, strengthening the internal security of the United States, implementing a civil defence programme, improving the intelligence services, reducing all Federal expenditure, except that designed for defence, reducing foreign aid and increasing taxes.

All these proposals were implemented in the early

1950s, including military spending which rose more than three times from 1950 to 1952. Here it is worth noting that until 1950 the main internal factor restraining the growth of military expenditures was the fear among government circles that such a move could bring about an unacceptable growth in the rate of inflation. But Directive NSC 68 contained its own argument against this, recalling the Second World War when a vast increase in government spending did not lead to serious inflation. Thus it was concluded that in 1950 the United States could bear an increase in military spending of at least threefold without affecting living standards. It is also interesting to note that this argument for increases in military spending was mainly supported by Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, and his advisers and opposed (most sharply) by Louis Johnson, the Secretary of Defence, who feared inflation as a result of excessive military spending.

NSC 68 was strongly criticized by the well-known American political figure, George Kennan, who was not in agreement with its interpretation of Soviet intentions and its one-sided stress on military strength. Acheson and Nitze did not see the main objective of NSC 68 to lie in a realistic assessment of Soviet intentions so much as in forming a bloc of the US political elite into a hard-line and militant anti-Soviet consensus, which at the time was in no way indisputable. The Defence Department planned expenditure for the fiscal year 1950 in the region of 13.5 billion dollars, with Defence Secretary Johnson opposing, as was mentioned above, any considerable increase in the military budget because of his fear of inflation. Congress was also very restrained. In these conditions a new stimulus was needed for the arms race. Thus the distorted interpretations of Soviet intentions as contained in a document of such political importance as NSC 68 had a definite purpose—orientating national policy towards militarism.<sup>58</sup>



On October 29, 1953, the National Security Council approved Document NSC 162. The following day President Eisenhower gave his blessing to the basic political principles contained in the directive and passed it on to the main executive organs of the US government. Appended to the directive was a corrected version of a document entitled: "US Objectives vis-à-vis the USSR in the Event of War", which had been approved earlier in June 1953 as Document NSC 153. Directive NSC 162 was called the "Review of Basic National Security Policy".<sup>59</sup> It consisted of twenty-one standard printed pages and was divided into two sections: "General Considerations" and "Policy Conclusions" as well as the aforementioned document.

In "General Considerations" it is maintained that "the basic Soviet objectives continue to be consolidation and expansion of their own sphere of power and the eventual domination of the non-communist world." At the same time it points out that "the USSR ... may desire a settlement of specific issues or a relaxation of tensions and military preparations for a substantial period". On the other hand, it claims quite unjustifiably—as if there could be any such justification!—that "the USSR soon may have the capability of dealing a crippling blow to our industrial base and our continued ability to prosecute a war". This section also states that "the detachment of any major European satellite from the Soviet bloc ... would be a considerable blow to Soviet prestige and would impair in some degree Soviet conventional military capabilities in Europe". Later it is asserted that "the USSR does not seem likely to deliberately launch a general war against the United States ... Similarly, an attack on NATO countries or other areas ... would be unlikely". The recommendations, however, contain instructions for the "development and maintenance of ... a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power" in the event of total war.<sup>60</sup>

The intelligence services were given the following objectives: to "undertake military, political, economic and subversive courses of action affecting US security"; to "conduct and foster scientific research and development so as to insure superiority in quantity and quality of weapons systems"; and to "continue for as long as necessary a state of limited defense mobilization". The directive stressed the absolute necessity of the United States possessing "sufficient atomic weapons and effective means of delivery" and noted that US strategy ought to be based on nuclear weapons and that this should be something that its allies could rely on.<sup>61</sup>

The directive pointed out that "the United States should keep open the possibility of settlements with the USSR, compatible with basic US security interests", and that "to maintain the continued support of its allies, the United States must seek to convince them of its desire to reach such settlements." Reviewing the state of the anti-Soviet coalition the directive stated that the main thing was the "manifest determination of the United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory striking power".<sup>62</sup>

At the same time the directive recorded that "allied opinion, especially in Europe, has become less willing to follow US leadership. Many Europeans fear that American policies, particularly in the Far East, may involve Europe in general war, or will indefinitely prolong cold-war tensions. Many consider US attitudes toward the Soviets as too rigid and unyielding and, at the same time, as unstable, holding risks ranging from preventive war and 'liberation' to withdrawal into isolation. Many consider that these policies fail to reflect the perspective and confidence expected in the leadership of a great nation, and reflect too great a preoccupation with anti-communism."<sup>63</sup>

The directive also pointed to the need to promote anti-Sovietism and anti-communism among the American public bearing in mind "the soundness of national morale

and the political willingness of the country to support a government which it feels is holding the proper balance between the necessary sacrifices and the necessary defense. Accordingly, the American people must be informed of the nature of the Soviet-Communist threat ... and of the need for mobilizing the spiritual and material resources necessary to meet the Soviet threat."<sup>64</sup>

The section entitled "Policy Conclusions" insists on US military power being maintained "with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength" on the basis of nuclear weapons, massive strike power and the necessary military bases. The main direction for US diplomacy was defined as convincing the allies all over the world that "the best defense of the free world rests upon ... deployment of US forces". Point 39.b. of the directive states that "in the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions. Where the consent of an ally is required from the use of these weapons from US bases on the territory of such ally, the United States should promptly obtain the advance consent of such ally for such use. The United States should also seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations." Although the directive was classified "top secret" and was accessible largely to members of the National Security Council only, this point carried the proviso that "this policy should not be made public without further consideration by the National Security Council".<sup>65</sup>

On matters concerning military budget the document stated openly that "every effort should be made ... to minimize Federal expenditures for programs that are not essential to the national security".<sup>66</sup>

In relation to the Soviet Union the following programme of action was approved: "The United States must seek to improve the power position of itself and the rest of the free world in relation to the Soviet bloc... The United States should: a. Take overt and covert mea-

asures to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology as effective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength of communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements.

"b. Take all feasible diplomatic, political, economic and covert measures to counter any threat of a party or individuals directly or indirectly responsive to Soviet control to dominant power in a free world country.

"c. Undertake selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Communist control over any areas of the free world.

"...Accordingly, the United States should take feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR, impair Soviet relations with Communist China, complicate control in the satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc."<sup>67</sup>

The Annex to NSC 162<sup>68</sup> contains a list of "Objectives vis-à-vis the USSR in the Event of War". These were considered supplementary to those outlined above and include:

"a. Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the war.

"b. Destroying the structure of relationships by which leaders of the All-Union Communist Party have been able to exert moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens in countries not under communist control."

It was assumed that the defeat of the Soviet Union in war would lead to the world domination of the United States. This was noted in a demand for the creation of a situation which would "prevent the development of power relationships dangerous to the security of the United States and international peace."

Thus this directive also proclaimed its ultimate objective to be structuring the world in the American manner.

These two documents embodied the main trends in the military and political planning of the United States during the cold war period and in conformity with them the US war machine was developed in the post-World War II period.

### **3. Forming the Unified Structure of the Armed Forces and Its Development in the Postwar Period**

The US war machine, which was created after the Second World War, grew in parallel with the final formulation of the expansionist concept of national security, which proclaimed permanent military readiness and the global character of American interests. The problem of relations with the Soviet Union was unambiguously connected with the subsequent build-up of the US Armed Forces, which were set the task of being in a position to wage and win a war against the USSR, whether conventional or nuclear. The US military and political planners came to the conclusion that in order to achieve this objective they required a joint structure in the US Armed Forces. But the main obstacle to this in the postwar period remained the internal struggle between the commanders of three services for the lion's share of the budget and for prestige. The outcome of this struggle in specific areas substantially affected the organizational and other forms which various military and political decisions were given.

In 1943 General Marshall, then Chief of Staff of the US Army raised before Congress the issue of creating a unified structure for all the US Armed Forces. He instructed General Somervell to estimate the size of the forces needed in the interim between the end of the war and the advent of a "permanent post-war military establishment".<sup>69</sup> At the same time, a Special Planning Division was also set up under General William F. Tom-

pkins, and for the two years till the end of the war was engaged in planning the structure of the postwar armed forces.

The interests of global policy and the experience gained in the Second World War made the military command stress the need for interservice coordination and even integration on geographical and functional lines. The unified and specified commands of the world war became institutionalized in American military organization, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff retained its wartime role as the collective adviser on unified military policy. Another governmental response emphasized the "requirement to integrate military contingency planning with a host of other international activities: the collection and analysis of intelligence, the planning and delivery of military and non-military foreign aid, the conduct of diplomacy at every level from the United Nations through regional alliances to individual countries and resource planning at the national level."<sup>70</sup>

The coordination on an inter-departmental level and within the Pentagon was due not only to considerations of how the aggressive foreign and military policy of the United States could be more effectively pursued. A number of other considerations were also taken account of. In the first place, colossal military spending could threaten the structural stability and growth of the US economy. Secondly, the anti-communist psychosis led to fears that US state institutions had been thoroughly infiltrated by Soviet agents.

The final creation of the unified structure of the US Armed Forces came in autumn 1946, when General Norstad and Admiral Sherman made a series of carefully worked out proposals on the institution of a unified command structure. The proposals were accepted by the JCS which at the time included such prominent military commanders as Marshall, and later, Eisenhower, King, Nimitz and Arnold. They reflected the global ambitions of the United States to establish

its military presence in all parts of the world and create the kind of system as would make the most effective use of the US Armed Forces. General Norstad and Admiral Sherman also prepared another document on the role and objectives of the various armed services. The documents were directly related to the 1947 National Security Act. The setting up of joint overseas commands led to the need for centralized coordination and control, and agreement among the chiefs of staff of the services on their role and objectives made centralization possible.

At the time claims to world hegemony were supported by the whole military leadership of the United States. In a number of documents issued at the time General Marshall supported the proposal to unite all the US Armed Forces under one department and instructed the planning division of the JCS to avoid duplication and work on the assumption that the basis of the war machine in the postwar period would be universal military training. The draft National Security Act was drawn up by Norstad and Sherman and subsequently approved by the President. At hearings in the Senate Committee on Armed Services the senators carefully listened to the reports of the JCS representatives and in essence approved the draft without substantial amendment.

Nevertheless, as we have already mentioned, differences between the service commanders affected the process of creating a single US war machine during the postwar period. Thus, for example, according to American specialists, the Army always considered that ground troops had the main role in hostilities. For them the Air Force and the Navy were only means for transporting troops to the combat area and for giving support in the theatre of operation. The land forces commanders were convinced of the value of the classical military principle of one-man command, i.e. rigid organizational control to

ensure the effectiveness of the auxiliary role played by the Navy and the Air Force.

The Air Force command, while recognizing its supplementary role in relation to the land forces, was nevertheless convinced that the development of new weapons and technology, engendering as they did new ways of conducting hostilities, made the modern field of battle quite different from what it traditionally had been. The Navy command also considered its role to be more important. With its Marines, who could fight on land, its considerable amphibious force, its carrier-based aviation providing tactical air support, its flexibility in deploying and supplying the troops, and finally its sea-based nuclear weapons the Navy became an independent and self-contained armed service. Consequently the Navy wanted to conduct military operations without interference from the other armed services. As distinct from the Army and the Air Force the US Navy considered that it could operate more efficiently in a decentralized structure.

This point of view, of course, created difficulties for developing a unified military structure in the post-war period. Another difficulty consisted in a somewhat specific position of the Air Force in the overall US military structure. The point was that the Air Force provided considerable tactical support for the land forces in action. But this role meant that the Air Force was subordinate to the Army. Only certain special objectives could justify the independent role of the Air Force. According to those who supported this viewpoint, recognizing the prevailing role of the strategic objective and reducing the importance of land operations in modern warfare meant also reducing the importance of tactical support. In the Navy the influence of the Air Force on organizational structure was different. In accordance with the post-World War I reforms initiated by Admiral Sims, each naval officer was ob-



liged to have specialist technical training. But at the same time he remained an active commanding officer obliged to fulfil his military duties. The Army also encouraged specialist technical training, which gave rise to the separatist mood in the Air Force that was attached to the Army.

But the dispute on unifying the armed forces under single command had at its root other causes deeper than purely corporative interests and allegiance to this or that armed service. The way military action was conducted by the land forces made the Army command convinced of the need for a highly centralized military structure headed by one man. At the same time the Air Force tried to ensure for itself an independent role based on its ability to undertake strategic objectives. The Navy also wanted a decentralized structure, similar to the British Committee of Imperial Defence, although it was unclear from the outset how that structure exactly could be adapted to American conditions. In this situation the 1947 National Security Act was a compromise between the rival services and Congress. Being a temporary, transitional document, the Act was purposely composed in language that would allow different interpretations of its provisions. Indeed, it was a compromise which called for both integration and division, for unified control, but not unification, for a single strategic leadership, but without a unified apparatus that could conduct strategic planning.

Throughout the existence of the unified armed forces their structure underwent reorganizations and improvements. This took place practically every decade: in 1958 under Eisenhower important amendments to the 1947 National Security Act were made, later followed the decade of the so-called managerial revolution which Robert McNamara introduced into the military establishment, then again under the respective administrations of Nixon, Ford and Carter gradual changes were made in the structure and command of the war machine.

All these changes show the imperfection of the command structure of the US war machine which resulted from the egoistic interests of the services and the politicians as well as the complexity and depth of the problems facing them. For example, Admiral Burke, Chief of US Naval Operations in the early stages of interservice unification, remarked later with regard to the system that the organization was overloaded with responsibility that it could not handle.

Many of the problems confronting the US leadership in 1947 have still not been solved. In one of his speeches delivered in 1977 General Maxwell Taylor pointed to the need to review the role and objectives of the armed services. The situation in the world had changed, he said, but their objectives had not been discussed or reviewed since the Key West Conference in 1948, which was chaired by James Forrestal. He also noted that the JCS did not always understand that there was no longer any such thing as a purely military problem. American scholars have shown that the less the chiefs of staff of the services represented in the JCS take account of purely military motives and considerations, the more useful they are to the President and the Defence Secretary, but at the same time because of this they get deeper involved in political problems and disputes. If they lay stress on purely military considerations, then the value of their professional objectivity rises, but at the same time the role of the civilian staff in the Defence Department who have the task of adapting military demands to political and economic realities also increases.

At the same time the decision-making process in the sphere of national security policy is extremely complex. Both the civilian and the military leaders of the United States have spoken in favour of simplifying it. As for the military establishment the main problem is seen to lie in the fact that the chiefs of staff of the services are not willing to forgo their own independence in the

name of an effective, unified leadership of the armed forces. Specialists have also expressed the opinion that military strategic doctrines and concepts go far beyond the scope of the individual arms and services and that their formulation should primarily be the task of the JCS.

The thirty-odd years that the unified structure has been in existence also show that the problem of strategic national security planning has still not been solved. On the one hand, the State Department does not traditionally play the dominant role in military and political planning and therefore the Defence Department should take account of political motives and considerations. On the other hand, the military leadership does not tend to rely on purely political considerations when it comes to making decisions or taking action. The unification of the armed forces and the formation of the National Security Council led to many of the formerly sacred problems of diplomacy being taken out of the jurisdiction of the State Department and handed over for inter-departmental discussion in the National Security Council.

It would seem that the considerable numerical superiority of Pentagon planning personnel over that of the State Department should result in the military having a bigger say in national security planning. But according to American specialists themselves, the JCS has fulfilled its role as a joint organ only in supplies planning. Since from the very beginning the formulation of doctrines related to the competence of the individual chiefs of staff, a single doctrinal body has never been formed. American specialists also point out that a substantial weakening of the role of the State Department and the failure to formulate a common doctrine for the armed forces have to a large extent conditioned the excessive faith of the country's ruling class in finding a military solution to political problems and a technological solution to military

ones. These specialists point to the need for checking the whole national security system at all levels and on the broadest scale, and furthermore that this checking should be carried out on a permanent basis.

The newly organized Defence Department (1947) was faced with a number of problems. The most important of these were linked with the procurement of new weapon systems that had been developed, particularly nuclear warheads and the means of their delivery, and with the organization of budgeting. The chiefs of staff of the services had considerable difficulty in assessing the new weapons and their value in modern warfare. A system arose for hearing various opinions including those of the industrialists or contract bidders as well as a senior officer from the arm of the service who recommended that the weapon system should be made part of the country's arsenal. Behind the adoption of each new system, there was a principle according to which a final decision was reached with the aid of independent and disinterested experts. The need for this led to the creation of a Directorate of Defence Research and Engineering. There also arose a need for think tanks to provide the chiefs of staff with independent advice. To unite efforts here the Secretary of Defence, Charles E. Wilson and the Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Radford, set up in 1956 an Institute for Defence Analysis.

The sharp rise in the cost of weapons systems also required a review of defence budgeting. Only in 1953 the Secretary of Defence was permitted to reorganize the General Accounting Office. For the first time the head of the Pentagon had the right to use the budget to control the "recalcitrant" arms and services. The first comptroller was the retired Admiral McNeil. Under President Eisenhower the financing of the war machine was done according to the needs of each of the three armed services. No one considered or planned the general requirements of the Defence Department on the basis of the envisaged objectives of the staffs

of these services. The old order was maintained under which the main task facing the head of the Pentagon amounted to checking the equal distribution of resources between the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. This system had been to the detriment of the Army. General Maxwell Taylor, its chief of staff from 1955 to 1959, noted that during these four years with slight deviations the Army received 23 per cent, the Navy 28 per cent and the Air Force 46 per cent of the military budget.

With the Republican administration of President Eisenhower substantial changes were made in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the end of the war until 1949 the JCS had no chairman. This post was instituted at first to have very simple functions: to chair meetings, to prepare the agenda, and to try to defuse the situation if it looked like becoming too explosive. General Omar Bradley, the first chairman, was noted for the fact that it was impossible to tell which point of view he supported. He only led the discussion and summed up the arguments, in particular how to use nuclear weapons of all types for causing mass destruction whenever and wherever the Americans considered it necessary.

The doctrine of massive retaliation also determined the structure of the armed forces. It was dominated by the Air Force, particularly the long-range nuclear bombers. Then the Navy began to develop, also as a carrier of nuclear weapons. As for the Army, it became extremely worried during this period over the future of the land forces. In answer to the question on what the Army would have to do under conditions of massive retaliation the reply came that victory would be won by the Navy and the Air Force or the Marines, or a combination of all three.

During this period very tense relations developed between the members of the JCS. At the basis of the dispute, as before, lay the struggle between the ser-

vices for the lion's share of the military budget, which had reached \$38 billion by 1958. Already criticism of the doctrine of massive retaliation began to be voiced in the United States. This more sober-minded attitude developed in proportion to the growth of the Soviet Union's defence capabilities, particularly after the launching of the first sputnik. Doubts began to be raised about the feasibility of using nuclear weapons in reply, for example, to a border incident in the GDR, since this would be followed by a retaliatory nuclear strike on the territory of the United States.

It was basically at this time that the Americans came under the illusion that it was possible to wage a nuclear war that could be confined to the territory of the USSR and Western Europe and not necessarily develop into a global nuclear war. At the end of Eisenhower's presidency frequent official statements were made to the effect that conventional wars as a means of combatting the Soviet Union and the national liberation movement were "inevitable". But for eight years (right up to the official adoption of the doctrine of flexible response) there was no official statement that the doctrine of massive retaliation had been abandoned. The Eisenhower administration stubbornly clung to it despite all the changes that had taken place in the world.

It was during this period that heated discussion took place on what was called strategic sufficiency. Both in Congress and among the military themselves questions were asked on the level of "sufficiency" of the strategic nuclear forces. The Army and those who represented its interests in Congress believed that the unlimited build-up of strategic nuclear weapons threatened the future development of the land forces. In the course of this debate the political leadership had no concern for defining what exactly was meant by "sufficiency"; they spoke unambiguously for the unlimited development of strategic nuclear weapons. As they saw it, since a conven-

tional war would not be fought for a long time without the use of nuclear weapons, there was no need for any definition of the criterion of "sufficiency". Many American specialists believed that under Eisenhower the JCS functioned inefficiently. Its members could not reach agreement on many issues, a situation which was worsened by the reluctance of the civilian personnel to interfere in its affairs. Defence Secretary Wilson was unwilling to commit himself, seeking the support of the President on even the most insignificant issues, while the latter too avoided interfering in Pentagon affairs.

The JCS had at least two functional purposes. One was set out under the 1947 Act and defined the JCS as the main military adviser to the Defence Department, the National Security Council and the President. The other, which was not defined by the Act but which was established through usage, amounted to this: together with the joint staff the JCS was the regular staff body of the Defence Department through which control was exercised over the overseas military commands and their units. When the joint staff of the JCS was formed it consisted of joint committees on strategy, operation planning, supplies, etc. It was only during the 1958 Lebanese crisis that the Pentagon came up against difficulties in directing overseas operations. As a result in 1958 the staff was reorganized to have sectors involved with personnel, intelligence, planning and operations, and supplying according to the pattern of staffs in unified and specified overseas commands.

President Kennedy's and President Johnson's relations with the Pentagon were quite different from what they had been under Eisenhower. Eisenhower had always encouraged the National Security Council and its apparatus to take part in the discussion and decision-making on all the most important matters of the state. But Kennedy was extremely biased against the Eisenhower system, an attitude he had largely gained from such prominent state officials of the past as Robert

Lovett and John McCloy. They believed that this system produced nothing but a stream of papers, and was unable to properly monitor the implementation of presidential decisions and directives. Subsequently Kennedy used the National Security Council to simply rubber-stamp decisions he had already taken.

Significant changes also took place in Kennedy's attitude to the Pentagon and the JCS. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco Kennedy was extremely dissatisfied with his advisers and made a speech to the JCS on May 27, 1961. He became the first president to visit the members of the JCS in the "tank" (the room where the meetings of the JCS were held in the Pentagon and which was strictly off-limits to all non-members and regularly swept with the most sophisticated anti-bugging equipment.) The theme of his speech was the duties of the chiefs of staff as the main military advisers to the President. The question was asked whether they should limit themselves to purely military matters and deliberately exclude all non-military factors. Basically the military leaders' point of view amounted to this: according to the law only they could give military advice and no one else in the government, and only they could give the President a professional military opinion with the appropriate perspective.

According to the notes made by General Maxwell Taylor, then Chairman of the JCS, the President reminded the JCS that in their capacity of his chief military advisers their basic duty was to give him advice and expressed the hope that he would get it direct from them, unscreened. Their advice can and should go beyond purely military matters, because most of the problems he was confronted with had political, economic, psychological and military aspects, and he as President had to take them all into consideration. Naturally, while expecting that the JCS would, without fear or vacillation, present their military point of view in favour of, or against a certain political course, he wanted



them to know that he regarded them as being more than purely military experts and sought their cooperation in bringing military requirements in line with the general context of any situation. In his view, perhaps, the most difficult problem for the government was to turn all the available advantages of many departments into an integrated and effective model and he expected that the JCS would help him in the effort. Soon afterwards the President's speech was given the form of an executive memorandum and formally approved by the National Security Council as presidential policy.

The memorandum was reaffirmed by President Johnson and remained in force throughout his presidency, as it did during the first term of office of President Nixon.

Under Kennedy it was the "civilian strategists" who had the greatest influence in the Pentagon. But according to many of the professional military this influence was greatly exaggerated, even though they, i. e. the military, were annoyed by their presence en masse in the Defence Department. In order to reduce civilian influence on military decisions the Chairman of the JCS, Maxwell Taylor, got Defence Secretary Robert McNamara to listen first to his chiefs of staff. McNamara agreed, but gave no similar promise that he would not listen to his civilian colleagues.

The general effectiveness of the JCS and its influence on the political decisions of the President have not, according to many American scholars, been particularly high. This is largely explained by reasons of a purely bureaucratic nature. For example, during his work in the White House General Maxwell Taylor had a staff of only six. But he had daily access to the President and was kept abreast of his interests. This made it possible for him to put timely proposals and recommendations before the head of state and become the initiator of important decisions. In accordance with established practice the JCS could only enter into contact with the

President at the request of the latter's executive body. Then a document would be drawn up requiring the agreed approval and official stamp of the deputy chiefs of staff, the chiefs of staff and finally the Secretary of Defence. The result of this was that even well-prepared JCS documents had no great influence on presidential decisions since they reached him too late.

It is important to stress that as the American war machine grew bigger its role and the role of its components changed. The growing numerical strength of the arms and services and their saturation with new and expensive hardware objectively increased the importance of the military in the governmental apparatus. At the same time as a result of this new equipment the Army ceased to play the same dominant role in the US war machine that it previously had. The formation of the Defence Department and the separate Air Force Department in 1947 together with the gradually increasing powers of the Defence Secretary resulted in a considerable reduction in the importance of the land forces in comparison with the war and even the prewar period.

The growing aggressiveness of US imperialism, an essential part of its hegemonist policy, increased the role of the war machine in foreign policy, but within that machine the importance of the Army substantially diminished.

During the period of postwar adaptation (1945-1950) the US Army command, and for that matter the entire military and political leadership of the country, assumed that the next war would differ little from the previous one, except that the enemy would be the Soviet Union and hostilities would most likely take place in Europe. Efforts were concentrated on the training of the active-duty land forces to ensure that they were in the necessary state of combat readiness, that there was a large and well-trained reserve and that industry could be appropriately mobilized and rapidly convert to full-scale military production. The strategy was based on

faith in the American monopoly of atomic weapons.

One example of this strategy put into practice, and of course of the implementation of US hegemonistic policy, was the Korean War. It began as a conventional war on land demanding enormous effort on the part of the Army, whose numerical strength rose threefold from June 1950 to June 1951 to reach two million officers and men. The fact that the Korean War remained limited and ended without nuclear weapons being used is not due to the "humane" intentions of the Americans. In fact, the majority of the military leadership of the country were in favour of using them. The point is that on the eve of the US invasion of North Korea a presidential memorandum on national security (NSC 68) was passed outlining a general programme for the rearmament of the United States. Its main purpose was to create the capability for implementing a policy of containment — i.e. aggression against the USSR in Europe. And one of the reasons why the Americans did not use the atomic bomb in Korea was the fact that they intended to use it first against the Soviet Union in Europe. The defeat of the US interventionists in Korea resulted, apart from other things, in the reduced prestige of the Army in the eyes of the American public.

The arrival of the Eisenhower administration in the White House, which ended the Korea adventure, did not signify any retreat from the policy of hegemonism and intervention in the affairs of other states. On the contrary, the State Department with that hard-line anti-Soviet, John Foster Dulles, at its head, pursued a policy of concluding more and more military agreements and enlarging the sphere of American expansion. This administration began to accelerate the build-up of its forces with a view to waging a long war against the Soviet Union. It was in pursuit of these aims that the doctrine of massive retaliation was proclaimed.

Meanwhile the dispute over the role of this or that

armed service continued. In essence it was a question of which service could make the greatest contribution to the achievement of world domination. According to American specialists the nuclear strategic bombers were considered in the 1950s as the only important weapon in future wars. As for the land forces, it was considered that in an atomic age they were only useful for maintaining internal order and carrying out civil defence. General Maxwell Taylor noted that the Army command at the time was in the minority on all major questions of national security policy.<sup>71</sup>

The Army command tried to adapt to the new situation by reviewing the outmoded concepts of the 1945-1950 period. In the mid-1950s the Army tried to participate in designing medium-range guided nuclear missiles. But after long and expensive competition with the Air Force the Army was forced to concede defeat.<sup>72</sup> In 1956 Defence Secretary Wilson decided to give the Air Force control of all medium- and long-range missiles. The Army was left with only tactical rockets, short-range missiles and land-based anti-aircraft defence weapons. As a result the Army began designing highly sophisticated missile systems like the Nike Hercules, the Nike Zeus and finally Sentinel and Safeguard, which assured its having a role to play in a strategic nuclear war.

In the late 1950s the defence research establishments and the think tanks began to develop new doctrines of "limited war". Their purpose was to find ways of achieving foreign policy objectives at a time when the Soviet Union was approaching nuclear parity and the United States was becoming fully vulnerable to a retaliatory strike. Essentially it was a matter of reducing the risk to the United States itself in pursuing a hegemonist policy.

In 1957 Henry Kissinger and Robert Osgood both published books on the theory of "limited war". Their publication gave this concept a certain respectability in

the eyes of military and civilian theoreticians alike.<sup>73</sup> The majority of those who supported the concept of "limited war" believed in the use of nuclear weapons for political purposes. But at the same time they did not renounce their support for the concept of massive retaliation.

In developing this theory Kissinger and others did not have the US Army specifically in mind. Their only purpose was to provide the political elite of the country with new military and strategic ideas. But the Army command used this theory to formulate a "philosophy" of their own which would guarantee a place for the land forces in the nuclear age. The Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgway (1953-1955) was one of the first to state that Soviet possession of the means to deliver a retaliatory strike completely devalued the importance of nuclear superiority in the air. He claimed, therefore, that in this situation all arms and services had an equal role to play. But although Ridgway stimulated a number of studies on this theme, he found no support in the Defence Department.

Nevertheless, the new Army Chief of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor with the aid of Army Secretary, Wilber Brucker, supported the line of his predecessor (General Ridgway retired in 1955). Taylor drew up concrete proposals for adapting the Army to the concept of a "limited war". They were formulated in a document entitled "National Military Program", which was approved by the Army Secretary and put before the JCS in autumn 1956.

Taylor's arguments amounted to the following: in the new conditions it was essential to be able to maintain deterrence at a high and a low level and wage all types of wars—from local wars to a strategic nuclear war. The new concept of flexible response was based on balanced deterrence and gradual retaliation. It required structural improvements in the Army by increasing its capability of delivering sudden, effective

strikes in a modern full-scale war. The concept of flexible response was based on the belief that ground troops play an important, if not to say leading role, in a limited or local war. Even in a strategic nuclear war, the military theoreticians now insisted, the Army could play a substantial role at all stages. The Army command at the time put forward the idea of building its own nuclear arsenal and set about designing tactical nuclear weapons and evolving tactics for their use. The concept of the Pentomic Division was born, which would consist of five combat groups equipped with missiles, artillery and personal weapons with nuclear or conventional warheads. Thus during the late 1950s and early 1960s the Army embraced the doctrine of "limited war" and the concept of a war on land in the nuclear age.

When Kennedy came to power in 1960 the administration adopted whole-heartedly the doctrine of flexible response, which required the formation of "limited war forces". According to Defence Secretary, Robert McNamara, these forces "should be properly deployed, properly trained and properly equipped to deal with the entire spectrum of such actions ... from guerrilla and subversive activities ... to organized aggression involving sizeable regular forces".<sup>74</sup> Thus the doctrine of flexible response strengthened the position of the Army within the war machine as a whole. In 1963 the numerical strength of the Army was increased to 16 divisions and one experimental special aeromobile division of 15,000.

During this period the accent began to shift from the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a "limited war" to preparations for conducting a war at the lowest possible level. What was meant here of course was opposing the revolutionary and national liberation movements. As a result the Pentomic Divisions were replaced by others with strong artillery support and greater ability to conduct a conventional war. Furthermore, preparations were increased to conduct anti-guerrilla

warfare for which specially trained units were formed.

But this was only one side of the matter. In 1965 the Army doctrine divided ground operations into three sorts: nuclear warfare, conventional warfare and counter-insurgency warfare. The new concept came into use during the Vietnam War. Just as in the Korean War it was once again the Army in Vietnam that was the main tool of aggression. At the very height of the "dirty war" in 1968 the numerical strength of the land forces there exceeded one and a half million. From 1961 to 1971 the army budget almost reached that of the Air Force. As distinct from the Korean War the American aggression in Vietnam was conducted without fronts or stabilized positions.

Finally the aggressor in Vietnam suffered a shameful defeat. The Army could not win even a local victory for territorial control. The war became a drawn out war of attrition and gave rise to a vast protest movement within the United States itself. All this had an extremely negative effect on the armed forces personnel. If account is also taken of the fact that the latter had been replenished through the draft and that the majority of draftees were young people who reacted with disgust at having to take part in colonial adventurism, then it becomes clear why this Army was plagued by indiscipline, drug-abuse and discontent with the officer corps and the political leadership of the country. In this sense it is not surprising that the concept of "limited war" which the Army had embraced turned out to be bankrupt: it took no regard for the most important factor of all—the human factor, i.e. how far the aims of this war were supported by the American people.

The main conclusion that the US rulers drew after the Vietnam War was that punitive measures and escalation of intervention in far-off regions of the world are not enough to force the American political will on an independent and freedom-loving people.

But this conclusion certainly did not mean the re-

nunciation of intervention as a means for implementing US foreign policy. Force still had to be used to achieve political objectives and the Army command still continued to adhere to the doctrine of flexible response. The creation of a unified structure for the US Armed Forces and its development throughout the postwar period was subordinated to the single aim of improving the American war machine as the main instrument of aggressive policy.

#### **4. Relations Between the Services As a Factor in the Evolution of the US War Machine**

It has already been noted that conflicts, differences and rivalry between the various arms and services had a substantial effect on the formation of the unified structure and on the subsequent development of the US Armed Forces. Relations between them were an important factor in the evolution of the US war machine and therefore should be considered in greater detail.

During discussion of the 1947 National Security Act the Navy representatives did everything to oppose unifying the armed forces and fought to maintain their own independence. Those specialists who have studied the effect of unification on the Navy note its largely negative side. In their opinion, the experience of more than thirty years shows that the whole purpose of unifying the services, that of raising their efficiency, has not been achieved. Furthermore, they claim, it is only with great difficulty that the Navy has been able to restore its tactical independence, which was limited by the formation of the Navy Department and by the fact that the latter contained non-professionals. In support of this point of view they refer to the US defeats in Korea, at the Bay of Pigs and particularly in Vietnam. A more effective use of the Navy, they claim, and participation of naval specialists in the planning of



military operations might have changed these defeats almost into victory.

The basis of the critical attitude to interservice unification was the fear on the part of the Navy that too much say would be given to civilians or to personnel from the other services who might underestimate or even fail to understand the importance of naval power. The naval commanders produced examples from the history of other countries and pointed to the unfortunate outcome of interference into naval affairs as a result of an incorrect and non-professional use of naval power. After an amendment to the 1947 Act made in 1949 the Navy Secretary lost his position in the cabinet and ceased to be a full member of the National Security Council. This resulted in the Navy having a reduced influence on shaping national security policy. At the same time, according to the Navy commanders, the Secretary of Defence and his Assistant for International Security Affairs also played an insufficiently important role in formulating this policy.

A further cause for considerable dissatisfaction in the Navy was the change made to the subordination system. Navy specialists claimed that the system which had developed throughout the Navy's 150-year history, that included the Second World War and that remained in operation after the war, was completely in accordance with all the demands of waging a modern war on sea. It differed vastly from the system used in the Army, since it was based on factors that were characteristic of the Navy—mobility, versatility and a high degree of self-sufficiency. In their opinion this system had proved its worth during the war, when the Navy had conducted various operations like anti-submarine warfare, providing supplies to the allies and carrying out large-scale landing operations.

The 1947 Act had severely curtailed the powers of the Navy Secretary and particularly those of the Chief of Naval Operations. He had virtually become nothing

more than a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the unified and specified commands in the Pacific, the Atlantic, the North Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In 1953 President Eisenhower decided that henceforth the secretaries of the armed services and not the respective chiefs of staff would be the executive agents of the Defence Secretary. The secretaries gave operational control to their chiefs of staff, which was a step towards restoring their real power, a move that concerned the Navy more than the other armed services. The 1958 reorganization of the Defence Department made the unified and specified commands directly responsible to the President and the Defence Secretary for the tasks entrusted. And here the Defence Secretary delegated his authority to the Chief of Naval Operations. Thus the power of the naval command was restored to its former extent.

As for the Air Force command, immediately after the Second World War it tried to get its service established as an independent entity. Reference was made to the growing fire-power of the Air Force and the experience it had gained during the war in strategic bombing as an argument for extending its sphere of activity and granting it a separate department. This aroused the opposition of the other armed services, particularly the Navy. The conflict basically revolved around which command would be given a strategic nuclear mission. Until 1949 the Air Force had wanted the Defence Secretary to strengthen his hold and influence over the unified armed forces, believing that in exchange he would support their claims. But as a result of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act the Air Force considered that it had lost its influence over the formulation of national security policy, since the Secretary of the Air Force was removed from the National Security Council.

The desire for independence came from the fact that in the modern age the Air Force was capable

of striking blows against the sources of an enemy's military power and not simply giving support to land and sea operations. Furthermore, the four-engine long-range strategic bombers had come to symbolize the "independent mission". Even during the war the army air force units, which were formed on June 20, 1941, had already gained a considerable degree of autonomy. In March 1942 the US War Department underwent reorganization as a result of which the army air services, the ground forces, and the supply and logistics were made into independent commands. General Henry Arnold, who commanded the army air force, was brought on to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and took part in strategic planning and in the planning of major operations. Arnold had even secured a promise from General Marshall that after the war he would give his support to making the Air Force an independent service. The Air Force command declared that their service had made a major contribution to victory in the past war. By propagating this idea, particularly in Congress, the Air Force tried to get for itself not only organizational independence, but also an independent strategic nuclear mission.

Eisenhower, who replaced Marshall as the Army Chief of Staff, was among those who supported the idea of making the Air Force a separate service. He believed that if mass demobilization were to take place, a powerful, independent Air Force could compensate for the overall loss of fire-power. President Truman also believed that because of the part it had played in the Second World War the Air Force also had a right to be considered the equal of the other armed services and he too therefore supported its being given an independent role.

In January 1947 War Secretary, Patterson, and Navy Secretary, Forrestal, informed the President that agreement had been reached between them regarding the distribution of functions between the armed services. Thus the conditions were created for adopting the 1947 National Security Act. But this inter-departmental agree-

ment did not remove the fierce contradictions between the Air Force and the Navy. But a compromise, even though only on paper, was essential to ensure support for the idea of unifying the armed forces from the respective commands. The new law instituted three military departments, headed by a civilian secretary who was responsible to the President.

As has already been mentioned, the Air Force as distinct from the Navy supported strengthening the power and influence of the Secretary of Defence hoping for a favourable attitude on his part to its demand for strategic nuclear mission. Even so, the 1947 Act had nothing to say on this score. The position taken by Defence Secretary Forrestal that the budget should be equally divided among the three services only served to inflame rivalry between them for a greater share of the appropriations. And this situation was worsened by the fact that the Air Force was convinced that the Navy intended to form its own strategic air command and therefore deprive the Air Force of its claims to having a strategic nuclear mission. The Secretary of the Air Force, Stuart Symington, and the Chief of Staff, Carl Spaatz, complained that Forrestal as Defence Secretary avoided appointing officers with aviation backgrounds to his staff, preferring naval commanders. These disputes between the Navy and the Air Force were eventually leaked to the public.

Attempts to reconcile the two services during the Key West Conference and the Newport Conference in 1948 were without result. The new Secretary of Defence, Louis Johnson, cancelled the building of a superaircraft carrier, an idea promoted by the naval staff, and thereby caused what was called at the time the "Admirals' Revolt" with the latter demanding an increased military budget and raising this question before a congressional committee. The ever increasing anti-Sovietism of US foreign policy influenced the decision to enlarge military appropriations and to adopt the directive NSC 68 which

contained, as we have already seen, instructions for stepping up the cold war against the Soviet Union.

In November 1952 the United States tested its first thermonuclear device. Rocket technology developed at a rapid rate towards the building of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. As the United States government stepped up its aggressive foreign policy, particularly after the war in Korea, it began to considerably build up its war machine. It was this period that saw the Eisenhower administration adopt the policy of massive retaliation. The Air Force command had foreseen such a development and in summer 1952 held a conference to discuss future policy. This conference confirmed the general concept that the strategic air command should be in a position to deliver an instantaneous massive strike. It was a concept based on the conviction that the United States could not at the same time maintain its "deterrence" and wage local wars with large land forces. The air command also wanted a reduction in the number of ground troops, claiming that to maintain large contingents of land forces abroad would overstrain US resources. This point of view was also supported by Admiral Radford, who became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1953. Furthermore, the US political leadership at the time, that had been considerably worried over the long drawn-out war on land in Korea, was also inclined to listen to the opinion that the Air Force should be strengthened.

At one time the Commander of the Air Force, General LeMay considered that part of the Air Force should be used to support the ground troops. But as nuclear delivery vehicles began to be developed during the 1950s, he changed his mind and declared that air power should be used to prevent the launching of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies. This was tantamount to a call for a preventive strike against the Soviet Union.

LeMay's views on doing away with the Tactical Air Command were naturally rejected by the Tactical Air Command itself. They claimed that tactical aircraft could play an important part in the future since limited wars were more likely than strategic wars. The Strategic Air Command was precisely designed to wage this kind of war and it could not cope with a limited war. In 1957 the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Thomas White, decided to keep the Tactical Air Command independent, although the priority, particularly financial preference, was given to the Strategic Air Command. Behind this decision there was also the reluctance to let air support for the ground forces pass into the hands of the Army.

The reorganization of the Defence Department in 1958 was perhaps the most substantial of all the measures of this kind taken since 1947. It completed the change by which the secretaries of the various armed services had been turned from members of the cabinet taking political decisions into simply high-ranking managers. They were similarly released from operative command duties. The armed services departments were now responsible for the raising, training and equipping of the units attached to the unified and specified commands.

Throughout the 1950s the conflict between the strategic and tactical commands of the Air Force was accompanied by differences between the Air Force as a whole and the Army on the priority of the forces that would wage a strategic or "limited" war. During this period too tension arose in the relationship between the Air Force and the Navy on the question of strategic forces in view of the forthcoming appearance of the Polaris submarine fleet. The Army and the Navy were almost continually protesting that the Air Force received the lion's share of budget appropriations: the Strategic Air Command alone took an average of 18 per cent of the whole military budget throughout the 1950s. Gen-

eral LeMay, its commander, and General Thomas Power who replaced him made considerable use of the "Soviet threat" campaign, especially in view of the fact that the Soviet Union had by now developed its own long-range strategic nuclear force, to get an even larger share of the appropriations.

On the other hand, the Army and the Navy opposed these appropriations with the argument that the fact that the Soviet Union had reached nuclear parity diminished the role and importance of strategic aviation, since there now existed a "mutual deterrence". From their point of view, therefore, a conventional limited war was more likely than an all-out war. The Army and Navy commands also expressed the opinion that nuclear deterrence in conditions of parity required only the capability of destroying the enemy's urban and industrial centres. These concepts in American literature on the subject were termed finite deterrence.

The Air Force upheld counterforce strategy aimed at destroying the enemy's nuclear arsenals. This strategy required a nuclear arsenal that was far more varied and numerically superior to that required to implement a policy of finite deterrence. At the same time the Air Force command which in 1948 had been given conduct of a strategic nuclear war tried to convince the naval staff to hand over a list of the Navy's strategic targets so that the Air Force could integrate it in a single plan. But in the belief that the Air Force was trying to get control of all strategic weapons and strategic operations, the Navy refused to cooperate.

The reorganization of the Defence Department in 1958 gave the Secretary of Defence large powers in the sphere of unified strategic planning. The Army and the Air Force supported this new development, but the Navy was against it. Speaking in Congress in support of President Eisenhower's programme, General Thomas White said that it was of vital importance for the organization of the national armed forces under a single com-

mand and for conducting integrated strategic and tactical planning. The formation of the Polaris submarine fleet in the late 1950s and support for the concept of finite deterrence compelled the Air Force command to accelerate the introduction of unified strategic planning and an integrated target list. The Navy, however, continued to resist this fearing that the Air Force would try to get control of all the strategic systems and selection of targets.

The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General LeMay, went even further. Speaking to a Senate committee on aeronautics and space sciences, he declared that the reorganization of the Defence Department was only the first step on the way to creating a unified service with a single command and a single staff for controlling all the armed forces. General White proposed a single unified strategic command including both the Strategic Air Command and Polaris submarines. But the Army, the Navy and the Marines rejected this idea. Defence Secretary, Thomas Gates, who had formerly been Navy Secretary, chose a compromise policy between the desires of the Air Force and the attempts of the Navy to maintain the status quo. He was guided by the fact that alongside the Strategic Air Command, which had the majority of strategic means at its disposal, there were now in existence the Polaris submarines as well as tactical missiles and aircraft stationed on foreign bases. Thus the need for coordinating the selection of targets was essential.

In August 1960, Thomas Gates announced the formation of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff. It included representatives from all the armed services so as to compile and have in a state of readiness a National Strategic Target List as well as a Single Integrated Operational Plan for the distribution of available nuclear weapons according to selected targets. Considering the experience and capabilities of the Strategic Air Command, its commander was made director of the Joint



Strategic Target Planning Staff, and the personnel of the SAC planning division were also attached to the Planning Staff. A naval vice-admiral was made deputy director. According to Gates himself, this was the most important decision taken during his term as Defence Secretary. It put an end to the years of competition between the Navy and the Air Force and became the prototype of the centralized system of command, which the future Secretary of Defence, Robert McNamara, adhered to.

While the Air Force Secretary, Eugene Zuckert, was content to submit to McNamara and showed virtually no independence, his Chief of Staff, LeMay, opposed the major initiatives of the Defence Secretary. He resisted the change-over to the strategy of flexible response with its emphasis on conventional forces. LeMay believed that McNamara was foisting the F-111 bomber on to the Air Force instead of developing a new aircraft to replace the obsolescent B-52. He made a report to the effect that strategic bombers continued to play an important role in implementing the concept of assured destruction when nuclear forces were targeted on enemy urban and industrial centres. LeMay maintained that the concept of assured destruction, introduced by McNamara, was simply a euphemism for finite deterrence. To all the computations of the Defence Secretary the Chief of Staff of the Air Force preferred a combination of counterforce and assured destruction as well as a combined force of bombers and missiles.<sup>75</sup>

In the final analysis it turned out that the Air Force's attempts to support a powerful Defence Secretary did not bring the desired results. It could not bring about a situation in which it would play the dominant role in the military establishment. But at the same time, the fact that ruling circles in the United States continued to gamble on nuclear weapons as a means of waging war and as an instrument furthering

their foreign policy meant that the Air Force retained a fairly important position in the military hierarchy when it came to receiving appropriations.

While on the subject of the development of the US war machine during the postwar period a special word has to be said on the part played by the Marines. Neither during the war, nor during the first years following the war was any mention made of this force. But a memorandum on the organization of the War Department in the postwar period which was put before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on November 4, 1943 by General Marshall mentioned it among the "unimportant organizational details".<sup>76</sup> However, in March 1946, General Eisenhower, the Army Chief of Staff, set out in a memorandum to the JCS his proposal for the creation of a Marine force to defend US interests abroad and guard warships and naval constructions. He recommended that the numbers of the force should be limited to 50,000-60,000 men, warning that if this limit were exceeded the Marines would end up duplicating the tasks of the ground forces and become a second Army. A year later in April 1947 Eisenhower said in a private conversation that Army fears that the Marines could become another ground force went back as far as the time of the First World War.

In late 1946 the Navy Secretary, James Forrestal, and the Army Secretary, Robert Patterson, tried on the instructions of President Truman to find a mutually acceptable solution for the dispute between the Army and the Navy so as to effect the creation of unified armed forces. In January 1947 they put before the President a signed agreement which was the basis for the National Security Act. This law provided for the existence of a Marine Corps. At the Key West Conference in March 1948 at which the tasks and role of the armed services were discussed it was decided that the Marine Corps must not under any circumstance be turned into another land army and that

its number would be limited to four divisions.

After Louis Johnson came to the Pentagon as Defence Secretary the numerical strength of the Marines was reduced to 8 infantry batallions and 12 air squadrons. In October 1949 the Corps Commander, General Gates, asked Congress about representation among the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and informed the Armed Services Committee that Defence Secretary Johnson had refused to satisfy this request. Congressman Carl Vinson introduced a resolution on this question, but its discussion was postponed for a year. From late 1946 the Marine command was already supporting the idea that helicopters based on aircraft carriers were the best means of landing troops from ship to shore. Ten days before the beginning of the Korean War President Truman visited the site of military exercises where training was in progress in ship to shore landings from helicopters. But he did not give his support to the idea, saying that it simply did not appeal to him.

During the Korean War much attention was paid to the Marines. From July 1950 they took active part in the fighting. In April and May 1951 the House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services published a report which confirmed that the Marine Corps was and had always been from the moment of its formation a separate armed service, quite distinct from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. The marine commander was given equal status with the chiefs of staff of the other services and the right to attend the JCS sittings. The structure of the Marine Corps was subsequently developed after its shameful intervention into the affairs of the Dominican Republic in 1965. The landing on this island was made by two marine brigades and one airborne brigade.

The Marines also took part in the Vietnam War. Essentially it was their force which brought about an escalation in the American war against the Vietnamese people. The landing of the 9th Marine Ex-

peditionary Brigade in March 1965 in Danang was the beginning of a rapid build-up of American forces in Vietnam, and in May 1965 the Marine command set up its headquarters there. In a certain sense the American aggression in Vietnam was the greatest war in the history of the Marines. In 1968 the corps numbered 86,000, i.e. more than the total number of those who fought in the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa. In comparison with the other armed services a greater percentage of Marines took part in the fighting in Vietnam.

Traditionally the Marines have enjoyed great popularity among the ordinary American people. But in recent years their prestige has considerably fallen. According to American specialists the main problem with the Marine Corps today is the low moral and political level of its personnel. Nevertheless, even today the corps command professes the aggressive doctrine of using the Marines abroad.

The Second World War and the postwar aggressive policy aimed at world hegemony resulted in a cumbersome and complex organization developing in the United States — the military and political bureaucracy. At the peak of the pyramid stood the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the top brass of all the armed services — the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines. The JCS was instituted at the beginning of the Second World War to coordinate the efforts of the US Armed Forces in a war on such a vast scale and to dovetail operational plans with the British ally.

The first session of the JCS took place on February 9, 1942. The JCS then included General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Admiral King, Commander in Chief of the Navy, General Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Force and Admiral Leahy, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander, President Roosevelt. Organizationally, the JCS consisted of two main committees — one involved with strategic planning, the other with planning troop supplies. The committees contained

representatives from all the armed services. They headed the working groups, which translated strategic concepts into actual military plans.

After the war ended this system of committees continued to function for a time. But in 1946 as the United States was beginning to adopt the cold war policy the country was hit by an "organizational mania", the purpose of which was to adapt the state apparatus to the needs of the expansionist policies pursued by the ruling class. It was then that the Reorganization Act was passed and the Committee on Military Affairs and the Committee on Naval Affairs united to form the Committee on Armed Services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was given the right, along with target planning, to exercise operational control over the US Armed Forces. The Joint Strategic Survey Council, which was responsible both for drawing up plans and supplying the troops, moved to the fore within the executive system of the JCS.

In the course of debates among ruling circles in the United States on such matters as the future of the unified armed services, the enlargement or reduction of presidential power, the reorganization of the State Department and the forty-three other departments that were involved at one level of foreign policy or another during the postwar period, only two questions found unanimous agreement: the need for unified military planning and command, and need for integrate consideration of political and military factors affecting the security of the United States. American scholars rightly note that many disagreements over government organization in the postwar period might have never been resolved had it not been for the circumstances of the cold war against the USSR.<sup>77</sup>

The JCS was given the task of formulating an integrated military policy. The chiefs of staff continued, as in wartime, to prepare strategic plans and exercise strategic command over the armed forces, to formulate

supply planning and delegate responsibility for its implementation and to examine material and manpower requirements as the main connecting link between strategic planning and supply plans, on the one hand, and political, military and financial considerations, on the other.

The most important provision of the 1947 Act was the institution of a staff of the JCS. During the war and immediately after it the JCS had been completely dependent on working groups made up from personnel selected from the staffs of the various services, and that seriously limited its freedom of action. The new Act authorized the Chiefs to create a staff of up to one hundred officers,<sup>78</sup> a number that was later legislatively increased to four hundred,<sup>79</sup> and which today stands at three thousand. The staff was served by a ramified system of specified committees.

The main body responsible for military policy was the Joint Strategic Survey Council, which was comprised on a permanent basis of officers from all the various armed services.

According to American specialists between 1947 and 1950 the JCS was unable to show unanimity on almost any one major issue. The chiefs could only agree amongst themselves on short-term military plans based on currently available forces. Until 1950 only four such plans had been drawn up and these were subsequently annulled. The biggest mistake, according to American specialists, was that the chiefs of staff formulated their plans on the expectation of large appropriations in peacetime and on the basis of limited intelligence, unrealistic estimations of the capabilities of their new NATO allies and incorrect calculations as to the development of events in the enemy countries. It was during this period, American scholars believe, that the planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was at its lowest level.<sup>80</sup>

The difficulties encountered in reconciling the differ-

ent positions of the chiefs of the various services and ironing out disagreements between them made it necessary to create the post of permanent chairman. This requirement was contained in the draft amendments to the 1947 Act which were put before Congress by the Defence Department in 1949. According to the amendments the JCS chairman was appointed, except in war-time, for a term of two years and maximum of two terms. His status was that of first chief of the armed forces, but he held no command. The duties of the chairman were clearly formulated: he was to preside at the JCS meetings, draw up the agenda for such meetings, help the meetings get through their business as quickly as possible and report to the Defence Secretary and the President on matters where agreement was unable to be reached. The amendments also stated that the chairman had no right of vote. Furthermore, it was not the chairman, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a whole who acted as advisers to the President and the Defence Secretary. The 1949 amendments recognized the responsibility of the chiefs of staff to Congress and obliged them to bring their recommendations before Congress whenever they considered it necessary after giving prior notification to the Defence Secretary. During the Korean War the commanding officer of the Marines was made a member of the JCS.

When President Eisenhower came to power in 1953 he made an immediate proposal to reorganize the Defence Department. At the root of this proposal lay his dissatisfaction at the dual role played by the chiefs of staff. On the one hand, they were advisers and planners, on the other, commanders of their respective armed services. As a result of this reorganization the JCS became a planning and consultative body. The chairman was given the additional function of guiding the work of the JCS so as to relieve the other members of their administrative tasks. The Director of the Staff was appointed by the Defence Secretary but the JCS chair-

man approved his candidature. It was also decided to enlist the help of civilian experts so as to ensure that economic, technical and other factors were taken into consideration in the Joint Chiefs' planning. In 1954 Defence Secretary Wilson issued a directive whereby the JCS chairman was fully authorized to concentrate on JCS work and report to the Defence Secretary his own opinion on disputes among his colleagues.

In October 1953 on the basis of reports from the services' chiefs of staff and a review of national security objectives approval was given in Washington for the strategy of massive retaliation. The appropriate document was the first of a number of similar documents defining the basis of national security policy. Each was presented to the Joint Chiefs for discussion. According to the system adopted in 1952 the basic planning document of the Joint Chiefs, which transformed the aims of national policy into strategic plans was the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP). This plan covered the level of readiness of the armed forces for a period of several years ahead and contained decisions on their numerical strength and deployment. This provided a basis on which the military budget could be planned for each fiscal year. But once again differences between the chiefs of staff prevented the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan from being completed on time and from its being used as a basis for budgeting the armed forces.

During his second term of office President Eisenhower undertook a second reorganization of the US war machine, which was announced on April 3, 1958. This decision was dictated by the fact that the previous measures had not produced the desired results and friction within the JCS had in no way abated. Also taken into account was the changing character of modern warfare.

All the armed forces were divided into five unified and three specified commands and placed directly under the Secretary of Defence. Orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given in the name and on the in-



structions of the Defence Secretary. In order to improve the chain of command a special operations division was set up in the JCS staff. Henceforth the staff consisted of different directors. The chairman now had the right to set tasks to his staff and appoint a staff director with the approval of the Defence Secretary. The members of the JCS were required to hand over a large part of their responsibilities to their deputies so as to have time themselves to concentrate on the work of the JCS. The chairman was now given the right to vote.

The 1958 reorganization was approved by Congress, but not without difficulty.

President Eisenhower's military reorganization policy was severely criticized in Congress, particularly by the Democrats. They believed that all the committees, councils and directors formed a clumsy system and one that was poorly suited to the changing situation. Therefore, when Kennedy came to power, the permanent bodies that had been formed to serve the National Security Council were done away with and replaced by *ad hoc* groups that would make decisions on current matters of importance. Kennedy also did away with the system of annual national security policy directives, believing them to be pointless since their assessments were so vague. In this situation JCS representatives were far from being included in all the *ad hoc* groups. The importance of the JCS was slightly reduced due to the increased role played by the Secretary of Defence, who at the time was Robert McNamara. At the same time this period saw slightly better cooperation between the chiefs of staff.

President Lyndon Johnson paid great attention to the functioning of the National Security Council. The JCS chairman also became an indispensable member of the Tuesday Group which met with the President every week on that day to discuss matters of national security.

The next President of the United States, Richard

Nixon, preferred formalized methods of leadership. He resurrected the National Security Council standing committees in which representatives of the JCS regularly participated. The JCS chairman became a member of practically all the most important committees set up to deal with crisis situations, to consider matters relating to arms limitation and to review military appropriations. After Nixon retired in 1974 this system more or less remained unchanged. Furthermore, Defence Secretary Melvin Laird strengthened the position of the JCS within the Defence Department. He introduced a system of regular conferences with members of the Joint Chiefs at which many important matters were settled on a compromise basis.

According to some American specialists, the 1960s saw a considerable fall in the prestige of the military particularly in Congress due to the unpopularity of the Vietnam War. During this period the chiefs of staff fully supported the policy of the various administrations of the time and were united in their defence in Congress. Under President Carter the position changed somewhat. The JCS played smaller part in preparing the military budget in view of the new procedure. The President took a number of important decisions, for example, on withdrawing American troops from Korea (which, incidentally, still remains unfulfilled) without consulting the JCS. In early 1980 the Joint Chiefs of Staff dissatisfaction at presidential policy on the military budget developed into open opposition.<sup>81</sup> But as the "Soviet military threat" campaign was stepped up, Congress began more and more to favour the military establishment. Well-known hawks like Senators Sam Nunn and Henry Jackson frequently demanded an increase in military spending, and the JCS members became gradually more welcomed guests in the House of Representatives and in the Senate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff has been in existence for 35 years. During this time its organization has largely

remained at the 1949 level. It continues to be responsible for planning, military advice and operational command. But it has still not been able to win back the prestige and influence it had during the Second World War.

The 1947 National Security Act, although formalizing the existence of the JCS, lowered its importance by instituting the post of Defence Secretary which from that time on became the means by which the chiefs of staff made recommendations to the President. Nevertheless, the post of JCS chairman remains important. For the public at large and for Congress it personifies the whole military establishment. Its responsibilities have continually been increased. Sufficient to recall that at difficult moments in the country's history, like the Korean War and the Vietnam War the JCS and the Pentagon virtually determined US foreign policy. But in so far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff remains the main link between the military and civilian leadership in the exercise of national security policy, its role in the future is bound to fluctuate depending on the preferences of the civilian leadership, on its sympathies and antipathies and, most important of all, on the development of the country's military capabilities and its plans to use them in furtherance of foreign policy.

In so far as Washington has not only continued, but even increased its reliance on military strength in pursuit of its foreign political goals, the JCS has correspondingly acquired considerable political significance. The presidents of the United States in the recent decade have not only turned to their chiefs of staff for aid, but sought their support for certain of their own political actions. And this support has often been the deciding factor determining the attitude of Congress and a section of public opinion. Suffice it to say that President Kennedy, for example, considered the political weight of the JCS such that he had to convince and request every chief of staff to support his position on conclud-

ing the Test Ban Treaty. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, though opposing the building of anti-missile systems, continued to spend millions of dollars on building four anti-missile complexes so as to satisfy the chiefs of staff who were dissatisfied at the above agreement.

In 1977 and 1978 when the United States was swept by a wave of chauvinism in relation to ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty, the Carter administration also actively sought the support of the JCS. According to several of the President's critics, the chiefs of staff only supported the treaty because of pressure from the administration, not through their own strategic convictions. Thus the executive power has always used all the means at its disposal to bring influence to bear on the JCS.

A number of American scholars have noted the disparity between the level of political professionalism among the JCS members and the tasks of military and political analysis they are required to fulfil, and consequently the low quality of their recommendations to the President. Before taking his place on the Joint Chiefs of Staff not one chief of staff felt it necessary to closely examine the nature of the "threats" to US security. A study of the official biographies of JCS members for the last 25 years testifies to their very superficial education.<sup>82</sup> In this connection the words of the American specialist, Stuart H. Loory, are of special interest. "For more than twenty-five years," he writes, "a succession of Joint Chiefs advised the civilian leadership on how to 'contain communism'. None of them had a good first-hand knowledge of just what it was they were trying to contain."<sup>83</sup>

The hardening of political attitudes in the United States in favour of using force to solve international problems increased the role of the military establishment and strengthened its influence on all aspects of the life of the country. An important factor here was the use of the armed forces alongside the police as an

instrument of internal repression. This was particularly true of the mid-1950s when the Eisenhower administration used the National Guard and regular army units to crush disorders. It was during this period that a new pattern of army involvement in law enforcement began to evolve, according to which the final decision to involve the Army would be made at the highest levels of government. In fact the channel of authority would extend from the President and Attorney General to the executive agent, the Secretary of the Army and then to the commander directly involved.<sup>84</sup> To this end army units were given specialized riot-quelling training and in the early 1960s they were sent in to put down disorders in Mississippi (1962) and Alabama (1965). By the mid- and late 1960s the use of the Army in operations of this kind had become quite normal and disturbances were put down in the ghettos of Watts (1965), Newark, Detroit and Milwaukee.

The Army was used to fulfil the functions of the police in breaking up mass demonstrations, meetings and other forms of protest against the Vietnam War like the march to the Pentagon in 1967, the attempts to break up the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago in 1968, the numerous protest marches to military bases and other places where troops were stationed, and the major disturbances in Washington in 1971. The role of the Army in crushing the protest movement against the Vietnam War and general social unrest grew to such a scale that by the late 1960s its command set up illegally a special intelligence service to bring pressure to bear upon dissidents. The scale of this activity can be judged from the fact that a central data bank was started at the US Army Intelligence Centre at Fort Holabird.<sup>85</sup> When faced for the first time with mass public protest Defence Secretary Melvin Laird ordered an end to all intelligence gathering on US citizens. But the punitive functions against those involved in social, racial and other outbreaks continue to this

day to be carried out by the Army.

The numerical strength of the armed forces and the sheer scale of the war machine have had a considerable influence on the importance of the military factor in the ideological and political life of the United States. At the end of the Korean War the armed forces numbered from 2 to 2.5 million. To these should also be added approximately 1.3 million National Guardsmen and trained reservists and approximately 1.5 million civilians working for the Pentagon.<sup>86</sup> Such is the numerical strength of those directly involved (particularly economically) in building up the US war machine. And its political influence, especially that of its leadership, is very great.

The further build-up of the country's military power and the increased military budget under President Reagan will lead to a numerical growth of this group and to its even greater influence. And it is this group that forms the political base of the country's military-industrial complex. The group includes the bosses of the military-industrial corporations, the higher ranks of the military-industrial bureaucracy, and legislators from the states whose well-being depends on a militarized economy. The sources of power of the military-industrial complex are not limited to the industrial sphere—they are widely rooted in the regional, political and economic layers of American society.

In 1962 General Douglas MacArthur said in a speech at West Point Military Academy: "Your mission remains fixed... It is to win our wars. Everything else in your professional career is but corollary to this vital dedication."<sup>87</sup> But much water has flown under the bridge since then. Now the whole war machine is being politicized. In taking decisions it must now account for not only the purely military consequences, but the economic and political consequences as well. There is no such thing as a purely military or professional role for the army any more. And let us note in passing that President

Eisenhower, President Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor and a number of other influential military have held exactly the same opinion. Its practical reflection can be seen in the fact that at the United States Air Force Academy, which was opened in 1955, there has been a vast growth in the number of political sciences taught, rather than military disciplines, and the curricula for training junior and senior officers has been considerably revised in this direction.

Thus what we now have is a process whereby the military and political leaderships of the country are merging. And it is this continually accelerating process that is seen as one of the dominant trends in US political life today. It only remains to add that although certain civilian and military specialists criticize the process of politicizing the US war machine, they are primarily concerned not with its essence, but with the fact that such politicizing could have a deleterious effect on the professional standards of the officers corps.<sup>88</sup>

Today in the 1980s the old song can be heard with increasing frequency that the country is still faced with "terrible" threats to its national security. The ruling class and its military and political leadership continue as in the past down the traditional path of creating artificial "threats", which then have to be combatted. And here of greatest importance is the myth of the Soviet threat. Of course, at the same time it must be recognized that even today there are still sober-minded people, who realize that the US position in the modern world is changing (particularly in comparison with the pre-Vietnam War period) and that now there is considerably less opportunity for the US to influence world events from a position of strength.

Over the last decades American ruling circles have always considered that "the interest of the United States of America... is best served by preserving and protecting a world of diversity in which no one pow-

er or no one combination of powers can threaten the security of the United States".<sup>89</sup> With such an understanding of what constitutes US "vital interests" the race for military superiority, which threatens enemy and ally alike, is only logical.

The traditional prescriptions of the imperial strategists have now been embraced by the current Republican administration. They have been openly and unambiguously formulated in a large volume entitled *American National Security*, which was published in 1981 and is recommended reading for higher educational establishments in the United States. The relevant section runs thus: "... a hard, realistic, 'power politics' game played by a military preeminent United States within a strong Western security community offers this country the best prospects for success. History is littered with the wreckage of nations and empires that attempted to ignore the ancient lessons of power in world politics."<sup>90</sup>

These old militaristic prescriptions of American hegemonism take on the form, when the subject is the Soviet Union, of appeals to pursue towards that country a somewhat renovated policy of containment. The pivot of this policy, as before, remains the US readiness to use nuclear weapons first against the USSR in the name of maintaining the balance of power. Furthermore, the US gambles on the increasing destructive power of its conventional weapons, that have been developed as a result of technological breakthroughs in targeting systems and space-based reconnaissance systems which certain American specialists<sup>91</sup> consider to be a revolution in the ways of waging war comparable in importance to the development of the atomic bomb in 1945. The ability to strike a target with conventional weapons, but with high accuracy ought, in the opinion of these specialists, to be fully exploited by the West in the interests of waging a preventive war against the USSR.



Thus, neither lessons of postwar decades, nor the foreign policy fiascos and military defeats, nor the experiences of normalizing the international situation during the 1970s have done anything to alter the essence of the US war machine, which to this day remains the main instrument for pursuing a policy of US hegemonism.

### *Chapter III*

## **NUCLEAR MADNESS RAISED TO THE LEVEL OF STATE POLICY**

### **1. Formulating Nuclear Strategy and the Policy of Atomic Blackmail.**

The news on July 19, 1945 that the United States had successfully tested the first atom bomb was met with rejoicing by President Truman and his advisers, for they were now convinced that they could harden their position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The idea had already begun to be mooted that atomic weapons might be used to restructure the postwar world on a pattern that suited Washington, as the then State Secretary Byrnes and others had quite explicitly told President Truman.

From the very outset the attention of ruling circles in the United States had been focussed on the military possibilities of the new weapon. On September 6, 1944, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had taken a decision to use the atomic bomb to "shorten the war". According to John L. Gaddis, War Secretary Stimson later wrote that "at no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war".<sup>1</sup> Admiral Leahy said that "FDR would have used it in a minute to prove that he had not wasted two billion dollars".<sup>2</sup> This attitude to the atom bomb was largely explained by the de-

sire to win victory as fast as possible by technological breakthroughs rather than troops. Hence the use of the bomb in war was a logical continuation of this thinking.

But the main reason lay not so much in military considerations as in the political possibilities offered by the atom bomb. The appearance of this newly developed weapon, so the Washington politicians believed, sharply changed the postwar balance of power and gave the United States the political possibility to foist its will on the rest of the world.

Of course, the administration gave no public voice to these views. But there is enough documentary evidence available now to show that President Truman and his advisers considered using their atomic monopoly to extort political concessions from the Soviet Union which would have cost it its legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. This idea subsequently came to underlie virtually all the foreign policy moves of the US military and political leadership.

After the capitulation of Japan the Truman administration began to examine the political consequences of using atomic energy for military purposes. They were faced with two alternatives: either keep their nuclear monopoly so as to use it for political purposes or find ways to exclude nuclear weapons from the life of society so that they could not be used as a continuous threat of blackmail and coercion. Taking the first alternative meant unleashing a qualitatively unprecedented arms race and facing the whole human race with the threat of mass annihilation. But in the long run this was the choice Washington believed, that could bring world hegemony for the United States. The sacrifice and cost it would entail was not important for the American ruling class. And of even less importance were the officially proclaimed principles.

As for the second alternative, it was discarded almost immediately with no really serious measures being proposed that might possibly implement it. The so-called in-

ternational control of atomic weapons that the United States did propose was nothing more than an attempt to perpetuate the same American nuclear monopoly but with the aid of the international community. The Soviet Union, at any rate, was either completely excluded from the system of international control or required to accept conditions that would be quite intolerable for a sovereign state.

The flirtation with the idea of international control meant, of course, a certain concession to that section of the American ruling class that wanted to maintain the type of international cooperation that existed during the period of the anti-Hitler coalition. But it was a very half-hearted concession. Most of those in the administration and in Congress believed that "the head start which the United States enjoyed in bomb development would give it a permanent advantage over other nations".<sup>3</sup> To support the administration's policy of maintaining a nuclear monopoly and to put down the protests of the progressives and inflame anti-Soviet hysteria Congress began in September 1945 the first postwar witch-hunt in the United States.

The military and political leadership of the United States chose without too much hesitation to begin the nuclear arms race in order to maintain and increase their military superiority. The ideological grounding for this position was expressed in a speech in New York by President Truman on October 27, 1945, when he said: "The possession in our hands of this new power of destruction we regard as a sacred trust."<sup>4</sup> Thus the leading role in introducing nuclear weapons as a permanent element in the foreign and military policy of the United States belonged to the highest political office in the country. As for the US military, for a number of reasons they were not ready to give immediate recognition to the importance of nuclear weapons or consider them as the decisive factor in the military power of the United States.

The point is that US military planning after the Second World War had not foreseen the atom bomb and the armed services commands were against changes being made to plans that had already been drawn up. This can largely be explained by the natural conservatism of many of the top-rank military, which led them in the early stages to underestimate the power of the new weapon. The exception to this, however, was the Air Force which had begun to evolve an air-atomic strategy, hoping to get the lion's share of the military budget and gain independence from the Army. But the main reason, of course, was the desire to build up the might of the US Armed Forces.

It is characteristic that the move towards air-atomic strategy, which began in autumn 1945 and continued until spring 1947 took no account of the real condition of the US nuclear arsenal or the availability of delivery means for atomic weapons. According to the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal, the United States had "probably no more than a dozen atomic bombs by spring 1947—none of them ready for immediate use—and...a production rate that completed perhaps two weapons per month".<sup>5</sup> But even earlier, in October 1946, when there were even fewer bombs President Truman claimed that "that was enough to win a war".<sup>6</sup>

It was precisely this desire to "win a war" that affected the American leaders when in spring 1947 they put the atomic bomb at the centre of military planning since they believed it could ensure the foreign policy interests of the United States. In summer 1946 the Navy began to design an aircraft-carrier for nuclear bombers, but the Air Force command refused to give them specifications on the size of an atom bomb.<sup>7</sup> Two months after the capitulation of Japan a study was made of the possibility of delivering a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union. The resultant document, entitled "The Strategic Vulnerability of the USSR to a Limited Air Attack", was prepa-

red by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On the assumption that the same type of bomb would be used against the Soviet Union as was used against Japan, the document set down twenty Soviet cities that were "suitable" for an atomic strike. The choice was determined by their importance as industrial centres, by the presence of military research institutes or by the presence of key government or administrative personnel. Since it was not known how many bombs there were in the US arsenal, the study did not mention the numbers required for accomplishing this mission. The document was not an operational plan, but rather constituted a basis for future planning. It was also an attempt to assess the influence of the new weapon on old military doctrines.

Differences in the viewpoints of the Army and the Navy made it impossible to make this document into an integrated operational plan. Of course, these differences had nothing to do with whether a war with the Soviet Union was necessary or not. This was considered a self-evident fact. The question at issue was whether the destruction of twenty Soviet cities would be sufficient to force the Soviet Union to capitulate. There were also other differences. In early 1945 the Air Force command rejected the possibility of a "Soviet military threat" on the grounds that the USSR had a "primitive" aviation industry and was therefore unlikely to present such a threat for a whole generation's lifetime. But in July 1945 Air Force intelligence claimed that the USSR constituted a threat to the security of the United States. In autumn 1945 the same documents were claiming that within five to ten years the USSR would be in a position to challenge the air supremacy of the United States.<sup>8</sup>

At the inspiration of its Secretary, James Forrestal, the Navy too tried to secure for itself a global role in postwar American plans. The difficulty, however, was that as distinct from the Army, the Navy could not take part in military action in Europe, nor like the Air Force could it strike deep into the heart of Soviet territory.

American scholars note in this connection that possession of the atomic bomb together with the ever increasing anti-communist mood finally resulted in a decision to build up the power of the Navy. But for a time the Navy command and the Navy Secretary were somewhat suspicious of atomic weapons. A navy memorandum issued in January 1946 on a future war did not even mention them. Here the "fault" lay with the "battleship admirals", who in order to keep in service their obsolete battleships were against the building of modern aircraft carriers. Later Forrestal was to go over to the side of Admirals Nimitz and Radford who wanted nuclear weapons for the Navy and the building of new long-range superaircraft carriers capable of carrying nuclear bombers that could strike into the "heart of Russia".

The Army's first reaction to the atomic bomb was even more complicated. Army planners initially rejected its "revolutionary" character and the idea that it would change the face of war. The Special Planning Division believed, for example, that the third world war would last five years and furthermore that there would be a "warning period" of about a year during which the United States could mobilize. "Army planners believed that the atomic bomb would play some role in the ensuing battles, but presumably only as an adjunct to the conventional air offensive against the enemy."<sup>9</sup> This position was due to fears on the part of the Army command that the new weapon could bring about a reduction in the number of combat units, since a large concentration of troops would become very dangerous. But opposition to the introduction of the bomb from the Army command was largely undermined by General Marshall, who declared that this kind of vulnerability "necessitated an expansion of supporting personnel. Therefore no cut in the overall size of army was foreseeable."<sup>10</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to reconcile the difference in points of view by broad formulations of the

role of the atomic weapon in American strategy. In October 1945, the Joint Strategic Survey Council pointed out in its first postwar document assessing the influence of the atomic weapons on strategy that its presence would make defending military bases difficult and, furthermore, that the high cost of the weapon and its limited numbers would lower its effect in war. "This limitation will dictate its use only against targets of major importance... Thus, only exceptional circumstances would justify its tactical employment in support of conventional land, sea, or air operations."<sup>11</sup>

In subsequent studies undertaken by the JCS for the country's military and political leadership the limitations on the use of atomic weapons were similarly stressed. It was also pointed out that "the present bomb is primarily a strategic weapon of destruction best suited for employment against large industrial centres, ports, supplies or other targets vital to the war potential of a nation and therefore worthy of the bomb".<sup>12</sup> The Joint Chiefs represented the influence of the bomb on military strategy not qualitatively, so to speak, but rather quantitatively. The chiefs of staff ultimately accepted the point of view of the Army—the bomb not only did not reduce the role of existing conventional forces, it on the contrary necessitated their increase in order to defend the bases from which it was planned to deliver a nuclear strike against the enemy. They also affirmed that a future war in which the atomic bomb would be used would still require the seizure and occupation of enemy territory in order to force capitulation.<sup>13</sup>

The attitude of the chiefs of staff was largely explained by their reaction to the predominant mood of the country. After the destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima there was a widespread opinion in the country that atomic bombs had so changed the character of war that there was now no further need for the traditional armed forces. One of the JCS committees noted in October 1945 that "there is a vague thought in the popular mind



that the advent of new weapons, particularly the atomic bomb, will somehow replace or greatly reduce our army, navy and air forces".<sup>14</sup> The military leadership was troubled by these feelings as can be judged from the fact that the Air Force command was asked to voluntarily give up one wing of its atomic bombers so as not to encourage demands for preserving just this one wing and reducing other air forces units.

The Joint Chiefs, as American scholars have noted, were also concerned to avoid conflicts between the various armed services during the period of transition from wartime to peacetime. Their official position on the atomic bomb satisfied the interests of all the armed services, since they stressed the need for naval and air blockades and the occupation of enemy territory after an atomic strike. Defining the bomb as a strategic weapon aimed against civilian rather than military targets was a compromise attempt to maintain unchanged the functions and character of all the armed services. But this compromise position on the part of the JCS was almost immediately criticized by the new generation of officers. Doubt was cast not only on the assessments and plans of the Pentagon related to the details of a future war. Steps were also taken to reorientate American military thinking in the direction of a new, post-war strategy, based primarily on the atomic bomb.

The main critical attack on the JCS came from the Air Force. Raised on the theories of Giulio Douhet and his modern follower, Alexander de Seversky (a Hungarian born American), the air force officers tried to apply what had been learned in the Second World War to the peculiarities of the postwar period. But the strategic bombing that was carried out by the United States and Britain during that war provided little experience that was useful. These bombing raids had virtually all been no more than supplementary elements to the final victory over Japan and Germany which had been won by the ground forces. According to information provided

by the Strategic Bombing Survey, which was published in 1946, the peak of the strategic bombing offensive against Germany coincided with the peak of German industrial production. Furthermore, despite enormous losses among the civilian population, the rear continued effectively to serve the needs of Hitler's war machine and those of militarist Japan. It was the Survey's opinion that not even the atomic bomb had proved decisive in the war. Furthermore, Secretary of War Robert Patterson personally interceded with army historians in 1946 to ensure that the bomb, and not the USSR's entry into the war, would be represented in official postwar accounts as decisive in Japan's surrender.

The information contained in the Survey was used by those who were opposed to emphasizing the bomb and role of the Air Force. They were concerned that a move in favour of atomic weapons would lead to the formation of a small, compact air force capable of delivering nuclear strikes. But even here the supporters of the new doctrine, which was based on the atomic bomb and long-range bombers, i. e. the ability to project great destructive power at a considerable distance, won out. Those who supported the new strategy were headed by General Carl Spaatz, the architect of American strategic bombing raids against Germany during the Second World War. In October 1945 he made a report to Air Force commanding officers calling for the "building of a modern air force around the bomb".<sup>15</sup>

Spaatz's views were shared and supported by General Arnold. In November 1945 he made a report to War Secretary Patterson in which he used the term air-atomic strategy, thereby connecting air power with the latest technology of mass destruction. On his retirement Arnold recommended entrusting General Curtis LeMay, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, with implementing the new strategy. And, of course, a more suitable candidate for this could hardly be imagined.

In March 1945 LeMay commanded the 20th Air

Force, which razed Tokyo to rubbles. He was the first air force commander to give an enthusiastic welcome to the atomic bomb. He also foresaw a number of other new military developments. Thus in November 1945 he proposed forming a joint command of the Army and Navy for the purpose of adapting nuclear weapons for use with intercontinental guided missiles. He called for the maintenance of a large, well-equipped air force, but pointed out the need to form small strike forces equipped with nuclear bombers. A few weeks after LeMay had made these proposals a decision was taken to form the Strategic Air Command, the nucleus of the US air-atomic strike force.

At approximately the same time the Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, sent the Joint Chiefs of Staff a report in which he cast doubt on whether those who belittled the importance of atomic weapons were correct. To the report he appended a memorandum from General Groves entitled "Our Army of the Future as Influenced by Atomic Weapons" which stated: "if there are to be atomic weapons in the world, we must have the best, the biggest and the most."<sup>16</sup> Navy Secretary Forrestal, being more and more obsessed by the "Soviet threat" mania and completely opposed to the idea of postwar demobilization, was all for the building of an atomic strike force. Thus the atomic bomb gradually began to take an ever larger place in US military planning.

In early spring 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the paper on the influence of the atomic bomb on US military strategy. The Joint Strategic Survey Council now, as distinct from what it had recommended six weeks before, unconditionally recognized that the atomic bomb marked a huge "step forward" in comparison with other weapons and could influence future military operations. It also gave its unreserved support to the recommendation of General Arnold that the United States should maintain supremacy in the air. The Joint Chiefs

also finally changed their attitude to the Soviet Union. During the Yalta Conference the JCS had assessed Soviet intentions and aims to be largely defensive, now 18 months later Pentagon emergency planning documents were stating that the main aim of the USSR was "a limitless expansion of Soviet communism accompanied by a considerable territorial expansion of Russian imperialism"<sup>17</sup>

It was precisely on the crest of anti-Sovietism and anti-communism that the military and political leadership of the United States focused its attention on the strategic importance of the atomic bomb.

Its growing importance in military planning inevitably affected the thinking of the US military and political leadership. While mouthing their adherence to the concept of deterrence, i. e. preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, the US military and political establishment was increasingly drawn to the idea of using nuclear weapons first.

This approach sanctioned nuclear aggression under the pretext of the need for deterrence. And the full-scale destruction of cities at the very beginning of a nuclear war, as envisaged in the plans for delivering a preemptive nuclear strike, was in a way the culmination of the practice of strategic bombing carried out by the British and Americans during the Second World War. The possession of nuclear weapons, as the US military and political leadership believed,<sup>18</sup> meant not just a quantitative increase in current military force. The colossal damage that the atomic bomb could cause quite easily and in a very short time changed the whole relationship between military power and foreign policy. To force a foreign country to make concessions or to capitulate had in the past required a long period of military action and the defeat or the threat of defeat for that country's armed forces. Nuclear weapons now changed all that. One atomic bomb could destroy a whole city in the flash of an eye. Nuclear weapons could cause irreparable damage

to a state, they could destroy everything without a single battle having been fought.

Such a capability, as American scholars themselves note, seemed extremely attractive to ruling circles in the United States. On the one hand, the atomic bomb could result in the achievement of all their foreign policy goals, on the other, it could help avoid the dangers of postwar inflation and achieve world hegemony at what was in effect a cheap price to pay. Thus the US leadership decided in the future to use the threat of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union without in any way excluding the possibility that the United States would be the first to use them.<sup>19</sup> This strategy was based on the then dominant viewpoint among the military and political leadership that "the Russians would be unable to match or even to challenge American nuclear supremacy for another decade or longer".<sup>20</sup>

In June 1946 the Joint Chiefs finished drawing up the first war plan against the Soviet Union, codenamed "Pincher". The plan assumed that war between the United States and the Soviet Union would take place in summer 1946 or 1947 with a "warning period" lasting no less than three months. The plan was considered "experimental". It reflected the uncertainty on the part of the chiefs of staff as to the number of atomic bombs that could be used. The plan was supplemented by "Harrow", a document prepared by General LeMay in autumn 1946 which contained plans for the nuclear bombing of 20 Soviet cities and a repetition of the studies carried out in autumn 1945.

In the course of drawing up Plan Pincher the JCS planners discovered that the "experimental" concepts went beyond the capabilities of the Air Force. The Soviet towns chosen as targets turned out to be further than the B-29 bombers could reach from their European bases. The plan had provided for atomic-air attacks against the oilfields of Baku being launched from Turkey,<sup>21</sup> but the strength of the Soviet land forces and

their geographical deployment made the Joint Chiefs doubt the practical effectiveness of the atomic bomb in this instance, and therefore acted as a restraining factor.<sup>22</sup>

It is noteworthy that during this period the chiefs of staff were against the concept of deterrence, even in the form which suited the political leadership. They were worried that sooner or later the Soviet Union would have the bomb and that this would deter the United States from decisive action against it as "a situation dangerous to our security could result from impressing on our own democratic peoples the horrors of future wars of mass destruction".<sup>23</sup>

It should be said, of course, that among civilian strategists in 1946 the opinion was mooted that in an atomic age security could not be guaranteed by winning a war, but by averting it. Prominent among such strategists was Bernard Brodie, who in 1946 contributed to a book entitled *The Absolute Weapon*.<sup>24</sup> Brodie and other writers came to the conclusion that the atomic bomb cast doubts upon the traditional military postulates including the axiom that numerical superiority largely guarantees victory. One of the contributors to the book, Arnold Wolfers, wrote that "a high degree of Soviet-American 'equality in deterring power' would prove the best guarantee of peace and tend more than anything else to approximate the views and interests of the two countries".<sup>25</sup>

But US military doctrine, however, turned out to be a far cry from the idea of avoiding war in a nuclear age. From the very beginning it assumed that wars could be fought and won. More than that, in a memorandum entitled "Our Army of the Future—as Influenced by Atomic Weapons" General Groves urged that "the United States initiate a nuclear attack against any 'aggressor nation' about to acquire the bomb".<sup>26</sup> Publicly, of course, the military leaders resolutely rejected the possibility that the US would deliver a preemptive strike. This was said

in particular by the Army Chief of Staff Eisenhower. But as can now be seen from documentary sources the chiefs of staff at their secret sessions were far from excluding such a possibility.<sup>27</sup> Thus, three weeks after the destruction of Hiroshima they approved a navy proposal for delivering a first strike. The intelligence committee of the JCS recommended putting Plan Pincher into force if the Soviet Union should acquire the capability for an "eventual attack against the United States or defense against our attack".<sup>28</sup> The strike against 20 Soviet cities was planned to prevent Soviet attack.

In June 1947 the Joint Chiefs prepared a study entitled "Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon", in which it was stated: "If used in numbers, atomic bombs not only can nullify any nation's military effort, but can demolish its social and economic structures and prevent their reestablishment for long periods of time."<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, War Secretary Patterson advised Eisenhower that the War Department "is already following a policy that assumes the unrestricted employment of atomic energy as a weapon".<sup>30</sup> This showed the firm conviction of the US military leadership that the bomb gave the United States the decisive advantage in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.

In late August, 1947, the JCS planners reviewed Plan Pincher and drew up a new plan, codenamed "Broiler". This contained an important change from the previous plan, which indicated the final triumph of air-atomic strategy in US military doctrine. Like Pincher, Broiler anticipated a strategic air-atomic offensive against the Soviet Union, but conceded that the success or failure of the war effort hinged on the "early effectiveness" of the air-atomic campaign. Complete confidence was felt in the successful effect of the atomic bomb. The fact that atomic weapons were exclusively in the hands of the United States would, according to the plan, mean that the allied forces would not only win back the "lost territories", but also seriously undermine the Soviet

Union's ability to offer resistance. The effectiveness of the air-atomic offensive would be increased by staging atomic raids from the Ryukyu Islands of Japan as well as from bases in England, Egypt and India. The earlier problem of some targets in the USSR being out of the B-29's range was resolved in Broiler by a simple expedient—the bombers would land or “ditch” in friendly or neutral territory on the return flight.<sup>31</sup>

Whereas Plan Pincher envisaged the limited destruction of Soviet war potential, which was then considered the main objective, Broiler went considerably further, planning for the “liberation” of Eastern Europe and the capitulation of the Soviet Union “immediately following the initial atomic bomb campaign”. In view of this the plan stated that “preparations should be made early... to enable the Allies to take quick action in case of an early Soviet collapse”.<sup>32</sup> Broiler also differed from Pincher in the fact that the selection of targets in the Soviet Union was determined to a large degree by political considerations. As the plan stated strikes would be made against “‘the political, governmental, administrative and technical and scientific elements of the Soviet nation’, or, specifically, ‘key government and control facilities’ in the cities.”<sup>33</sup>

The new plan showed that the military and political leadership of the United States had already begun to look upon nuclear weapons as the main means of waging war against the Soviet Union. As American scholars have stressed, the plan was fully in accordance with all the demands of US “security” and was the first practical emergency war plan. In October 1947 the Joint Strategic Survey Council informed the Pentagon that approximately 400 atomic bombs would be needed to strike at Soviet targets.<sup>34</sup>

But for all this, Plan Broiler, as American strategists themselves admitted, contained one basic drawback: it could not answer the one question that had troubled all echelons of the US military and political leadership since



1945—when would the Soviet Union have the atomic bomb? The planners had assumed that American monopoly would last at least until 1956 or even later. In July 1947 the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepared a report for the President setting out two points of view on this issue. The first boiled down to the belief that the Soviet Union would not have the bomb until 1952 and that in view of difficulties with raw materials would not be able to produce more than three to five bombs per year. This point of view was supported by the Army and the Navy. The second theory, put forward by the Air Force, was that the USSR would get the bomb between 1949 and 1952.

The Joint Chiefs themselves considered that both opinions were simply guesswork. At the end of 1947 the CIA, the State Department and Atomic Energy Commission also tried to find out when the USSR would get the bomb. After a considerable amount of study they came to the conclusion that there was not much likelihood of the Soviet Union getting the atomic bomb before 1953, much less before 1951. These studies also stated that for the first three to five years the USSR would only be able to produce from 8 to 15 bombs per year and subsequently just one or two. This assessment was considered as the most authoritative. The US military and political leaders were not concerned that a more or less precise date could not be given. They were quite happy with the assertion that the USSR would not have the bomb in the near future.

In late 1947 the opinion was current among ruling circles in the United States that the US nuclear monopoly would last for a long time. But the USA's possession of the "winning weapon", as it was called by Bernard Baruch, could not force the USSR to bow down to American diktat, as Washington would like it to, and agree to international control over nuclear weapons on discriminatory conditions. The US monopoly of the atomic bomb, coupled with anti-Sovietism and hegemon-

ist ambitions and the traditionally scornful attitude to the abilities of other nations all combined to blind the American military and political leaders from making a sober evaluation of the situation.

In late 1947 the JCS produced its regular report stating that over the next decade the Soviet Union would be unable to produce the bomb. In the winter of 1947-1948 ruling circles in the United States were optimistic that their plans for establishing American hegemonism throughout the world could be effected. There were a number of circumstances behind this optimism. In March 1947 the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed as a result of which the military tentacles of the United States were stretched around the world. The strategy of containment acquired a clearly militarist character. In May 1947 the Marshall Plan was adopted, which was essentially aimed at perpetuating the American "embrace" of Western Europe. In July 1947 Congress adopted the National Security Act which gave the force of law to the creation of the war machine, and strengthened the power of the executive branch, particularly that of the President.

At the same time the continued growth of the US nuclear arsenal gave ruling circles there a special kind of confidence. From mid-1947 the number of atomic bombs began for the first time to approach that which the Joint Chiefs and the Atomic Energy Commission considered necessary for the achievement of their objectives. The policy of the United States was clearly set out in a letter from Defence Secretary Forrestal to the Senate Armed Services Committee in December 1947, which reflected his confidence in the country's military strength and called for the maintenance of US military supremacy. Having in mind the establishment of US hegemony throughout the world, he wrote that it could be achieved without unacceptable risk so long as "we can outproduce the world, can control the sea and can strike inland with the atomic bomb. ...The years before

any possible power can achieve the capability effectively to attack us with weapons of mass destruction are our years of opportunity."<sup>35</sup> This letter illustrates quite clearly how far both American military planning and the strategy of containment were dependent on the possession of nuclear weapons.

In early 1948 the US military and political leadership began to look for ways to roll back communism in a bid to put increased pressure on the socialist countries. The result was a decision to "increase atomic bomb production".<sup>36</sup> This decision was a mirror reflection of Washington's militarist policy, a policy of atomic blackmail. In response to this the Air Force, which at the start of 1948 had only 33 bombers capable of carrying atomic bombs, began planning to increase the number of atomic capable B-29s to 120 by the following November. The US Atomic Energy Commission intended to more than double its number of trained bomb-assembly teams from a planned three in June 1948 to seven a year later.<sup>37</sup> "Progress" in the production of weapons of mass destruction seemed the unconditional guarantee of American security. Anti-Soviet hysteria and military psychosis swept the country. On orders of the President a commission was set up to deal with problems concerning the Air Force. In February 1948 the JCS approved a plan for the stockpiling of strategic materials in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. In January 1948, at a Conference of Chiefs of Staff at Key West the subject of a possible war with the Soviet Union was discussed without dissent and the representatives showed a remarkable unanimity in their views. The result was the adoption of a "short-term emergency plan" for war with the Soviet Union, which was given the code name "Grabber".

This plan differed from former plans in so far as it assumed that a war could start at any moment and in view of the suddenness factor the "warning period" would be very short or might not even occur at all. More than ever before the stress was laid on atomic weapons.

In March 1948 the National Security Council on its own initiative began to reassess US strategy with the aid of the Army, Navy and Air Force commands, the State Department and the CIA. The result was NSC-7, a document entitled "The Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism", which was famous for being the first document from the administration in which the term cold war was used.<sup>38</sup> It amounted to a plan for mobilizing the forces of US imperialism in order to roll back the Soviet Union. It rejected a defence strategy, proposing instead the rearmament of America through the introduction of universal military training; the maintenance of US superiority in nuclear weapons; increased American aid to Western Europe, including a coordinated programme of support for underground resistance movements behind the Iron Curtain; and measures to crush the internal "communist threat". NSC-7 showed that the United States government had finally opted for a policy of subverting socialism from within and attacking the progressive forces in its own country.

A new wave of war hysteria hit the United States in connection with the Berlin crisis, despite the fact that both the American embassy in Moscow and the CIA discounted the idea that the Soviet Union intended war.<sup>39</sup> Nevertheless, President Truman ordered the Joint Chiefs to review existing plans for war with the Soviet Union. At approximately the same time discussions were being held with Britain on the deployment of US bombers there in the event of war. As a result, a special plan was drawn up for distributing nuclear weapons among the US arms and services, but as before the same sort of rivalry arose among them as to who was to play first fiddle.

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis Denfeld, put a memorandum before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on April 6, 1949, criticizing the emphasis placed on an air-atomic offensive against the Soviet Union and accusing the Air Force of exaggerating Soviet military capabilities and ignoring the armed forces of the allies. Of

course, the important thing here to the Navy was not the exaggeration, but the fact that Plan Grabber allowed for the loss of the Middle East and the Mediterranean, i.e. areas from which the US Navy intended to launch nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union from its aircraft carriers. Even the temporary loss of these areas would nullify the role of the Navy in the war and in the air-atomic offensive against the Soviet Union. And if the Navy were not to take an active part in the war, its budget could not be expected to be large.

The Admiral also raised the question of giving custody of atomic weapons to the armed services. But the country's political leadership preferred to keep them well under the control of the Atomic Energy Commission, for as Budget Director, James Webb, put it when speaking to President Truman in May 1948, "the idea of turning over custody of atomic bombs to these competing, jealous, insubordinate services, fighting for position with each other, is a terrible prospect".<sup>40</sup>

However, in this situation of militarist intoxication the Defence Department proposed deploying American bombers on air bases in Britain, from where they could strike into the heart of Soviet territory. This of course required that permission be given for the Air Force to have atomic bombs, for their deployment without them would be senseless. And since the bombers would be subject to air attack, it is difficult to imagine that the President would not sanction the use of bombs in the event of war. It was precisely these considerations that the Defence Department had in mind. As for the reasons for transferring them to Britain, the most important was the advantage of having bombers deployed at forward bases, which could serve as a precedent for future intervention in Europe and as a launching pad for strikes against the USSR. It was also believed that forward basing of nuclear bombers was something long decided upon and quite natural for a state preparing for war. Greater cynicism is hard to imagine!

The stationing of bombers in Europe ultimately meant blackmailing the Soviet Union, for the B-29s were not yet re-equipped for carrying atomic weapons, which, of course, was kept top secret. Furthermore, Army Secretary Kenneth Royall declared that it was necessary to have "several A-bombs available (in England and elsewhere) for immediate use .. such use [ to] be left entirely to the military."<sup>41</sup>

Thus by 1948 the atomic bomb had finally become the chief element in the military and political strategy of the United States in relation to the Soviet Union. It was then that the strategy of waging and winning the cold war was codified. The Berlin crisis was perhaps the first international conflict when the military and political leadership of the United States resorted to atomic blackmail by transferring to Britain in August 1948 another 30 B-29 bombers when the situation in Berlin had virtually normalized.

In the second half of 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff began, partially in reply to criticism from the Navy, to draw up a new emergency war plan codenamed "Fleetwood". It envisaged a much greater role for the Navy in launching air attacks on Soviet cities and blockading the Soviet coast. But perhaps the most significant part of the new plan was its understanding of the role to be played by the air-atomic offensive. A sudden nuclear attack against the USSR might be decisive and could, so the strategists believed, obviate a protracted, quasi-conventional war.<sup>42</sup> Plan Fleetwood reflected the growing anti-Soviet hysteria among US ruling circles. It envisaged the destruction of 70 Soviet cities through a simultaneous strike with 133 A-bombs. This should, according to Washington's calculations, be enough to produce a shattering psychological effect upon the rest of the USSR's population.

Plan Fleetwood was immediately approved by the Joint Chiefs and dispatched to the armed services staffs for execution on September 1, 1948.

There is sufficient evidence to show that the atomic bomb and the expectations it gave dominated the thinking of the US military and political leadership after the Berlin crisis. Thus a National Security Council directive required those attending the talks in London in July 1948 on the formation of NATO to undertake not to reveal for the meanwhile US policy or plans for the use of atomic weapons in war.<sup>43</sup> The talks clearly demonstrated the intention of the Washington administration to declare that the atomic bomb was the key to American guarantees in Europe. As Baruch put it, "it is the chiefest weapon in Europe's arsenal".<sup>44</sup>

Directive NSC-30, which was approved in September 1948, confirmed that American plans in Western Europe, including even its economic revival, were based on the use or threat to use nuclear weapons.<sup>45</sup> According to the directive, "the Soviets ... should in fact never be given the slightest reason to believe that the US would even consider not to use atomic weapons against them if necessary".<sup>46</sup> The State Department assessed the practical consequences of NSC-30 thus: "If war of major proportions breaks out, the National Military Establishment will have little alternative but to recommend to the Chief Executive that atomic weapons be used, and he will have no alternative [but] to go along. Thus, in effect, the paper actually decides the issue."<sup>47</sup> The question of how the United States would begin a nuclear war and what enemy targets would be destroyed was purposely left to the discretion of the military.

Directive NSC-30 confirmed that in the event of war with the Soviet Union the United States was ready to use nuclear weapons first to bring about Soviet capitulation.

## **2. Evolution of Plans for a Preventive Nuclear War Against the Soviet Union**

In 1949 the Joint Chiefs drew up yet another plan for

war against the Soviet Union (it was expected to begin in 1957.—R. B.) codenamed "Dropshot". It attempted to foresee the future development of political and military events. Its main prognosis was still the conviction that the United States would constantly retain its nuclear supremacy over the Soviet Union. It assumed that the United States would win the war in two to four weeks of intensive nuclear bombardment. If this did not happen, it was expected that the war would continue for three years and require the occupation of the USSR by ground forces. Plan Dropshot provided for a preemptive nuclear strike on a number of Soviet cities.

The plan was appended by a document drawn up by the Air Force and codenamed "Charioteer". This assumed that by 1957 the Soviet Union would have several atomic bombs, but stated that the United States would not only have a qualitative advantage but numerical superiority "in the order of 10 to 1". According to the plan it was "necessary that weapons of mass destruction be applied as early as possible and to the extent estimated to be necessary for the destruction of the Soviet ability to resist without undue emphasis on their intangible effects". At the same time on a special request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff the National Security Council made an assessment of the internal political situation in the United States and proposed the mass arrest of Americans suspected of disloyalty.<sup>48</sup>

Despite its strict top-secret classification certain parts of Plan Dropshot and its predecessors were leaked to the press in early 1949. The "leak" was arranged by those members of the Pentagon who wanted to advertise their own branch of the armed forces and "threaten" the USSR. A whole series of articles appeared on the pages of the American press,<sup>49</sup> all of which assumed American nuclear superiority and sketched the possible development of events in highly optimistic colours. In autumn 1951 *Collier's* described a plan for war with the Soviet Union, according to which American Marines



were to be parachuted behind the Urals to destroy Soviet atomic stockpiles and preempt an attack upon the United States.<sup>50</sup>

American scholars have noted that the immoral strategy of a preemptive nuclear strike and the destruction of the civilian population in the cities had not yet met with any mass condemnation in the United States, only a few anxious voices being sounded. For example, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal wrote in his diary that the atomic bomb had destroyed moral principles and cast man back to the jungle from which he emerged with all ethical limitations of warfare gone.<sup>51</sup>

In January 1949 the chiefs of staff informed the Atomic Energy Commission that the production of atomic bombs should be continuously and considerably increased. The main reason for this was not strategic needs, which as the JCS itself conceded did not make nuclear stockpiling necessary, but the desire to maintain superiority. Lilienthal expressed the fear that President Truman relied too much on atomic weapons—"the atomic bomb was the mainstay and all he had".<sup>52</sup>

In April 1949 Budget Director Frank Pace sent a memorandum to the President warning that the unconditional approval of air-atomic strategy bound him to the full-scale use of nuclear weapons in war in order to bring about the unconditional capitulation of the Soviet Union. This strategy, Pace pointed out, excluded the search for political alternatives. The destruction of the civilian population only hardened the enemy and made any kind of agreement impossible. After this memorandum the President asked the Air Force command for its warplans. He was shown Plan Trojan, which confirmed what Pace had said, for the plan envisaged a full-scale nuclear attack on Soviet cities and industrial centres by B-29 and B-50 bombers launched from Europe and by B-36 bombers from the United States. According to the plan's calculations between three and five million

Soviet citizens would be killed and some 28 million left homeless.

In April 1949 it was decided that NATO should begin nuclear planning on a permanent basis, its target being the Soviet Union. Three days after signing the Atlantic Pact the Pentagon proposed that the "new weapon" should be included in the bloc's military planning. A directive from the Defence Department stated that Western Europe should bear in mind the opportunities presented by the full use of the Air Force and weapons of mass destruction. In the same month the President assured a delegation of Democratic congressmen that he "would not hesitate" to use atomic weapons. He approved plans for the construction of airfields in the United States from which the "heavy punch" against the USSR would be launched. Earlier representatives of the Strategic Air Command and the Royal Air Force had finalized joint "pre-D-Day" plans for the air-atomic offensive from Great Britain.<sup>53</sup>

In summer 1949 the JCS began work on a new emergency plan for war with the Soviet Union, codenamed "Offtackle" which was intended to replace Plan Fleetwood. It assumed that an atomic *blitzkrieg* would be the only way of conducting such a war, and stated that atomic weapons would be used against the USSR from European territory as well. In late August 1949, the chiefs of staff put a draft directive before the National Security Council sanctioning the first use of atomic weapons in Europe. It was approved and became known as NSC-57. It contained for the first time the formulation of the concept of a nuclear umbrella over Europe, guaranteed by the US atomic monopoly.

But in September 1949 the event took place which delivered a crushing blow to the very basis of US strategic planning: the Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb. The news of this was received in Washington with nothing less than shock. The US government and particularly President Truman and Defence

Secretary Louis Johnson, shaken by the collapse of the forecasts they had been given and the calculations presented by the government services, could hardly believe it was true. Despite the fact that the President received information about the atomic tests in the USSR on September 12, he decided not to announce it immediately. It was not until September 23 that Truman informed his cabinet and the whole country of what had happened. According to Lilienthal, "the Russian bomb has changed the situation drastically".<sup>54</sup> But the most astonishing thing for the military and political leadership of the United States was the fact that they had underestimated the capabilities of the USSR.<sup>55</sup>

The American military and political leadership could now see that their plans for rolling back communism and making a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union were all fruitless. It was now clear that the time of impunity and the "years of opportunity" were a thing of the past. It was the moment to make a choice, which would determine US policy for many years to come. But there were no forces in the United States influential enough to take the country down another path and come to terms with the new realities. No one gave any thought to the reaction of the Soviet Union to the continuous stockpiling of nuclear weapons under the pretext of a "Soviet threat" and in the name of "national security".

Short-sightedness and conceit, multiplied by great-power chauvinism and anti-communism drove the ruling class of the United States towards the arms race and pursuit of the spectre of supremacy. The first reaction of the US administration to the news of the Soviet bomb tests already showed that it took no account of the new realities. The President declared at a session of the cabinet: "[Now] we are in a straight race with the Russians."<sup>56</sup> The project codenamed "Super" was immediately revived to build the hydrogen bomb. Particularly enthusiastic about this were the physicists Edward Teller

and Ernest Lawrence, who were staunchly supported by Senator Brian McMahon and the new Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss. However, the majority of scientists on the General Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, which was convened in late October 1949 to review the prospects for and the consequences of building a hydrogen bomb, were against it. Plan Super was called the genocide plan.

The opinion of these scientists, however, exercised no practical influence over the decisions of the military and political leadership.

To take the final decision on the production of the hydrogen bomb President Truman formed a special group consisting of David Lilienthal, Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson, which was known as the "Z Committee". Lilienthal was opposed to Plan Super, fearing that US foreign policy would drag the country down in a nuclear bog. Acheson said that it was first necessary to coordinate military considerations with the publicly stated commitments of the President to look for ways of establishing international control over nuclear weapons. Louis Johnson had no doubts—he was wholeheartedly in favour of building a hydrogen bomb.

Plan Super also gave rise to dispute within the State Department between George Kennan who was retiring and Paul Nitze who was replacing him as Director of the Policy Planning Staff. He, like Louis Johnson, was all for the idea of building a hydrogen bomb. Kennan, who was concerned at the possible consequences of a decision to build the bomb, prepared an 80-page memorandum setting out his opposition to the plan. He intended to submit his memo to the President before going into retirement. Kennan rested his argument upon ethical objections to the Super and the strategy of atomic blitz. Together, he wrote, the two "reach backward beyond the frontiers of western civilization". He called for a "clean and straight beginning" in American policy

towards nuclear weapons. Such a policy would include renouncing their first use and reviving serious efforts towards achieving international control.<sup>57</sup>

In autumn 1949 the chiefs of staff came to the conclusion that the hydrogen bomb was not so much a weapon of war as an instrument of general destruction. In a report to the President (January 1950) justifying the need for the increased production of atomic bombs the Joint Chiefs of Staff made no mention of the hydrogen bomb as a future requirement. The JCS held that there were only four targets in the Soviet Union justifying the use of a hydrogen bomb. But for all their own logic, the Joint Chiefs suddenly—and probably in a bid to play up to the mood of the White House—discovered the “worth” of the hydrogen bomb in its non-selective effect, i.e. in its enormous destructive capabilities. For this reason General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, declared that the hydrogen bomb would have an enormous psychological effect on the USSR and the achievement of psychological supremacy soon became the main theme among those who advocated building the bomb.

In a report to the President in mid-January 1950 the JCS stated “that a US monopoly of the hydrogen bomb ‘might be a decisive factor if properly used’ in war”. The report went on to say in relation to the H-bomb that “its ability ‘to grossly alter the psychological balance between the United States and the USSR’ ... might tilt the ‘balance ... grossly in favor of the United States until such a time as the USSR had developed a stockpile of super bombs’.” The Joint Chiefs confirmed that “the best defence is a good offence”, which logically led to the principle of being ready to be the first to use the hydrogen bomb in a preventive war with the Soviet Union. Thus right from the beginning the H-bomb was not thought of as an instrument of deterrence or retaliation, but as a first strike weapon. In conclusion the report said that the hydrogen bomb would restore to the

United States the advantage lost since the Soviet atomic test and that "the public expects the Department of Defense to take action necessary to regain the favorable balance previously held". On January 19, 1950, Truman told the Director of the National Security Council, Sidney Souers that the Joint Chiefs' recommendations "made a lot of sense". Later he announced at a press conference that he had decided to go ahead with the production of the hydrogen bomb.<sup>58</sup>

The idea of a preventive war against the USSR dominated US strategic planning after the Second World War. Of course, this was not discussed publicly, and the plans for a preemptive strike were kept carefully hidden. According to American scholars they were not discussed openly because the United States was ready for such a strike at any moment.<sup>59</sup> In 1946 Baruch and Searls proposed that the Joint Chiefs launch a preventive atomic war against the Soviet Union. Later the chiefs of staff themselves made a proposal to the President and Congress that they consider the United States take certain actions similar to the launching of a preventive war as soon as it became clear that the Soviet Union had the capacity to produce atomic weapons, the very existence of which was considered as provocation against America.

In September 1949, when news came of successful atomic tests in the USSR, the members of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy also discussed the possibility of a preventive war against the Soviet Union. In spring 1950 the question was once more raised in a paper by Paul Nitze, who proposed a preventive war against the USSR as one of the possible alternatives. A number of Senators also raised the same question with the Secretary of State Dean Acheson, except they made no bones about the issue: a war, they claimed, was necessary "before it was too late." The Navy Secretary, Francis Matthews and the Director of the War College, Orville Anderson held the same views. Matthews, in particular, called upon the Truman administration to

become "the first aggressor in the name of peace".

For many years the idea of a preemptive strike, which had grown on the crest of American nuclear supremacy, was taking root in the consciousness of the US military and political leadership. The Soviet Union's approach to nuclear parity had a sobering effect on a certain section of the ruling class, but did little to influence others who were ready to sacrifice everything in the name of their own self-interest. And at certain stages these adventurers, who have remained the prisoners of their imperial, hegemonist ambitions, have set the tune in Washington's corridors of power.

One can understand, though by no means justify, the desire of those hate-blinded imperialists who longed to destroy the Soviet Union in a preventive war while America still had a nuclear monopoly and enjoyed a measure of impunity. But it is extremely hard to understand the obstinacy of those who clung to the same aims subsequently when the United States itself was threatened with retaliation. It is this that reveals more than anything else the extreme adventurism of the most aggressive sections of the American ruling class.

In announcing at a meeting of the cabinet his decision to go ahead with production of the hydrogen bomb President Truman put forward the same arguments that the Joint Chiefs had made, adding that the bomb was necessary "only for bargaining purposes with the Russians".<sup>60</sup> American scholars note that this decision served to confirm the growing dependence of American strategy on nuclear weapons, a strategy which also depended on the slender hope of maintaining superiority in the arms race.

After the decision was taken to go ahead with "Super" the President ordered an extensive review of the whole policy of the cold war. The decision largely determined the whole tone and content of NSC-68, which was mentioned above. In February 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff drew up a number of planning and intelligence papers

in which the theme of the "growing Soviet threat" was allowed to run riot. One paper recommended that since the Soviet Union had now developed its own nuclear defence capability, the preventive strike should be launched against Soviet atomic centres and laboratories rather than cities. In a directive on the future of NATO it was noted that the Soviet nuclear capability could impede the use of American atomic bombs for the "defence" of Western Europe.<sup>61</sup>

Militarist, anti-Soviet hysteria had so deeply penetrated the minds of many of the military and political leaders of the United States that they began to ascribe to the Soviet Union such thoroughly absurd intentions that even the CIA in a special paper sent to the top leadership considered it necessary to point out that neither in 1945 nor at any time later did the USSR have aggressive designs. But even this had no effect, as can be seen from this reaction to the paper by the State Department: "*lack of evidence of a Soviet intention to use military force on the United States [cannot] be taken as evidence of the absence of such a Soviet intention.*"<sup>62</sup> For its part the Army command stated that "dissemination of the [CIA] paper and its use for planning purposes could seriously affect the security of the United States". The Air Force considered the CIA paper as "dangerous".<sup>63</sup> Thus hysteria bordering on panic led to a fantastic distortion of reality.

A top-secret report from the Military Liaison Committee, which included high-ranking Pentagon and Atomic Energy Commission personnel, was prepared for the government in late February 1950. It stated that "Russia's atomic 'stockpile and current production capacity are equal or actually superior to our own, both as to yields and numbers' and that a Soviet hydrogen bomb 'may be in actual production' already".<sup>46</sup> And yet only a year previously these same officials had been maintaining that the United States would have a tenfold superiority over the Soviet Union in atomic bombs until



1957 at least. This was how the idea of the growing Soviet capability became automatically transformed into the growing "Soviet threat".

The decision to produce the H-bomb and the passing of NSC-68 show convincingly that Washington had put nuclear weapons at the service of its hegemonist foreign policy. But the nuclear bomb could neither guarantee security nor the achievement of such aims. A policy based on the use of force and superweapons could not in the present day and age be successful. It was a policy doomed to inglorious failure.

In June 1950 the United States began its aggression in Korea. The plans to use atomic weapons in North Korea and China and in other places in the Far East were known to a very narrow circle of persons. On November 30 the President declared at a press conference that the United States was prepared to use "every weapon we have" and he added that the decision to use a particular type of weapon would probably be left to the commanders in the field.<sup>65</sup> Later, Truman made a note in his diary on January 27, 1952 that he intended to use atomic weapons in Korea and against China. "This means all out war", he wrote.<sup>66</sup> This was tantamount to blatant atomic blackmail and gave rise to considerable anxiety on the part of his British allies. Prime Minister Clement Attlee asked the President for a guarantee that the bomb would not be used without prior consultation. Truman replied that he would inform Attlee before the bomb was dropped, but could not promise prior consultation on the actual decision. For the fourth and final time the United States refused Britain's request for the right of veto on the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>67</sup>

In January 1951 the President was presented with a document entitled "Recommended Politics and Actions in Light of the Grave World Situation" (NSC-100). The document was prepared by Stuart Symington, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and was considered to be a replacement for NSC-68. It stated that

the United States should take the offensive in the cold war with the atomic bomb and that the United States should evacuate Korea and begin a combined air-and-sea campaign against China using nuclear weapons. It proposed that an atomic ultimatum should be made to the Soviet Union, in view of the fact that the USSR would deliberately start a war in the near future. According to entries in Truman's diary he paid particular attention to this proposal. However, he maintained directive NSC-68 in force. But many of the ideas contained in NSC-100 were later embraced by the Eisenhower administration, for the document anticipated the strategy of massive retaliation and the doctrine of all-out war proclaimed by the Republican administration. Maintaining the initiative in the cold war, building up naval and air power to the detriment of the ground forces and planning for a preemptive nuclear strike were the heritage passed down from the Truman administration to the Eisenhower administration.

Soon after he took over the White House Eisenhower reviewed the question of using nuclear weapons in Korea in the light of the new aims of the administration. In May 1953 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the National Security Council consider the "extensive" use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons against both China and North Korea if the administration decided to risk a world war for the sake of victory in Korea. The NSC concurred in the Joint Chiefs' recommendation. The signing of the Korean armistice two months later, however, rendered further consideration of this option moot.<sup>68</sup>

In summer 1953 a special advising group set up by the new administration conducted its own survey of American cold war strategy—the so-called Solarium study—and recommended that the containment strategy of NSC-68 be continued. The new doctrine of massive retaliation was aimed at creating and maintaining the permanent threat of nuclear war in order to achieve US

hegemonist goals. It is therefore quite fruitless for certain American scholars to try to represent the policy of massive retaliation as a kind of bluff. Each successive president from Truman onwards was given completely serious proposals by his chiefs of staff for starting a nuclear war. At least four presidents secretly sanctioned the farreaching preparations for delivering a first nuclear strike or threatened to use nuclear weapons during one or another international crisis.<sup>69</sup> Nixon's memoirs contain confirmation that the United States considered withdrawing the French forces from the encirclement at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 by using nuclear weapons.<sup>70</sup> President Eisenhower ordered preparations to go ahead for the full-scale use of tactical nuclear weapons to break the siege of the Chinese offshore island of Quemoy in 1958 and a similar order was given during the so-called "Lebanon Crisis" in 1958.<sup>71</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Kennedy use nuclear weapons in Laos in 1961 and Lyndon Johnson did not exclude the use of nuclear weapons for breaking the encirclement in which the US Marines had been caught in 1968. The former aide to President Nixon, Harry Haldeman revealed that Nixon did have a secret plan to win the war in Vietnam when he entered office in 1969. He made explicitly secret threats to the North Vietnamese and their allies that he would escalate the war massively, including the possible use of nuclear weapons.<sup>72</sup> In January 1980 President Carter threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. According to the *Los Angeles Times* of January 18, 1980, a war with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf "would almost certainly become a nuclear war, because the United States has concentrated on its nuclear weapons".

Over the last decades US presidents have frequently resorted to making nuclear threats. As has been shown, for a period of twenty-five years after the war the United States exulted in its nuclear superiority. For this reason it had no interest in trying to find other alterna-

tives to preserve peace and maintain international security. In Washington it was assumed that the possession of superweapons could solve any problems and unite the complex knots of international politics. That at any rate, according to Haldeman, was what Nixon thought.

Of considerable interest in this connection is the remark made by Daniel Ellsberg, the well-known American specialist and public figure: A president, he says, "quickly learns that his predecessors had found this [i.e. the threat to use nuclear weapons—*Ed.*] most useful at various times. Remember it wasn't just that they used threats but that on a number of occasions the President felt, rightly or wrongly, that the threat had been effective. It is, as they see it, a record of success."<sup>73</sup> These illusions which became rooted during the years of nuclear superiority are highly dangerous elements in the military and political thinking of the US leaders. Again Ellsberg notes: "What is at issue for US leaders is giving up something they have enjoyed for a long time and which has been a tangible benefit. That is part of the explanation why they are so reluctant to change their ways of thought and to accept the possibility that these practices have become excessively dangerous."<sup>74</sup> It is no accident that the ruling circles who continue the arms race do not want to commit themselves to pledging not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

"Soviet military superiority" has been a conscious fabrication on the part of the military and political leadership of the United States that has lasted virtually since the war. One of the best examples of this was the "missile gap hoax" which was widely publicized in 1958-1960. According to the Pentagon's version, by 1961 the Soviet Union would have 500 or more missiles capable of delivering a preemptive strike against missile installations in the United States. This lie was inflated by propaganda, despite the fact that the Pentagon possessed accurate information that this "Soviet threat" had been exaggerated many times over. Nevertheless, on the basis of this anti-Soviet

fabrication the administration decided to build 1,000 Minuteman missiles and received all the appropriations it needed from an anxious Congress.

As a result of all the hullabaloo caused by this falsification it was decided to deploy American operation and tactical missiles throughout the world. In a bid to give authenticity to the "threat" the administration began round-the-clock air patrols by bombers of the Strategic Air Command, which, as it turned out, were loaded with four or five 24-megaton hydrogen bombs. According to Daniel Ellsberg, "Many people in the Air Force and the Pentagon were very proud of the missile gap hoax. They said there was no other way they could get enough tax money for the necessary weapons to maintain our superiority—which was the real issue. They said, now we have the Minuteman missiles and the B-52s."<sup>75</sup>

Apart from the desire for profits on the part of the military-industrial complex, the reason for this hoax was the wish to prevent, or at least put off the time when the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity. With this in mind the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity. With this in mind the military and political leadership systematically rejected or held up Soviet arms control proposals.

In late 1979 Henry Kissinger speaking to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London openly admitted: "Our strategic doctrine has relied extraordinarily, perhaps exclusively, on our superior strategic power. The Soviet Union has never relied on its superior strategic power."<sup>76</sup> Hence the contradiction that comes out in the thinking of many US politicians when the subject turns to parity. On the one hand, they are terrified at the thought of the inevitable retaliation, on the other they are still under the influence of the past chasing after the illusory spectre of superiority. Today this chase has been stepped up by the Reagan administration that spares no effort to recreate the situation of US military superiority. Now once again the great-power ambitions have come to the forefront, in the way that

they have been under all the postwar administrations when it comes to building up the armed forces. The goal is always the same—to have a war machine superior to that of any potential enemy, particularly the Soviet Union.

American specialists noted that the plans for war with the Soviet Union drawn up during the 1950s and 1960s were based on the assumption of US nuclear superiority. According to Ellsberg, who worked as a strategic planner in the Pentagon and prepared political directives for the Joint Chiefs, “if US forces should find themselves in direct combat with Russian troops anywhere in the world, regardless of how this had come about, our plans proposed to launch an all-out nuclear strike against the Soviet Union with all of our weapons, as fast as possible, hitting every city in Russia and China as fast as we could along with military targets. In other words, in 1960 and 61 I was reading war plans that prepared for the initiation of all-out nuclear war by the United States—a nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union... The Joint Chiefs of Staff calculated that we would cause 325 million deaths in Russia and China alone...

“And when you added in the Russian retaliation and the European weapons—you were talking about a war which would not involve less than 500 million deaths. These were American plans for a holocaust...”<sup>77</sup>

As in the past the most aggressive circles in the US ruling hierarchy pinned their hopes almost exclusively on the possession of developed military technology. They had long lost the ability to make any positive initiatives of a political and strategic character. The loss of this ability gave rise to dangerous illusions. “The Pentagon’s strategic plans focus on a first, pre-emptive strike.”<sup>78</sup>

US strategic planning was carried out, apart from anything else, on the false premise that the Soviet Union would commit aggression with conventional or

nuclear weapons or a combination of both. Each plan even gave a time-span for an attack. But the military and political planners knew quite well that the USSR has never had such intentions, as they run counter to its fundamental peace policy.

Among the stream of false information about Soviet intentions there have, of course, been a number of more serious and more objective evaluations, which have cast doubt on the thesis of "Soviet aggressiveness". But these have all been deafened by the shrieks of the hawks. The myth of the aggressive plans of the Soviet Union is primarily needed to justify to the American people and public opinion the hegemonistic, imperialist designs of the more aggressive members of the American ruling class. The thirst for hegemony and the hope of achieving world domination with the aid of superiority in nuclear superweapons have destroyed all moral norms and made permissible any form of struggle against "Godless communism". The myths of aggressiveness and the Soviet military threat serve just this end.

Falsification now even has its own methodology: one does not judge the Soviet Union by its true intentions as set out in the resolutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and in official foreign policy documents and moves, but rather on the basis of groundless, speculative, abstract reasoning, where the intentions of the Soviet state, against all logic, are hypothetically inferred from its capabilities. Hence the deliberately trumped-up claims are made like, if the USSR has a powerful army, then it is trying to take over the world, or if the USSR has nuclear weapons, then it will attack the United States.

Equally astonishing is the logic of ruling circles in the United States when they try to evaluate Soviet intentions: "the United States knows that it builds nuclear forces only to counter the threat of Soviet forces. Since we have told the Soviets this often enough, we believe they need not feel threatened by any US improvements.

But, since they continue to expand and improve their systems, they must be so doing for aggressive purposes; they cannot be expanding because of a US threat."<sup>79-80</sup> It is difficult to say what features most in this logic—ignorance or hypocrisy.

### 3. Nuclear Weapons and Presidential Power

In recent times there has been a lot of discussion in military and political circles in the United States on matters relating to nuclear strategy. In particular, discussion has centred around the powers of the President regarding the use of nuclear weapons. This discussion has resulted from the aggravation of international tensions, the desire among the more aggressive factions of the American ruling elite to find ways to conduct a "limited" nuclear war, and the greater likelihood of a nuclear conflict being started "accidentally".

Since August 1945, when President Truman gave the order to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the right of the President to order the use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict is considered one of his most important prerogatives. Under the US Constitution this right is part and parcel of the President's powers in his capacity as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Thus, despite the fact that the very existence of the United States as a country may depend on the decision to use nuclear weapons, from the point of view of American law it can be taken by the President alone.

The military powers of the President are not just a constitutional right, but a product of historical development. Practically all American presidents have been actively involved in military and strategic decision-making. Even Woodrow Wilson, who is depicted in American bourgeois historiography as a peace-maker, took a number of important military decisions, participated in disputes on the anti-submarine warfare and the role of the American expeditionary forces, and involved himself



in the disagreements between the Army and the Navy on the powers of the two commanders, General John Pershing and Admiral William Sims. In both cases Wilson's decisions dominated all other opinions.<sup>81</sup>

Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin D. Roosevelt considerably expanded the role of the head of state as supreme commander of the armed forces. Theodore Roosevelt, who had been a naval historian, and assistant to the Navy Secretary and a colonel in a volunteer cavalry regiment, demanded great efficiency from the professionals and the reform of the war machine. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had also been an aide to the Navy Secretary, paid considerable attention to military policy and carried through decisions even against the will of the military leadership and despite the scepticism of Congress.

As for Congress itself, in wartime it played a subordinate role to the administration by virtue of the mobilization strategy. In the interwar period Congress played an important part in determining the role and place of the armed forces. It adopted such laws as the National Defence Act (1920) and the Army Air Corps Act (1926). Congress paid particular attention to developing the Air Force and the aviation industry.

During this century both the presidents and Congress have faced a number of difficulties when it came to influencing the state and politics of the armed forces. This was largely the result of the process in the course of which the Army and the Navy developed into relatively independent bodies within the state mechanism. The increased complexity of military operations and the development of more and more sophisticated weapon systems demanded specialized knowledge from the civilian leaders which they not possess. Therefore they began to increasingly depend upon military experts. The scale of wars demanded a definite military policy, which would include contingency planning by career officers.<sup>82</sup>

The majority of military theoreticians recognized the right of the civilian leadership to make decisions on the use of military force. But they pointed to the necessity to take such decisions only after consultation with the professional military who should pass their judgement on the possibility of the troops they had been given by the government securing victory. Furthermore, the military insisted that after the outbreak of hostilities the civilian leadership should not interfere in their conduct of the fighting. Thus it was a matter of getting the political leadership to recognize the role of the military and their operational autonomy.<sup>83</sup>

The process of institutionalizing the consultative role of the military began in 1880 and was completed during the Second World War with the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The influence of the Army and the Navy on the civilian administration increased as the planning bodies developed and improved. These bodies first made their appearance in the Navy in 1884 and the Army in 1903. In that year the Joint Army-Navy Board was set up. After 1903 the army and navy planners began to draw up separate plans which essentially excluded the possibility of their coordinated action. Strong differences arose over the question of deploying troops in the Philippines and in Panama and also in connection with the Army's demand that its air units be joined with the coastal artillery and the Navy for the defence of the continental United States against invasion by sea. The dispute was decided only in 1931 after laying bare the new phenomenon of that time: the fierce struggle for the importance of one's own service and the tasks it had to fulfil.

Members of the various congressional committees as well as the lobbyists of the war industry understood the benefits of exploiting the rivalry between the various armed services in their own political and commercial interests. It became possible to create artificial difficulties for the administration in power, to procure luc-

rative contracts and to acquire sophisticated sources of information.<sup>84</sup> The military leaders in their turn used their connections in Congress (they virtually acquired allies there) and in the opposition groups to put pressure on the government. If the military did not have enough support from the law-givers and the opposition, the presidents simply ignored their advice.

Until the Second World War the administration leaders almost never took account of contingency plans and rarely gave the military planners detailed political directives necessary for effective planning. But in the two world wars the military planners were under the definite influence of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The latter maintained strong links with the Joint Chiefs, but never considered their advice as binding. As a rule Roosevelt did not inform the JCS of his talks with the leaders of the anti-Hitler coalition, frequently presenting his service commanders with a *fait accompli*. The commanders complained that the President accorded too little time to problems connected with distributing resources and to inter-services differences.<sup>85</sup> Even in strategic planning both Wilson and Roosevelt brought military recommendations into line with diplomacy, politics and the demands of the domestic situation, but rarely interfered in operational planning.

During the Second World War the functions of the President as commander-in-chief were enlarged considerably. And all postwar presidents tried to strengthen and develop them. They saw themselves, in the graphic description of Allan Millett, "as generalissimos of the 'Free World' much as Marcus Aurelius and Constantine might have defined these duties centuries ago".<sup>86</sup> Today, in the nuclear age this role is incomparably greater than it was before 1941. It is not surprising therefore that the working day of a president now begins with a report on the security situation and foreign policy containing all the information that has been received in the

last twenty-four hours from all over the world.

President Kennedy explained his preoccupation with these matters to his closest advisers thus: "What happens at home ... can only hurt us, but what happens out there can kill us!"<sup>87</sup> President Nixon, like indeed all other White House chiefs, considered that his main occupation was the control of foreign policy and security problems, whereas internal problems were the task of his cabinet. Each President from Truman to Carter served in the armed forces and each, irrespective of the nature of his previous service (with the possible exception of Richard Nixon) considered that his military experience gave him "special" knowledge of military matters. But only Eisenhower had any real knowledge of actual military decision-making. Whenever a President admitted that there were gaps in his military training, as was the case, for example, with Truman and Kennedy, they developed close relationships with their military advisers. But more important is the fact that all presidents felt the strong need to establish their power over the military establishment.

The management of national security affairs largely depends on the personality of the President, who remains the central figure in decision-making. In the postwar period Truman, for example, was faced with the need to unite the armed services and review relations within the various bodies of the executive in order to take more careful decisions on matters of foreign policy. For this purpose a number of new departments were set up to cover such fields as intelligence, civil defence and resource planning. A defence Department headed by civilians was formed and, finally, a National Security Council. It was believed that the purpose of the National Security Council was policy coordination and policy decision-making. In fact Truman relied here more upon his Defence Secretary, George Marshall. He also established close relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which he used to put an end to the insubordination and

political influence of General Douglas McArthur whom he called "Asiatic proconsul". The differences between Truman and McArthur showed that "limited wars" could lead to an alliance between a dissatisfied commander in the field and opposition groups within the country. On the other hand, they showed that with a Defence Secretary and the Joint Chiefs solidly behind him a President could neutralize the intrigues of the commanders who were trying to cast doubt on his fitness for office by appealing to Congress and public opinion.<sup>88</sup>

Eisenhower introduced the practice in the White House of personal meetings with his Secretary of State, Defence Secretary and the Joint Chiefs. In an attempt to improve inter-departmental coordination Eisenhower instituted a permanent apparatus for the National Security Affairs. Initially this apparatus concentrated on working in the two permanent inter-departmental bodies—the Policy Planning Council and the Operations Coordinating Board. Since these bodies continued issuing papers that were aimed rather at inter-departmental compromises, the NSC apparatus began increasingly to play a leading role, although it was not until 1961 that it became the main participant in the formulation of foreign policy. Eisenhower preferred to rely on his own judgement and the advice of Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, Treasury Secretary, George Humphrey, the JCS chairmen, Radford and Twining and his personal rapporteur and liaison officer with the JCS, Brigadier-General Andrew Goodpaster. They gave various advice including judgements on professional military matters and international problems.<sup>89</sup>

From President Kennedy onwards the NSC apparatus became the instrument of direct interference in national security affairs. Led by such "dynamic intellectuals" as McGeorge Bundy, William Rostow and Henry Kissinger, all special assistants for national security, the NSC apparatus soon became a "pocket-sized" copy of the State Department and the Defence Department with daily

access to the President. Kissinger solved the problem of his own personal domination in foreign policy making both by becoming Secretary of State and reducing the role of the Defence Secretary.

The distrust of career officials, which was characteristic of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford, led to a concentration of power in the hands of the NSC apparatus, while Kissinger in addition chaired all the important inter-department committees. Although all the presidential assistants for national security affairs changed the titles of documents issued by the White House, they always claimed that these memoranda, which they sent to the State Department and the Defence Department, had in fact been drawn up by the President. Even such powerful and influential figures as Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defence Secretary Robert McNamara accepted interference from the NSC apparatus in their affairs as normal.

Only President Kennedy had a personal military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor. Other presidents also never fully relied for military advice on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, even when it was headed by such prestigious figures as General Earle Wheeler and Admiral Thomas Moorer. Furthermore, the Office on Management and Budget played an important role in advising the President. This was reorganized in 1970 to become the Office of Management and Budget and included specialists on military spending not on the basis of internal economic considerations, but through analysis of the cost, effectiveness and programme of the arm of the service.

On matters of military policy and diplomacy US presidents also sought advice from specialists from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and from the Central Intelligence Agency. When necessary the chief executives turned for advice to the leaders of both chambers of Congress, to the chairmen of the various committees and to influential senators and congressmen.

But ultimately the authority and prestige of the Defence Secretary and the Joint Chiefs were dominant in presidential decision-making on military policy.

But the enormous influence of the military-industrial complex and organizations attached to it on decision-making must also be noted. This influence was expressed in direct pressure on the "power centres" and in the general creation in an atmosphere of chauvinism, anti-Sovietism and militarist hysteria. Gradually the military-industrial complex began to participate directly in all military and political decision-making.<sup>90</sup>

But for all this, it was the President who took the key military and political decisions and decided whether or not to use nuclear weapons. The 1946 Atomic Energy Act and a number of subsequent laws passed in this sphere endorsed the unlimited powers of the President in relation to nuclear weapons.

"General Eisenhower, as President, in 1957 secretly delegated the authority to use nuclear weapons to some of his unified and specified commanders under certain limited conditions ... such conditions as communication breakdown and serious risk or the imminence of war."<sup>91</sup> Subsequently, this policy was confirmed by other presidents.

In 1958 General Earle Partridge, former Commander of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), declared to the press that he had the right to use nuclear weapons without special presidential approval. He explained this by the fact that given the current communications system a presidential order to the NORADCOM might in the event of a strategic enemy attack arrive too late. However, despite the fact that in subsequent years an early warning system had been set up and considerable improvements had been made to the communications system, this right, as was officially stated at hearings in Congress in the late 1970 is still given to the NORAD commander, who has control over tactical nuclear delivery systems for air defence.

As has frequently been stated in the American press, the President is permanently accompanied in all his travels around the country and abroad by a special military assistant, who holds in a black suitcase the means of communication necessary of issuing the order to use nuclear weapons. He is always in the President's closest entourage and can be reached immediately.<sup>92</sup> The President always carries on his person a card containing a number of cyphers and codewords, which taken together, identify the President as the source of the order to use nuclear weapons, which is known as the "emergency war order". This order comes from the President to the command post at the Pentagon, where the cypher activates a top-secret system for checking whether the order is genuine.

On those occasions when the President is a long way from the command posts the order to use nuclear weapons is given via radio communications, in particular using air force facilities. Until spring 1981 only the President's personal plane had the equipment for conveying this order.

Both the Carter administration in the later years of its term and the present Reagan administration have taken steps to improve the system whereby the President can communicate with all the components of the strategic nuclear triad—the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

The presidential order to use nuclear weapons can evidently be given in various forms to allow for the various ways they can be applied. This conclusion is suggested by an analysis of the statements made in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by former Defence Secretary Harold Brown in a discussion with senators on the contents of Presidential Directive 59. The Defence Secretary emphasized that PD-59 enlarged the number and variety of alternatives available to the President and that these alternatives include various types of nuclear strike from a general all-target attack on the industrial



centres of the USSR to selective strikes against military and political targets. Thus obviously presidential orders for the use of nuclear weapons must be varied.

It is not without interest to note that in reply to a question by Senator Charles Percy as to whether there were plans for a preemptive strike against the USSR in the event of absolutely incontrovertible proof of a planned strike against the United States, Secretary Brown replied that this situation had been provided for. However, the rest of his reply was taken from records on the grounds of its secrecy. In the early 1970s when the Senate discussed the draft bill on military powers Senator John Stennis insisted on the inclusion of a clause giving the President the right to defend the United States from the threat of nuclear attack. At the time Congress considered this right too dangerous to endorse. The wording of the clause was watered down and eventually excluded entirely from the text. But as would appear from Harold Brown's statement, the ordering of a preemptive strike is nevertheless today considered as one of the possible courses of action open to the President.

As for the rest of the chain down which the President's order to use nuclear weapons passes, President Johnson in 1964 noted that complex codes and electronic devices prevented unsanctioned action and that each link from decision to destruction was subject to the control of two people. At least two people must decide independently that the order was given and then just as independently perform their duty.

According to current procedure the order passes, as we have noted, in the form of an authorizing cypher, to the command post in the Pentagon, from which it must be conveyed directly to the strategic bases of all the three armed services. The order must be accompanied by an "identification" code. This procedure virtually makes the Pentagon the centre issuing the order and certain American specialists have expressed concern that in an emergency situation the military might exceed their

authority and give the nuke order themselves.

In 1974 when as a result of the impending impeachment of President Richard Nixon doubts were being expressed as to his psychological stability, the then Defence Secretary, James Schlesinger, instructed all communications centres that conveyed the presidential order to use nuclear weapons, to inform him immediately of any unusual orders emanating from the President. This obviously implied that the head of the Pentagon could countermand the execution of such an order if it had been given.

The influence of the military is also shown by the fact that the President must on taking a decision to use nuclear weapons choose from a number of variants that have been previously calculated and programmed by the Pentagon within the framework of a single, integrated operational plan which gives details for the destruction of targets by specific units of the strategic nuclear forces. This integrated plan is continually being improved and supplemented by the computer complex in the central underground command post, from which the orders go directly to the strategic forces.

Throughout the whole postwar period discussions have been held in the United States on both the theoretical and practical aspects of the delegation of the presidential power to order the use of nuclear weapons. As reported in the American press, although the final decision must be taken by the President alone, its preparation involves the close cooperation, if circumstances allow, of the Defence Secretary, the Joint Chiefs, personal presidential advisers and other persons close to the President. Their influence and possibly the psychological pressure they exert can only serve to affect the final decision.

A far more complicated matter is the question of the President handing over his right to use nuclear weapons to other members of the administration or the military. The authors of a report prepared in 1975 by the Con-

gressional Research Service for the Foreign Relations Committee of the House of Representatives stated that they were unable to establish whether there had been any such instances of delegation by the President, but they emphasized that if there were any they would be kept top secret.

At the same time this report contained the extremely important conclusion that, although the specific character of nuclear weapons gave rise to the widespread opinion that the presidential right to delegate his powers to use them was more limited than his similar right to use conventional weapons, in reality there was no Constitutional or legislative basis for such an opinion. Having analyzed a number of legal acts that could be applied in the present circumstances the authors of the report came to the conclusion that there was practically no juridical limitation on the President delegating his powers to use nuclear weapons. The delegation of such powers was the exclusive prerogative of the President, and Congress was completely excluded from making any decision on this matter.

In the international crisis situations or conflicts in which the United States was involved in the postwar period the military insisted upon their having the right to use nuclear weapons at their own discretion, but these powers were not granted them. This kind of demand was made by the military at various times—in 1948 during the Berlin Crisis, during the Korean War, in 1958 in connection with the crisis over Quemoy and Ma-tsu Islands, in 1961 when the Kennedy administration considered military intervention in Laos and throughout the course of the aggressive war in Indochina.

In 1980 Harold Brown asserted that not one unified or specified commander, nor one task force commander had the right to use nuclear weapons at his own discretion. Nevertheless, as is apparent from his other statements, there exist secret instructions for the use of nuclear weapons which set out the principles for their

use and possibly also the rights of the senior commanding officers. These instructions were drawn up by the Defence Secretary and passed on to the Joint Chiefs who in their turn passed them on to the appropriate commanders.

In the course of the aforementioned hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Harlod Brown said that in the event of a nuclear war steps would be taken to improve communications between the President, the Defence Secretary or "persons officially appointed to replace them" on the one hand and the commanding officers of the appropriate forces, on the other. This suggests that such a plan exists and provides, in the event of the incapacity of the President or the Vice-President, for the right to give the order to use nuclear weapons to be delegated to the Defence Secretary or certain other persons.

In spring 1981 after the assassination attempt on President Reagan the card containing the President's personal nuclear code went missing for a time. This event gave rise to press commentary from which a number of conclusions can be drawn as to the system of delegating nuclear powers. When the wounded President was taken to a hospital and made ready for an operation the cypher card was left in his wallet in the pocket of his suit. FBI agents arrived at the hospital to make a list of the President's personal effects, found the card but refused to hand it over to the President's military assistant, despite the latter's insistence. The FBI were supported by the Attorney General William Smith, and the card was only handed back to the military after two days.

As a result of the assassination attempt in which the President was put out of action a situation arose in which the lost card fell into the hands of those who had no right to know the nuclear code, while the President was under anaesthetics for a four-hour operation and then on strong painkilling drugs.

*The Washington Post*, referring to government offici-

als, though not naming them, reported that in such a situation the right to give the order to use nuclear weapons went according to necessity to other officials determined by the President in a strict sequence. Each such official had with him his own personal code card that would allow him to identify himself in giving the command to use nuclear weapons, should the authority pass to him. But the decision as to whether this moment had indeed come, was evidently to be made by each of these individuals separately, since it could only happen after the absence or indisposition of all the others that occupied higher posts. It is quite obvious that there exists the possibility for excessive haste in taking action or even of abuse.

According to *The Washington Post* the next in line after the President was Vice-President George Bush, but since he technically could not have exercised control over nuclear weapons, being at the time in a plane on his way to Washington, the authority passed down to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. *The Washington Post* especially noted that the statement made by Secretary of State Alexander Haig that he was "in control" of the White House, violated the established sequence of the transfer of nuclear authority. The last on the list was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is fairly evident that on March 30, 1981, when an assassination attempt was made on Ronald Reagan, the existing system of nuclear weapons control collapsed and for a period of several hours there was no one in the government with greater authority than the career military.

In this context one other detail of the events of that day is interesting. It turned out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a duplicate of the President's cypher card, about which the White House knew nothing. According to Press reports Reagan was annoyed when he found out and took steps to make sure this did not happen again.

According to the Congressional Research Service

NATO plans envisaged that in certain circumstances the presidential right to use nuclear weapons might be delegated to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. General Norstad, who at one time filled that post, stated in the course of congressional hearings that during the 1960s when he was in office he had the right to use nuclear weapons in an "emergency". The existence of this delegation is evidently confirmed by the fact that at the Strategic Air Command in Omaha there is a permanent representative of the NATO command in Europe for the purpose of formally coordinating nuclear strike targets.

Theoretically the NATO Supreme Allied Commander is subordinate to the higher bodies of the bloc and through them to the governments of the member states. But at the same time the Congressional Research Service drew the conclusion that the US Constitution does not permit the President to delegate his authority as commander-in-chief to a person who is partially or fully responsible to the governments of other sovereign states. The point is, however, that the Supreme Allied Commander is also in command of US troops in Europe and is thus subordinate to the American command and to its commander-in-chief, i.e. the President. Evidently there is no doubt that in a situation of armed conflict this American general, despite his "international" title would take orders from Washington in everything, including the use of nuclear weapons.

From the moment NATO was formed the Americans have always considered that in relation to the use of nuclear weapons they are not bound by any obligations to their allies.<sup>93</sup> In March 1951 in reply to a question from Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the then Secretary of State Dean Acheson formally assured Congress that there were no obligations to other countries which could limit or retard the implementation of a presidential decision to use atomic weapons and that no similar obligations arose in connection with the appoint-

ment of an American general as NATO Supreme Commander.

Later a number of agreements were drawn up within NATO providing, should the use of nuclear weapons seem likely, for consultations between members through the NATO Council and Defence Planning Committee, as well as directly between heads of government. These are the so-called Athens Guiding Principles with the additions and alternations to them made in 1968 and 1969. But they contain an important and unambiguous proviso: consultations will take place "if time and circumstance allow". The decision on the question of "time and circumstance" is given to the United States or any other NATO country that possesses its own independent nuclear capability. Obviously, this proviso more or less frees the United States from the commitment to hold consultations. The existence and importance of these exceptions are fully known and understood in the NATO member countries, it is stressed in the Congressional Research Service report.

Thus despite the existence of consultation agreements within NATO, in practice, as former US Defence Secretary Schlesinger stated, only a nuclear power or powers have the responsibility for deciding whether nuclear weapons will or will not be used. This means in particular, that after the deployment of nuclear medium-range missiles in Western Europe the decision to use them can be taken by the President of the United States without consulting his allies. After Reagan decided to go ahead with the production of neutron warheads Defence Secretary Weinberger stated that although these warheads would be deployed on US territory, consultation with the West Europeans on their use, should a conflict arise, would be compressed into a very short period. Very likely it would be more correct to assume that in the event of an emergency such consultations would not take place at all—the President would decide for himself where the neutron warheads should be deployed and

when they should be used.

There are also cooperation programmes between the NATO countries, which provide for US nuclear warheads to be transferred to and then used by the allies. But before this can take place the US military units that control these warheads must receive orders which come exclusively from the US President.

In recent times foreign specialists have paid considerable attention to the question of planning a nuclear war against the USSR. The fullest available material on strategic planning has been published by Desmond Ball of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, who has specialized in US nuclear targeting policy for over six years.<sup>94</sup> He has analyzed recent developments in US targeting policy and capability as well as the antecedents and operational consequences of this policy and the fundamental political, military and arms control contradictions inherent in the fully developed counterforce strategy which the US has adopted.

US strategic policy, he claims, can be usefully divided into several different facets of which the most important are declaratory policy and action policy.<sup>95</sup> Declaratory policy is that set of public pronouncements made by the President, the Secretary of Defence or sometimes other senior administration officials regarding the requirements of deterrence, targeting policy and strategic doctrine. Action policy, on the other hand, comprises the actual war-fighting strategy that the United States has adopted and which includes the designation of the forces to be used and the targets to be hit and the allocation of the forces to those targets, and the rate at which the nuclear exchange is to proceed. It is the policy laid down in various presidential memoranda, spelled out in the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defence and given effect in the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). These documents are highly classified and only very infrequently have responsible officials chosen to publicly discuss



any details of this aspect of US strategic nuclear policy.

Most of the public discussion of action policy is therefore based on extrapolations from the declaratory level. In the mid- and late 1960s, for example, when the Department of Defence annual reports stressed the requirements for "assured destruction", there was a widespread concomitant assumption that the US strategic nuclear forces were targeted principally on Soviet urban-industrial centres. "However, extrapolations of this sort have invariably been quite wide of the actuality, since the periods when declaratory policy has coincided with the realities of targeting practice have been few and far between." Declaratory policy has been subject to periodic changes, whereas action policy has remained extremely resilient. "US war plans", Ball continues, "have *always* contained a wide range of target categories, including Soviet military capabilities, political and military command, control and communication (C<sup>3</sup>) systems and economic and industrial centres."<sup>96</sup>

The principal changes in the plans since the late 1940s and early 1950s have been, first, an enormous increase in the number of potential target installations from about 70 in 1949 to about 40,000 some three decades later<sup>97</sup>; and, second, the division of these targets into an increasingly large array of "packages" of varying sizes and characteristics, providing the National Command Authorities (NCA) with "customized" options for an extremely wide range of possible contingencies. Very important in this connection is the fact that US strategic nuclear forces have grown from 50 atomic bombs in May 1948 to more than 9,000 warheads today.

As Ball notes, there exists a direct "historical lineage" connecting the concept of strategic nuclear targeting contained in the Presidential Directive (PD-59) signed by President Carter on July 25, 1980 and a series of studies begun soon after President Nixon took office in January 1969. These studies, says Ball, led directly to National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM-169), ap-

proved by President Nixon in late 1973, and then in turn to National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM-242), signed by the President in January 1974."<sup>98</sup>

The NSDM-242 contained three principal policy components:

1. The targeting of a wide range of Soviet military forces and installations, from hardened command and control facilities and ICBM silos to airfields and army camps.

2. "Escalation control", whereby the National Command Authorities (NCA) should be provided with the ability to execute their selected options in a deliberate and controlled fashion throughout the progress of a strategic nuclear exchange.

3. The notion of "withholds" or "non-targets", i. e. things that would be preserved from destruction. Some of these, such as "population per se", have now been exempted absolutely from targeting\*; others, such as the centres of political leadership and control are exempted only for purposes of bargaining or deterring a resort to higher levels of violence during a war ("intra-war deterrence" and "intra-war bargaining") and strategic reserve force are to be maintained to allow their eventual destruction if necessary.

NSDM-242 also authorized the Secretary of Defence to promulgate the Policy Guidance to the Employment of Nuclear Weapons and the associated Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), signed by Secretary Schlesinger on April 4, 1974. The NUWEP was developed through close military and civilian cooperation and sets out the planning assumptions, attack options, targeting objectives and the damage levels needed to satisfy the political guidance. (For example, the NUWEP contains the requirements that the US strategic nuclear forces must in all circumstances be able to destroy 70

\* This "principle" is purely demagogic and has nothing to do with considerations of humanity. It is designed only to have a propaganda effect, since the planned destruction of industrial and military targets would inevitably cause enormous casualties among the civilian population, particularly from fall-out.

per cent of the Soviet industry).

The concepts and objectives set out in NSDM-242 and NUWEP provided the framework for the development of new strategic nuclear war plans. The first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP-5), prepared under the new guidance, took effect from January 1, 1976.

On August 24, 1977, President Carter issued PD-18, entitled "US National Strategy", which explicitly reaffirmed the continued use of NSDM-242 and NUWEP in "the absence of further guidance for structuring the US strategic posture".

This further guidance was provided, says Ball, by the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR), an inter-agency study directed by Leon Stoss in the Pentagon. Phase I of the NTPR was completed in December 1978 and formed the basis of a new Presidential Directive drafted in early 1979. Although the NSC staff pressed for the formal acceptance of this draft, there was opposition from the State Department and from some elements within the Pentagon, and it was shelved for more than 15 months—until it was retrieved just prior to the Democratic Convention, revised and up-dated and formally signed by the President on July 25 as PD-59.

SIOP-5D includes some 40,000 potential target installations, as compared to about 25,000 in 1974 when NUWEP was promulgated and the development of SIOP-5D initiated.<sup>99</sup> These targets are divided into four principal groups, each of which in turn contains a wide range of target types. The four principal groups are the Soviet nuclear forces, the general purpose forces, the Soviet military and political leadership centres and the Soviet economic and industrial base. Examples of targets within each category were given by the Defence Department to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1980:

1. Soviet nuclear forces:

ICBMs and IRBMs, together with their launch facilities (LFs) and launch command centres

(LCCs)

Nuclear weapons storage sites

Airfields supporting nuclear-capable aircraft

Nuclear, missile-firing submarine (SSBN) bases.

2. Conventional military forces:

Casernes

Supply Depots

Marshalling points

Conventional airfields

Ammunition storage facilities

Tank and vehicle storage yards

3. Military and political leadership

Command posts

Key communications facilities

4. Economic and industrial targets:

a) War-supporting industry

Ammunition factories

Tank and armoured personnel carrier factories

Petroleum refineries

Railway yards and repair facilities

b) Industry that contributes to economic recovery

Coal

Basic steel

Basic aluminium

Cement

Electric power.

The SIOP is further divided into four general categories of options available for the employment of nuclear weapons: Major Attack Options (MAO), Selected Attack Options (SAO), Limited Nuclear Options (LNO, which are "designed to permit the selective destruction of fixed enemy military or industrial targets") and Regional Nuclear Options (RNO, which are "intended, for example, to destroy the leading elements of an attacking enemy force").

Within each of these classes of options there is a wide range of further options including so-called "withholds",

four general categories of which have been publicly identified;<sup>100</sup> population centres, additional command and control centres (exempted from attack at least in the initial stages of a nuclear exchange so as to enhance the prospects of escalation control), particular countries targeted in the SIOP (so that attacks on the Soviet Union would not necessarily involve simultaneous attacks on Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Vietnam or other countries included in the SIOP); and "allied and neutral territory". Special categories of targets have also been delineated for preemptive attack against the Soviet Union and for launch-on-warning (LOW) or launch-under-attack (LUA) scenarios in the event of unequivocal warning of a Soviet attack.

According to Ball, while the general structure and contents of the SIOP will be essentially maintained, there are some five particularly noteworthy aspects of the recent developments in targeting policy which warrant consideration.<sup>101</sup> The first was the directive that greater attention "be directed toward improving the effectiveness of our attacks against military targets". It should be noted, however, that military targets already account for more than half of the 40,000 target installations in the SIOP, and that the destruction of these has always been a prime objective. For example, Attack Options I and II in the 1962 SIOP were aimed at the destruction or neutralization of Soviet strategic nuclear delivery forces and conventional military forces and military resources in being, respectively; the successful execution of Attack Option II would have reduced the Soviet and Warsaw Treaty residual ground forces to seven Soviet and ten Warsaw Treaty divisions and neutralized the "Eastern Bloc air forces as effective combat elements".

The second aspect was thus characterized by a White House official in late 1977 at the outset of NTPR:

"In the past nuclear targeting has been done by military planners who have basically emphasized the efficient

destruction of targets. But targeting should not be done in a political vacuum.

"Some targets are of greater psychological importance to Moscow than others; and we should begin thinking of how to use our strategic forces to play on these concerns."<sup>102</sup>

Hence, as Ball points out, there have been some changes to the targeting guidance so as to exploit potential Soviet fears, such as threatening the Soviet food supply and making a target of Soviet troops and military facilities in the Far East ("kicking the door in! "); ... and some consideration has been given to the adaptation of targeting to the dismemberment and regionalization of the USSR, "enhancing the prospect for regional insurrection during and after a nuclear exchange".<sup>103</sup>

The most important consequence of this is the attention now being devoted to the targeting of Soviet assets for political control—the Soviet state and all its apparatus. This includes key CPSU and government buildings, military headquarters, command centres, KGB offices and border posts, communications facilities etc. Once again, US war plans have always included some installations of this sort—for example, some 2,000 of the 40,000 potential targets designated in SIOP-5D are leadership and apparatus targets. But, according to Ball, it would not be unreasonable to expect that by the time SIOP-6 is authorized these targets would account for as much as 20 per cent of the Soviet target base—perhaps some 10,000 out of a likely total of 50,000 designated target installations.<sup>104</sup>

A third point, emphasized by Secretary Brown in a message to the defence ministers of the NATO countries on August 10, 1980 is that greater attention has been accorded planning for the use of very limited and selective options. Various packages of selected attack options (SAOs), limited nuclear options (LNOs) and regional nuclear options (RNOs) are being prepared for

use in not just nuclear situations but also in what hitherto would have been purely conventional situations.

According to testimony of the Commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), General Richard Ellis before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1980, deterrence can no longer be neatly divided into subgroups, such as conventional and nuclear, it must be viewed as an interrelated single entity. SAC is developing new options which provide the National Command Authorities with additional flexibility to respond to future conflicts in a timely and controlled manner.

As an example of the use of RNOs and LNOs, General Ellis suggested that combat missions could be launched from Andersen (US Air Force Base in Guam) to the Middle East in response to Soviet conventional military activity in that region. As an example of an SAO, plans for nuclear strikes against Soviet military facilities near Iran, including military bases and airfields inside the Soviet Union, have been prepared so as to significantly degrade Soviet capabilities to project military power in the Middle East-Persian Gulf region for a period of at least thirty days.

A fourth point is that PD-59 emphasizes that the preplanned target packages in the SIOP must be supplemented by the ability to find new targets and destroy them during the course of a nuclear exchange. As Desmond Ball points out, "while Soviet strategic nuclear installations and economic and industrial facilities would remain essentially fixed during wartime, there would be much movement of Soviet conventional military forces (including second echelon formations) and much of the Soviet political and military leadership would presumably be relocated. PD-59 requires the development of new reconnaissance satellites and signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems to provide the real-time intelligence capabilities necessary to effect this rapid retargeting."

The fifth noteworthy aspect of the recent develop-

ments in targeting policy is the recognition that the current US command, control and communication (C<sup>3</sup>) system is inadequate to support any policy of extended nuclear war-fighting. In this respect PD-59 should be considered together with Presidential Directives 53 and 58 and a wide range of other measures intended to improve the survivability and the endurance of the American C<sup>3</sup> system. PD-53 entitled "National Security Telecommunications Policy" and signed by President Carter on November 15, 1979, proclaimed that "it is essential to the security of the US to have telecommunications facilities adequate to satisfy the needs of the nation during and after any national emergency ... to provide continuity of essential functions of government, and to reconstitute the political, economic and social structure of the nation."<sup>105</sup> Its principal goal is described as ensuring "connectivity between the National Command Authority and strategic and other appropriate forces to support flexible execution of retaliatory strikes during and after an enemy nuclear attack".

PD-58 signed by the President on June 30, 1980 is concerned with the maintenance of "continuity of government". It directs the Department of Defence and other agencies to improve the capacity of selected parts of the government, from the President on down, to withstand a nuclear attack. The measures under consideration include plans for evacuating military and civilian leaders from Washington in time of crisis; the construction of new hardened shelters for key personnel, data processing equipment and communications systems; and the improvement of early warning systems.

Finally, Ball points out, the recent developments in targeting policy have some important implications for arms control. To cover all the Soviet political control assets and the wider range of military targets as required by the new targeting guidance will in turn require a large increase in the SIOP forces, as will the requirement for strategic reserves to both cover Soviet second-echelon



forces and provide intra-war deterrence against escalation to urban industrial attacks. On 9 April, 1979, General Ellis wrote to Secretary Brown to the effect that US strategic force levels were inadequate to support the policy of "countervailing" targeting—at least without the deployment of "sufficient numbers" of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), Trident SLBMs and MX ICBMs. Moreover, increased expenditures on strategic C<sup>3</sup> systems and real-time surveillance capabilities are also required. To be effective, then, the recent targeting developments are likely to come into conflict with arms control objectives.<sup>106</sup>

At their Seventh National Security Affairs Conference in July 1980 the Pentagon nuclear war planners rejected the principle of Soviet-American nuclear parity as an unacceptable policy for the 1980s. Instead of the only just alternative they chose to give preference to "national strategic concepts". As they see it, the United States must have in the near future 15,000-20,000 warheads as opposed to the 9,000 which they have at present.

The Reagan administration has continued and developed the policy of preparing for nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Much of the opposition to the original draft of PD-59 that was prepared in early 1979 was based on arms control arguments. President Carter's endorsement of PD-50, however, signalled the death knell of the arms control stance of his administration; according to that directive arms control was to be pursued only in so far as it served broader US national security interests.

Thus the United States has been once more unable to resist the temptation to use its technological sophistication to increase its counterforce potential and develop more sophisticated C<sup>3</sup> systems. The Reagan administration has gone even farther in this respect and the concepts embodied in NSDM-242, the NUWEP and PD-59 are being pursued to even further extremes. Given the

propensity of many members of the new administration to accept the possibility of "limited" nuclear war, it is also extremely dangerous. Directives like PD-59 give the Defence Department and the JCS the opportunity to convince the political leadership that it is possible to win a nuclear war.

Such are the basic results of US nuclear policy in the postwar period. It is obvious that these and other changes of concepts and doctrines notwithstanding, it essentially remains the same: the desire for world hegemony and pursuit of the mirage of nuclear superiority. At a time when the yield and destruction capacity of nuclear weapons have increased immeasurably, it is difficult to call this policy anything but nuclear madness. Detailed plans for the nuclear destruction of the Soviet Union, such as have so far been made available to the public, are simply astonishing in the way they forget present-day realities, i.e. the fact that there exists nuclear parity. The aggressor himself will be subject to a devastating retaliatory strike and the United States can expect a similar response to any destruction caused to the Soviet Union.

## *Chapter IV*

### THE DEFENCE DEPARTMENT AND POLITICS

In 1947 Congress adopted the National Security Act, in accordance with which the post of Secretary of Defence was instituted at the rank of cabinet minister. Today the importance of this post is so great that it can only be compared with that of the President. The Defence Secretary is virtually the deputy Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces.<sup>1</sup> This is because the sheer volume of military decisions on international problems that have to be taken by the leadership is constantly growing as is the amount of national resources spent on military needs. In this sense the Defence Department is a major state-monopoly conglomerate. Naturally the personalities of those who have occupied the post of Secretary of Defence (and there have been 15 since 1947) have made a profound impression on the US war machine.

In accordance with the 1947 Act the Secretary of Defence is approved by the Senate. He is the main presidential adviser on all matters relating to the Defence Department. He must not only formulate policy but supervise from the Pentagon the drawing up of national defence plans and programmes as well as the conduct of military operations. According to the law, a professional

soldier can be appointed the Secretary of Defence only after ten years retirement from active service. The same applies to his deputies. The only exception to this rule was General Marshall. The Defence Secretary cannot create his own military apparatus, but he can appoint his own aides from the serving military.

When the Defence Department was first formed, the Secretary's real power was very weak. But as a result of the reorganizations that took place in 1949, 1953 and 1958 he became the most powerful executive in the country's military establishment. American scholars thus define his sphere of activity: "...foreign policy, military strategy, defense budgets, and the choice of major weapons and forces are all closely related matters of basic national security policy. And the principal task of the Secretary of Defense is personally to grasp the strategic issues and provide active leadership to develop a defense program that sensibly relates all these factors. In short, his main job is to shape the defense program in the national interest. In particular, it is his job to decide what forces are needed."<sup>2</sup>

To this it should be added that the Secretary of Defence is responsible for the administrative control of the whole war machine including the military budget, which amounts to more than 25 per cent of Federal expenditure. The size and distribution of the military budget has enormous influence on all aspects of life in the United States. During a crisis situation the head of the Pentagon acts as the link between the chiefs of staff and other military advisers, on the one hand, and the President, on the other. Finally, the Secretary of Defence is the civilian head of a department to whom the top military commanders turn for guidance and who represents the interests of the war machine in the other parts of the state bureaucracy, in Congress and in the mass media.

Of the fifteen Defence Secretaries only three, in our view, have had a substantial influence not just on the

war machine, but on US politics as a whole. These have been the most devoted servants of their class and done the most to further its imperial ambitions. Their influence made itself felt not only at the time when they held the post, but also in the years to follow. They are James Forrestal, Robert McNamara and James Schlesinger.

James Forrestal was the first US Secretary of Defence (1947-1949). It was during his period of office that the war machine was given the form in which it appears today and the country's foreign policy was given the extremely dangerous orientation towards aggression, preemptive nuclear strikes and the continuous build-up of military power for the purpose of retaining superiority over the Soviet Union and achieving US hegemony throughout the world. Robert McNamara was prominent for the fact that he finally established the power of the Defence Department over the American military establishment, introduced a number of managerial innovations aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the war machine and tried to adapt US nuclear strategy to the new situation. McNamara's term of office in the Pentagon coincided with the peak of American aggression in Vietnam, for which he bears the main responsibility.

James Schlesinger, who was Secretary of Defence from 1973 to 1975, was the first head of the Pentagon in the post-Vietnam period, when the anti-war mood of the American public to some extent put a check on the military budget. He spared no effort to renew the military build-up and began a new stage in the "Soviet military threat" campaign. Schlesinger was a staunch defender of the policy of building up and improving the nuclear capabilities of the United States to bring them near to nuclear first-strike potential. This policy inevitably gave rise to dangerous illusions that the United States could wage and win a war in conditions of parity. He gave pseudo-scientific terminology to the traditional hegemonistic ambitions, which had a profound effect on the more aggressive groups among the American ruling class,

who were at the time regrouping their forces to launch an offensive on the policy of detente and peaceful coexistence. To a certain extent all subsequent administrations and Defence Secretaries only increased the "heritage" they received from James Schlesinger.

Let us now consider in more detail the contribution each of these three defence secretaries made to the formation of the war machine and to the military and political strategy of the United States.

\* \* \*

On June 26, 1947, while on board the presidential airliner, *Sacred Cow*, Truman signed the National Security Act and appointed James Forrestal as first Secretary of Defence.<sup>3</sup>

American specialists are quite right to draw attention to Forrestal's pathological anti-communism. In their opinion it was he who fanned the flames of the cold war, since "the Soviet threat was central to his thinking and was to govern most of his major efforts as secretary of defense".<sup>4</sup> He was firmly convinced that the military power of the United States ought to be superior to that of any country in the world and to achieve this aim he tried to enlarge the military budget. So insistent was he in this that he even aroused the discontent of President Truman, who was beginning an electoral campaign and therefore preferred to speak of a balanced budget and tax reductions. The extremist views of the new Defence Secretary even led to tensions arising between him and the Secretary of State, George Marshall, and there was friction and considerable differences of opinion between Forrestal and other highly placed administration officials. It must, however, be emphasized that Forrestal's political line to increase confrontation with the Soviet Union was on the whole supported by the country's ruling circles.

Forrestal effected the virtual unification of the armed

services and carried through two important measures which were reflected in their later development. First, there were the decisions taken at the Key West Conference of military leaders on March 11-14, 1948. They amounted to giving the Air Force the main strategic objectives, giving the Navy the right to have the atomic bomb and build an aircraft carrier of 80,000 tons displacement, building up the Marine Corps to four divisions, renewing conscription so as to satisfy the immediate needs of the Army, and requesting additional appropriations for the armed forces in view of the tense international situation.

The second important measure consisted in the decisions to give the Air Force temporary operational control over atomic weapons, to make each armed service exclusively responsible for planning and programming its own objectives, although account should also be taken of the possibility of using other armed services in this, to form a group to assess weapons systems, to set up a small military group to provide closer contact between the Defence Department and the chiefs of staff and to establish the general headquarters for the West European command. Forrestal restructured the war machine for the future, but in this he was guided by his own hard-line anti-communist views, as American specialists have rightly pointed out.<sup>5</sup>

\* \* \*

Robert McNamara's term of office as Secretary of Defence was a landmark in the history of the US war machine. He was appointed by President Kennedy in January 1961. During his election campaign Kennedy had stated that he intended to see to it that more funds were available for military spending. He also declared his intention to improve both the country's nuclear and conventional forces. Like all other presidents, Kennedy had his own views on military policy and on whom he

needed as his chief military advisers. The post of Secretary of Defence was first offered to Robert Lovett who declined to accept the offer (as he also declined to accept the post of Secretary of State), but who in his stead recommended Robert McNamara.<sup>6</sup>

Kennedy had not previously known McNamara, who agreed to accept the post but insisted on his own choice of aides and even secured a written guarantee from the President to this effect. From the very beginning of his term of office the new President gave his Defence Secretary considerably more freedom of action than he gave his State Secretary. In particular, he would not allow his National Security Assistant, McGeorge Bundy, to interfere in the affairs of the Pentagon. And McNamara firmly insisted on this throughout his whole time in office.

American specialists note that McNamara was quite unable to make compromises, which did nothing to help him get on with the Washington bureaucracy. His foreign policy views were similar to those of President Kennedy and his closest advisers, views which differed little from those of the 1940s and 1950s; Kennedy largely continued the policy of trying to "contain" communism by the use of military force.

Having established himself in the Pentagon, McNamara began to involve himself in managerial problems in the belief that "the direction of the Department of Defense demands not only a strong, responsible civilian control, but a secretary's role that consists of active, imaginative and decisive leadership of the establishment at large, and not the passive practice of simply refereeing the disputes of traditional and partisan factions".<sup>7</sup>

As for his deputy, McNamara followed the tradition established by General Marshall in 1950, and his deputy became his "alter ego". This was the case with all three deputies who worked with McNamara and he relied fully on their judgement.<sup>8</sup>

McNamara's relationship with the Joint Chiefs was far more complex. When he was appointed Defence



Secretary the JCS Chairman was General Lyman Lemnitzer, who had been appointed in October 1960 by Eisenhower and who was respected by him. After the Bay of Pigs fiasco which the President and his Defence Secretary largely ascribed to the incompetence of the Joint Chiefs, Lemnitzer completely lost face. One of the results of the defeat was the return to active service of General Maxwell Taylor. First he headed the enquiry into the causes of the disaster and then he became presidential military adviser. In October 1962 General Taylor was made Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He had a close relationship with McNamara and was in a position to be the most powerful chairman since Radford's tenure in the first Eisenhower administration.<sup>9</sup>

The longest serving JCS chairman under McNamara was General Earle Wheeler, who was appointed in early July, 1965. Apart from anything else he took active part in the decision to escalate the American intervention in Vietnam. General Wheeler was considered a first-class staff specialist and was furthermore able to get on with the Washington bureaucracy.

There were no less than nine chiefs of staff of the various armed services and they rarely met with the President. Both Kennedy and Johnson preferred to deal with the JCS chairman alone rather than with the Joint Chiefs as a group. McNamara was on poor terms with the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George Anderson, who considered the former's managerial innovations as infringing the prerogatives of the various armed services commands. Anderson's successors, Admiral David McDonald and Admiral Thomas Moorer, on the other hand, upheld the Secretary's new ideas and were able to make contact with him. Tension also characterized the relationship between McNamara and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, who openly expressed his dissatisfaction. McNamara tried to replace LeMay, but he was not supported by Kennedy, who "was always interested in keeping the military happy,

whereas McNamara was not especially concerned about that factor".<sup>10</sup>

Following the custom introduced by his predecessor, Thomas Gates, Robert McNamara met the chiefs of staff in the "Tank". The agenda was always prepared in advance, but those who attended the meetings noted that they were very general and never led to any concrete decisions. No real discussion took place and they were described by the participants themselves as merely "cosmetic".<sup>11</sup> More productive were the meetings held by the Defence Secretary at which not only the chiefs of staff were present, but also the Secretaries of the armed services and the Defence Secretary's assistants. According to eyewitness reports McNamara acted like a "teacher" at these meetings, never letting a discussion develop. On the whole the military were inclined to say that the Defence Secretary seemed to have a split personality. When he met the military commanders individually, he was warm, responsive, and understanding; when he attended group meetings he appeared authoritative and inflexible.<sup>12</sup>

McNamara and the two presidents under whom he worked basically preferred not to meet with all the chiefs of staff any more than was necessary. In 1965 during a meeting with President Johnson a difference of opinion occurred between the Army chief of staff and the Marine commander. McNamara was extremely annoyed by this and told General Wheeler that he did not wish to be present in this sort of situation again. After that only Wheeler represented the Joint Chiefs at meetings with the President, as did his predecessor, General Taylor. And this situation persisted right throughout the American aggression in Vietnam. The chiefs noted that McNamara used their splits against them.<sup>13</sup>

McNamara worked in close contact with Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. He believed that military policy was determined by foreign policy. Furthermore, he admitted that Rusk had a firmer grasp on the subtleties of foreign

policy than he did himself. But Kennedy considered that in many cases McNamara's opinion was clearer and more understandable than Rusk's and was therefore more inclined to side with him.

The relationship between McNamara and Congress was very complex, especially during the latter period of his tenure. He found it difficult to get on with the congressional committees, which in his opinion only served to impede "rational decisions" on military policy. This relationship became even more tense after McNamara's decision to close a number of military bases, since this gave rise to indignation on the part of a number of influential congressmen in so far as it led to a loss of jobs in their constituencies. Congress paid McNamara in kind by arranging for numerous studies that took up his time and energy. The source of the bad relationship between McNamara and Congress was not merely differences on specific issues. The point was that many of the military commanders tried to undermine his position by providing congressmen with information that only increased their dislike of him.

When Lyndon Johnson came to the White House he did not simply keep McNamara on as Secretary of Defence, he even encouraged him to take part in decision-making on many problems that had no direct relation to military policy. From autumn 1961 McNamara became increasingly involved in matters connected with the escalation of aggression in Vietnam. According to American specialists, he became the "action officer" on Vietnam for the President.<sup>14</sup>

In assessing the results of McNamara's tenure in the Pentagon, American specialists draw particular attention to his managerial innovations, such as the planning-programming-budgeting system, and the systems analysis. He considered these as the "essential management tools needed to make sound decisions on the really crucial issues of national security".<sup>15</sup> As a result of introducing these new "management tools", the civilian systems anal-

ysis specialists began to dominate the professional military, whose proposals were now for the first time subjected to technical examination.

The main purpose of these innovations was to create a rational basis for decision-making as opposed to an emotional one. The cost-effectiveness principle now began to prevail over all other considerations. Despite opposition the new Pentagon boss had converted an indeterminate coalition of armed forces into a centralized and controlled department.

The new management system essentially took the initiative in formulating military policy out of the hands of the armed services commanders. Now strategic and personnel requirements, and their costs were brought together in a single analytical document and no longer came as the result of trading between the various arms and services. From now on the Defence Secretary had an independent, analytical apparatus largely manned by civilians. And it was all due to McNamara's desire to play an active role in managing the department and not simply act as arbitrator between rival groups of the military.<sup>16</sup>

Under McNamara the research and engineering bureaux of the Pentagon changed into a centre where decisions were taken on new types of weapons and where the economic computations of the analysts were used to justify each new proposed system. The influence of the "statistical" approach to weapons systems and the conduct of military operations was, in the opinion of many American specialists, firmly rooted in the consciousness of all the top-ranking Pentagon officials from the time of McNamara onwards.

Another important "managerial tool" in the hands of the Defence Secretary was the International Security Affairs Office. Although the Defence Secretary looked at the world through the eyes of President Kennedy, he was far from being passive in international affairs. He became, in fact, as American scholars have noted,<sup>17</sup> a

principal foreign affairs adviser to the President.

McNamara, especially during his first years, exercised a considerable influence on the formulation of strategy. To a large extent he adapted the military power of the country to the goals of US foreign policy under the new conditions. When in the early 1960s the Soviet Union developed its ICBMs and built a reliable air-defence system the military and political leadership in Washington went over from the doctrine of massive retaliation to the strategy of flexible response. Nuclear war, of course, was still central to this strategy, but now stress was laid on the "controlled" use of nuclear weapons to match the scale of the military danger and the possibility of waging a limited conventional war.

Ground-based ICBMs became the main means for effecting a nuclear attack and with this in view 1,054 Minuteman and Titan launching pads were built together with submarines equipped with Polaris missiles. A powerful general purpose force equipped with conventional weapons was also envisaged. War against the USSR and the European socialist countries was planned to be waged first with conventional weapons, which would then be escalated to tactical nuclear weapons and, if the situation became critical, to strategic nuclear weapons.

McNamara, especially during his first years, exercised the numerous possibilities for using strategic systems so as to find out what would bring the best results for the United States in a potential armed conflict. Further innovations consisted also in the fact that additional information was fed into the computers on the characteristics and vulnerability of the nuclear delivery vehicles, the military targets, and the urban and industrial centres of the countries involved in such a conflict. Furthermore, attempts were made to model a phased out use of nuclear weapons on the assumption that hostilities would gradually escalate. The result of these studies was the conclusion that it was to the advantage of the United States to employ a counterforce strategy,

i.e. striking at an enemy's military targets instead of at his urban and large industrial centres.

Acceptance of this strategy was first officially announced by McNamara in a speech on June 16, 1962, at Michigan University Graduation Day. He stated that the purpose of the new strategy was to "preserve the fabric of our societies if war should occur". He then went on to say: "The US has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a possible general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war..., should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population. In other words we are giving a possible opponent the strongest imaginable incentive to refrain from striking our own cities."<sup>18</sup>

For the US itself, of course, the "strongest imaginable incentive" for an official change to counterforce strategy was the real change in the balance of strength between the USSR and the United States, which followed the USSR's acquisition of the capability to deliver a devastating retaliatory strike. Thus the decision to adopt counterforce strategy had nothing to do with humane motives, as the Americans pretended. It was a forced reaction to the change in the international strategic situation.

In the event of the United States delivering a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union in conformity with counterforce strategy and the USSR retaliating, it was assumed that the advantage would lie with the Americans and the ultimate scale of death and destruction in the United States would be almost half that in the USSR. According to McNamara and his specialists, such nuclear strategy could win the war. But at the same time he insisted that US strategic forces should keep available a wide choice of variants from counterforce to assured destruction. Each of these variants was designed to ful-

fil different functions. The assured destruction variant, according to the Defence Secretary, should fulfil the aims of "detering" an aggressor from attacking the United States. The counterforce strike, on the other hand, was considered to be a more "flexible" strategy allowing Washington to foist upon the other side a conflict scenario that suited its purposes better.

In assessing McNamara's counterforce strategy it is important to take account of the fact that the "humane" camouflage that covers it conceals the very real, though openly never admitted aim of achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union in the new conditions. In fact if both sides undertook to refrain from nuclear strikes against urban and industrial centres, then the side that had the greater counterforce capability would also have advantage over the other. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that exactly at that time the United States planned a rapid and massive build-up of ICBMs with MIRV warheads which were thought to give it counterforce superiority.

Immediately after its announcement, the counterforce doctrine provoked discussion and disagreement in Washington. The reason for this was that the doctrine was virtually an official contradiction of the declared concept of US strategic defence. It was obvious that counterforce strategy implied a nuclear first strike against an enemy, otherwise it was pointless. This to a certain extent McNamara himself was forced to admit. In other words, the conceptual innovations in American nuclear strategy introduced by the Defence Secretary and culminating in the formulation of the counterforce concept were an open provocation.

As the Soviet specialist, Genrikh Trofimenko quite rightly pointed out, "The American strategy of counterforce in relation to the Soviet Union is a pure piece of provocation. When one side is preparing to make a sudden attack on the other so as to reduce it to a state of unconditional strategic vulnerability, the other side has

no choice left but to strike a preemptive blow first. Furthermore, if this side does not yet possess the capability for a full-scale counterforce strike (in view of the high dispersal factor of the enemy's strategic forces and good defences) it, theoretically speaking, could resort in self-defence to a 'countervalue' strike. And this it could do not only by means of a preemptive strike, but also through launching its own killer missiles to hit missiles launched by the enemy. In this situation the counterforce strategy, thought up by the other side, will clearly not work. Here it is important to stress that if one side adopts the strategy of counterforce, which it sees as providing unilateral advantage to itself and as yet being beyond the means of the other side, it seriously destabilizes the strategic balance, which depends not only on the real material balance of military force, but to a very great extent on the psychological perception of the enemy's intentions by his opponent".<sup>19</sup>

In an attempt to try and iron out the contradictions here, McNamara introduced another concept which he at first looked upon as an "addition" to the counterforce strategy. This was the strategy of deterrence imposed through the threat of "assured destruction". This concept was based on the recognition that both the United States and the Soviet Union had sophisticated and well-defended strategic forces which were capable of withstanding a first strike and doing "unacceptable" damage to an aggressor in retaliation. It was assumed that this capability, which would still be maintained even after a first strike, ought to be enough to deter an enemy.

In a speech on January 30, 1963 to the House Armed Services Committee, McNamara declared: "We have to build and maintain a second-strike force. Such a force should have sufficient flexibility to permit a choice of strategies, particularly an ability to: (1) Strike back decisively at the entire Soviet target system simultaneously or (2) Strike back first at the Soviet bomber bases,



missile sites and other military installations associated with their long-range nuclear forces to reduce the power of any follow-on-attack, and then, if necessary, strike back at the Soviet urban and industrial complex in a controlled and deliberate way."<sup>20</sup>

Gradually McNamara began to reject the concept of counterforce strike in favour of "deterrence based on retaliatory power". Later he openly admitted: "We do not possess first-strike capability against the Soviet Union for precisely the same reason that they do not possess it against us. Quite simply, we have both built up our second-strike capability—in effect retaliatory power—to the point that a first-strike capability on either side has become unattainable... Both the Soviet Union and the United States now possess an actual and credible second-strike capability against one another, and it is precisely this mutual capability that provides us both with the strongest possible motive to avoid a nuclear war."<sup>21</sup> However, despite this statement by the chief of the Pentagon, the practical strategic goals of the US military and political leadership during the 1960s consisted precisely in the acquisition of unilateral advantages over the Soviet Union by the creation of a "limited counterforce capability". This was to be achieved by stockpiling nuclear warheads and delivery systems, which it was hoped, would give the United States certain advantages up to and including first-strike capability.

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The third Defence Secretary who, in our opinion, also made a substantial contribution to the building and development of the US war machine and to the formulation of military and political strategy was James Schlesinger,<sup>22</sup> who received his appointment in 1973.

According to American scholars, Schlesinger was one of the main opponents of detente in both the Nixon and the Ford administrations. In all Pentagon papers issued

under him, including those concerned with intelligence, his aim was to point up the "Soviet military threat". To aid him in this task he appointed his former colleague, Andrew Marshall, as Director of the Net Assessment Office to deal with the Soviet-American military balance.

In early October 1975 the Pentagon circulated an intelligence estimate asserting that the Soviet Union "is using the policy of detente to gain dominance over the West in all fields".<sup>23</sup> Publicly the Defence Secretary also declared that in all sectors around the American periphery the USSR was having clear superiority.<sup>24</sup>

In his degree of adherence to the ideology of militant anti-communism and the crusade to build up America's military power and in his vision and understanding of the world around him James Schlesinger, as many Americans have noted, can be compared with James Forrestal and John Foster Dulles. He differed from them only in his greater logic and the convincing manner in which he expressed his views.<sup>25</sup> He actively collaborated in sabotaging the SALT-1 and SALT-2 talks. Even former President Nixon noted in his memoirs: "The US military opposition to a new SALT agreement came to a head at the meeting of the National Security Council on the afternoon of June 20 when Secretary of Defense Schlesinger presented the Pentagon's proposal. It amounted to an unyielding hard line against any SALT agreement that did not ensure an overwhelming American advantage. It was a proposal that the Soviets were sure to reject out of hand."<sup>26</sup>

Schlesinger's military and political views amounted to the proposition that the armed forces are one of the basic factors determining international relations and influencing their development. He defined his own attitude to military force thus: "Power remains the ultimate sanction in dealing with potential conflict. Where power exists and is respected, it will not have to be exercised. Through power one can deter the initiation of an unfavorable chain of events. To be sure, military power

is not the only form of power, but it remains an irreplaceable element in the total mix of power; without it, the disadvantageous turn of events would be swift and sure."<sup>27</sup> From this, in the opinion of the head of the Pentagon, it follows that the United States must maintain military power, since that is necessary for keeping the balance of strength in the world in the United States' favour. Schlesinger believed that the military power of the United States was the basis of the security of the "free world" and that whereas during the Second World War the United States was the "arsenal of democracy" it is now the "West's first line of defence".

In the early 1970s the United States and the Soviet Union achieved quantitative strategic parity. This forced the US military and political leadership to adopt what they called a strategy of realistic deterrence, which was based on ensuring US qualitative superiority in the whole complex of strategic weapons. Numerous programmes were drawn up to spur on a further arms build-up, including nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and land- and sea-based strategic missile with MIRV warheads. Work was begun on a new type of strategic weapon—the long-range land-, sea- and air-based cruise missile.

The Pentagon paid particular attention to formulating concepts for the use of strategic nuclear weapons in a war with the Soviet Union. Its assumption was that as the Soviet Union possessed the capability to deliver an unacceptable retaliatory strike, the American threat to the USSR and the whole policy of nuclear blackmail would be seriously undermined. Therefore the plan for a strategic war in 1973, which was based on the principle of assured destruction plus flexible response appeared to Schlesinger as unrealistic. He considered flexible response in conditions of Soviet-American parity to be a no-good policy. And all those who believed in the possibility of winning a nuclear war against the Soviet Union agreed with him.

In this context Schlesinger formulated a new approach to strategic planning. This approach amounted to concentrating on the building of high-precision targeting systems so that these could be used to give the United States preemptive strike capability. He believed that by hitting the Soviet Armed Forces and disrupting their control system the United States could weaken a Soviet retaliatory strike, especially on US cities. Thus preparations were openly made to wage nuclear war against the Soviet Union and this was used to justify the colossal expenses incurred in maintaining and improving the nuclear arsenal.

This strategy was fitted into the conceptual framework of limited nuclear war and flexible strategic targeting. Schlesinger asked Congress for increased funds to finance research on warheads and ICBMs with counterforce capability. This Congress agreed to comply. Amendments were also made to the plans for waging nuclear war against the Soviet Union. In particular the targeting mechanism on Minuteman III missiles was modified so that all 550 of them could be retargeted in 36 minutes and the whole arsenal in 24 hours.

Schlesinger not only developed the concept of a preemptive first strike against the Soviet Union through US technological superiority, he also began to develop another area, which he considered would give the United States additional advantage over the USSR. He believed that in conditions of strategic parity the United States was obliged to build up its conventional forces and increase their combat readiness by changing the ratio between combat units and support units in favour of the former. A policy was adopted in 1975 to continually increase military spending so as to achieve military superiority. Thus Schlesinger proposed an additional six billion dollars to the 1975 military budget of 85 billion. In 1976 he proposed that the military budget be increased to a total of 102 billion dollars. However, in view of the coming election campaign President Ford

was not enthusiastic. But in January 1976 the new Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, argued in Congress for a military budget that was not far short of that proposed by his predecessor. Although Congress did not fully meet the Pentagon's demands, military expenditure was increased for the first time since 1968 in real terms.

In the 1973-1975 period James Schlesinger was able to orientate American strategic thinking completely towards the concept of a counterforce war against the Soviet Union on the basis of a preemptive first strike. He modernized and improved the country's conventional forces and tried to clear away the vestiges of the "post-Vietnam syndrome". Finally, he made sure of getting the appropriations necessary for the implementation of a hegemonist policy.

In their most concentrated form these developments were expressed in Directive 59 issued by the Carter administration and its other supplementary directives, and also in the decision of the Reagan administration to achieve "complete and indisputable" military superiority so as to be able to wage a protracted nuclear war. Schlesinger's ideas gave the subsequent strategic concepts a particularly aggressive character. It is no accident that bourgeois scholars who support the aggressive policy of the United States state that "history will doubtless judge that Schlesinger was a man who came at the right time".<sup>28</sup> His main service, they believe, was that "he provided the intellectual and philosophical direction, as well as the congressional support, that permitted the American military establishment to regroup and rebuild after the Vietnam turmoil".<sup>29</sup> James Schlesinger publicly expressed and put into practice the concepts that had been developed by the more warlike and aggressive members of the American ruling class.

## Conclusion

In order to achieve the goals of its hegemonistic policy the United States has for a period of more than thirty years continued to improve its war machine and develop nuclear weapons as the latter's main component. The United States possesses the largest and most technically equipped armed forces in the Western world. In manpower and weaponry they are greater than the armed forces of Britain, France, West Germany and Italy together. As distinct from other states the US Armed Forces possess a peacetime operational structure under which all manpower and equipment are distributed among six unified and three specified commands. These commands have been set up to direct and prepare their forces for war, and to draw up advance plans of theatre strategic operations to suit US global policy. In accordance with the doctrine of preparing and fighting aggressive wars abroad the manpower and equipment of four of the six unified commands are deployed in peacetime outside the United States. The two most powerful groups are stationed in direct proximity to the western and eastern borders of the USSR.<sup>1</sup>

Military doctrine in the United States today has as its basis a number of constant principles that have devel-

oped in the course of the country's two-hundred-year history. According to the main principle, military force is the foundation of a state's international position. It is significant that the Reagan administration believes that "the most notable Western successes generally occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, when the relative power positions of the two superpowers were most favorable to the United States".<sup>2</sup> The theoreticians and strategists of this administration also believe that the Soviet-American agreements on a wide range of questions, including strategic arms limitation, were only concluded because of the relative military weakness of the United States in the 1970s. For such people the very idea of beginning talks is seen as a sign of weakness.

The continual build-up in the war machine for the purpose of waging and winning a nuclear war is accompanied by insistent efforts on the part of the ruling class to convert the military power of the United States into a factor of absolute political influence on the world arena. However, these efforts have never ultimately produced the desired results. Nevertheless, to this day the military and political leadership of the country continues to obstinately cling to a policy of hegemonism as it chases after the illusion of American military superiority.

The Soviet Union knows well that the aggressive forces of international reaction possess powerful, sophisticated weapons, enormous economic, scientific, technological and military potential and vast manpower and natural resources. Their aggressive preparations and their military and strategic concepts present a very real threat to world peace. The Soviet Defence Minister, Marshal Ustinov, clearly formulated the permanent position of the Soviet Union: "The basis for preserving peace is the maintenance of parity as it exists already, the consistent lessening of military confrontation, and the reduction of arms and the armed forces while ensuring equal security for both sides. To think of victory in the arms race, and even more so in a nuclear war is madness,

and dangerous madness at that. We do not need military superiority over the West. We only need reliable security. And for this the maintenance of approximate equality and parity is sufficient.”<sup>3</sup>

The responsibility for the arms race which has gone on for more than three decades, particularly with the weapons of mass destruction, lies exclusively with the ruling class of the United States. The United States was and has remained the initiator of the strategic arms race at all levels. In August 1945 the world learned about the most destructive weapons in the history of mankind—the atomic bomb. Soviet proposals that were made in subsequent years to ban the use of nuclear energy for military purposes were rejected by the United States. And so in the face of this imminent danger the USSR took countermeasures and built its own atomic bomb.

During the 1950s under the pretext of “having fallen behind in bombers” the Pentagon got Congress to agree to major appropriations and began an extensive programme for building strategic bombers. When a whole armada of these aircraft had been built, it was “discovered” that the Americans had deliberately exaggerated the number of Soviet bombers three to four times over.

In the early 1960s a howl was raised about a US “missile gap” and the United States initiated a massive deployment of land-based ICBMs. Then, after more than a thousand of these had been deployed, it was “discovered” that the Soviet “missile threat” had also been exaggerated 15 to 20 times over. Simultaneously the Americans launched a programme to build 41 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. At that time no other country in the world had them. In the mid-1960s the Pentagon was already equipping them with MIRV warheads. The Soviet Union did not have such submarines until seven years later.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States was the first to begin arming strategic ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehi-



cles (MIRVs), thus starting a new spiral of the nuclear arms race. It was not until 1975-1977 that the USSR did the same. Immediately afterwards the United States launched a crash programme for the development of a new type of strategic weapon—the long-range air, land- and sea-based cruise missile. Finally, in 1981 the President of the United States decided to go ahead with the full-scale production of the neutron weapons. The same is true of the building of spy-satellites, the multi-purpose space Shuttle system, and AWACS aircraft, all of which first appeared in the United States, not in the Soviet Union.

As must be obvious, in the building up of its own armed forces the USSR has only been reacting to threats posed by the West.<sup>4</sup>

The Reagan administration has been particularly zealous in pushing ahead the arms race. Its aim has been to achieve superiority so as to change the existing parity between the armed forces and the military-strategic balance in its own favour and on the basis of military power to force other countries to adopt the American way of life.

From the time it first entered the White House the present administration has begun to formulate a highly dangerous policy—the strategy of direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union on a global scale. According to Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the present strategy is chiefly aimed at achieving complete and indisputable military superiority, restoring the leading role of the United States in the world and actively opposing the Soviet Union while defending the “vital interests” of the United States in various regions of the world and endeavouring to erode the socialist community. In this context the Deputy Defence Secretary, Frank Carlucci, has argued for US nuclear “warfighting capability”, while the Secretary himself has spoken of the need to try to “prevail” in nuclear war.<sup>5</sup>

The Reagan administration's fiscal 1983 budget statement proclaims that "US defence policies ensure our preparedness to respond to and, if necessary, successfully fight either conventional or nuclear war".<sup>6</sup>

Ruling circles in the United States make no bones about the fact that in starting a new round of the arms race they embark on militarizing the whole country and using American military power in a broad range of conflicts to achieve their own hegemonist plans for world domination.

The chief means to achieve this aim, so the military and political leadership in Washington believes, is by waging nuclear war against the Soviet Union. And this is shown most clearly in the concept of a preemptive first strike or counterforce capability. Those engaged in providing an ideological camouflage and a "theoretical" justification for this imperial doctrine, claim that the Soviet Union has already achieved this capability. And this, despite the fact that the top Soviet leadership has unambiguously rejected the very idea of a first strike. The gimmick used today by Pentagon strategists and the academic circles which serve them, is the claim that the high accuracy of Soviet ICBMs makes a first strike possible, irrespective of the intentions of the USSR. Since the intentions of the USSR are supposedly unknown, the United States itself must acquire this capability. Such is the pseudo logic that lies behind the policy of achieving military superiority over the USSR.

These strategists deliberately falsify Soviet intentions and when it is to their advantage they even crudely distort Soviet capabilities. They ignore the defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine and at the same time, despite all the facts to the contrary, claim that American weapons systems are built exclusively for defence. Exposing these falsifications, the American scholar Tom Gervasy notes: "If ... the Soviets lag behind us in some area of capability, and fail thereby to pose a credible danger, the alarmists switch horses and become quite

sure of Soviet intent, pointing out that ever since 1917 the Soviets have been bent on world domination—even though they know perfectly well that such a goal is no longer possible and real.”<sup>7</sup>

The strategists of the present administration claim that counterforce capability makes it possible to wage a protracted nuclear war, limited to strikes against military targets, command posts and the enemy's retaliation forces. Counterforce doctrine is even depicted as humane, since the civilian population are supposedly excluded from the strike. But the counterforce proponents say nothing about the fact that many important military targets are located in large cities or in surrounding districts. It is also quite possible after the military targets have been hit that the enemy's remaining nuclear forces may be used for retaliation against the whole range of targets. To this should be added the fact that with the destruction of the command posts, as required by first-strike strategy, the hope would also disappear that the war could then proceed along “normal” or limited lines. The enemy would then use his remaining strategic forces at will and in the interests of his country, and would have the complete moral right to make a total retaliatory strike.

There is no escaping the conclusion that from the 1960s onwards the American public and the world in general were deliberately deceived with talk about a rejection of the first-strike doctrine. The military and political leadership of the United States maintained that the risk connected with a counterforce, limited nuclear war was too great since there is the enormous danger of it developing into a general nuclear conflict. Indeed, it has been long evident that discussions about a “limited” nuclear war or hopes of surviving it make nuclear war itself more likely. But at the same time it is said that the invulnerability of US “deterrent” forces is sufficient for the defence of national security and that such invulnerability makes a further build-up of nuclear

weapons unnecessary.

However, in reality the United States has never rejected the concept of first strike, as is confirmed in Presidential Directive 59. The reason for the issuing of this directive was irresponsible assertion that the Soviet Union was enlarging its counterforce capability and that the United States was once more faced with a new "gap". But the new "gap" was just as false as the others, since the targeting accuracy of US missiles had long given the United States counterforce capability. Furthermore, possessing a large number of missiles, Washington has been able to target hundreds of them on to military targets in the USSR since 1964.

For 16 years the striking of military targets has been an integral part of all US operational plans. Proof of this comes from the fact that after PD 59 was adopted no further changes were made to the latest of these plans which is still effective today.<sup>8</sup> Soon after the signing of the Directive the Carter administration admitted what it denied for two years during discussions on the MX system—that it had the accuracy to deliver a first strike.

It is a well-known fact that the most difficult targets to hit are the reinforced silos in which the land-based ICBMs are deployed. According to Randy Forsberg of the Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies in Massachusetts, "the only warheads believed sufficiently accurate to be credited with a 90 per cent probability of destroying such targets are the MK 12A now being fitted on our Minuteman III missile." Some hundred of these are already operational.<sup>9</sup> Even Pentagon experts admit that the Soviet Union must be concerned about the threat to its vital centres. And these admissions are just further proof that it is precisely American action that gives rise to such a dangerous strategic situation and compels the USSR to take countermeasures.

An important role in instilling militarist and chauvinist aspirations in the American people has been played by the bourgeois mass media, which has followed

in the wake of the war machine and inflated the first-strike doctrine. But, of course, the tune has been set by the country's top leadership.

The authors of the counterforce concept have sown the dangerous illusion that the destruction of cities can be avoided in the event of a nuclear exchange. But if one state believes that another, in accordance with the counterforce doctrine will be the first to retaliate only on military targets while its towns remain unharmed after the first nuclear exchange, the deterrent effect of fear of losing cities disappears and the temptation arises to make the first strike.

The first-strike strategists claim that a sudden US hit would give them such overwhelming advantage that they would immediately gain peace on terms that suited them without the risk of general destruction.

The counterforce capability and the threat of delivering a first strike has allowed the United States, so its leaders believe, to dominate at any level of escalation of nuclear exchange. As Tom Gervasy notes, "this ability to move through the world with impunity is what the Reagan administration seeks to restore".<sup>10</sup> But no American strategist can explain how in the event of a nuclear conflict a general nuclear catastrophe can be avoided. They simply claim that the idea of a protracted and "limited" nuclear war seems to them more realistic than the prospect of the two sides causing each other "unacceptable destruction". But it is difficult to call anyone a realist who believes in the possibility of controlling a nuclear war.

In the opinion of a number of American specialists, the United States could have stopped building up its nuclear arsenal in 1966 when its leaders realized that they could maintain deterrence under any circumstances. But they did not do this. Today the top members of the Reagan administration, including the President himself, accuse the Soviet Union of a "unprecedented" drive to build up its nuclear capability. They

unashamedly conceal a fact, which they must undoubtedly know, that for the last ten years the USSR has only been moving towards parity, not going beyond it. They also deliberately say nothing of the fact that the United States itself which has supposedly shown "restraint" has in reality increased its number of warheads over this same period from 4,000 to 9,500 against the Soviet Union's 7,000.

This is the kind of correlation that the imperial strategists like to think of as "parity". They do not like the idea that the USSR is approximately equal to the United States in its strategic nuclear arsenal. In 1966 the United States pulled out all the stops to increase the accuracy of its missiles in a bid to achieve technological superiority over the Soviet Union without changing the ICBM ceilings. And as soon as the Americans had the technological capability to achieve the accuracy needed to deliver a first strike, they then went over to raising the first-strike capability to a new higher level, which in its turn gave them fresh hopes for an American empire established and ruled with the aid of "nuclear compulsion". It was to this end that the military and political leadership of the United States adopted the doctrine of counterforce.

The danger of the concept of counterforce consists in the fact that it encourages the illusion amongst the military and political leadership that a nuclear war can be won. It means in the first place that there is no longer such thing as an "unacceptable level of destruction." Any level is acceptable if the result is victory in nuclear war. One of the most important reasons for this nuclear madness lies in the fact that the banks and the shareholders of the military corporations demand investment profitability from the military-industrial complex. And nostalgia for a world empire, which the United States might have ruled with the aid of nuclear superiority, only serves to boost this nuclear madness.

In the early 1970s the realistically minded members

of the US ruling elite turned under the influence of the new correlation of forces to restructuring the country's foreign and military policy, which essentially meant an agonizing effort to adapt to world realities. In the first place this was expressed in the forced turn on the part of Washington towards improving relations with the Soviet Union and certain other steps that were taken in the direction of detente. This process of adaptation took place amid a fierce internal struggle between those groups of the ruling class that did not want to recognize the changes in the world and were trying to turn the clock back, and those who tried to make a sober assessment of the new correlation of forces between the two opposite social systems. -

The struggle went on throughout American politics. And it has to be admitted that in many cases the turn to reality was more of a declaratory tactic.

In this connection the Soviet specialist, Genrikh Trofimenko notes quite rightly that "slogans that seemed more democratic and realistic were often used to conceal traditional imperialist policy".<sup>11</sup>

The transition from a policy of global messianism and hegemonism during the postwar years to that of adaptation to international realities and realization of the United States' role in the world which characterized the early 1970s has today come to a standstill. Once again great-power psychology, messianic traditions and gambling on military force and the achievement of military superiority have come to dominate Washington. The Reagan administration, divorced from the realities of the present day, is sliding down the dangerous slope to cold war politics on a journey that promises nothing but increased tension and the danger of thermonuclear catastrophe.

At the same time it is only just to recognize that many realistically minded Americans reject this dangerous path.

There is one other exceptionally important aspect of

the matter. Obviously it is difficult to expect a change for the better or an improvement in the international situation, while ruling circles in the United States refuse to look the truth in the face and give up their fabrications about the Soviet Union and its policy. False ideological stereotypes remain a serious obstacle on the road to peaceful coexistence.

Today in Washington the spirit of militarism reigns. The Reaganites do all they can to improve the military machine and make it ready for nuclear war. Here it is well to remember the words of George Washington spoken in his Farewell Address to the People of the United States in 1796: "The Nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."<sup>12</sup>

How long will the present list in American politics towards aggression and hegemonism last? How dangerous will it become for the fate of the world? Will the US war machine be able to control politics? All these questions are of extreme importance today.

The Soviet leadership and the Soviet people are far from underestimating the dangers that result from Washington's present militarist policy. But we would like to hope that the forces of realism will in the end make themselves felt. Realism does not mean disparaging the role and importance of the United States. Realism does not mean lowering the importance of the United States' security problem in the eyes of American politicians and the politicians of other countries who form the contemporary framework of international relations. Realism means first and foremost recognizing the realities of the nuclear age and the threat that hangs over mankind of physical annihilation and the end of civilization. It means recognizing the need to work for security for all countries, the only genuine security in a nuclear age. And finally it means giving up the tradition of hegemon-



ism and the habit of using force to solve world problems. Realism has now become synonymous with self-preservation, the normal existence of society. The time has now come to learn from the historical experience of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. New arms drives will not make the Soviet Union agree to one-sided concessions. A challenge thrown down by the American side only means the Soviet Union will have to answer in kind—by building its own weapons systems. Any policy based on the desire to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union is fruitless and only serves to increase the danger of war.

The Soviet Union took the truly historical decision not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This decision contains the real prospect of averting a nuclear catastrophe. Resistance from the imperialist hawks to this proposal, when official Washington is discussing the possibility of a "limited", "protracted" or other kind of nuclear war, is quite understandable. The readiness to use nuclear weapons lies at the heart of American military policy. But one must be completely blinded by class hatred not to notice the realities of the age, not to see that "however and wherever the nuclear whirlwind strikes, it will inevitably get out of control and bring about a general catastrophe".<sup>13</sup> If the other nuclear powers were to follow the Soviet Union's example and agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, this would be an extremely important contribution to the cause of averting a nuclear war.

On the assumption that no task is more important today than eliminating the threat of nuclear war the Soviet Union is trying to reach agreement with the United States on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons. Speaking at the March (1985) Plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized: "We do not seek military advantages over the United States, over the NATO countries, or military superiority

over them; we want a termination, and not a continuation of the arms race and, therefore, we propose a freeze on nuclear arsenals, and end to the further deployment of missiles; we want a real and substantial reduction of the arms stockpiles, and not the development of ever new weapon systems, whether in space or on earth."<sup>14</sup> We are for an honest agreement which harms neither side and at the same time results in a reduction of their nuclear arsenals. Our country also takes account of the fact that the speed and destructive power of modern weapons make an atmosphere of mutual distrust especially dangerous. Even accident, miscalculation or a technical fault could have tragic consequences. It is therefore important to take fingers off triggers and put on the safety catches. And it is towards doing just this that the whole complex of proposals made by the Soviet Union is designed. Nuclear arsenals must be frozen without delay, limitations and reductions must be made on strategic arms, the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe must be radically lowered, the militarization of outer space must be prevented, and chemical warfare must be banned and weapons destroyed. These and other measures are realistic and equally accord with the interests of all states and with the demands and hopes of all peace-loving peoples. This also applies to the proposals made by the Soviet Union for reaching agreement on definite norms to which relations between nuclear powers would be subject and which would be made obligatory. The Soviet Union would like agreement in the first place to be reached on such major issues as renunciation to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and the non-use of military force in general. Agreement on these points could provide the basis for a real change in the international situation as a whole and in Soviet-American relations in particular.

The Soviet Union basically rejects the point of view of those who try to claim that force and weapons decide and always will decide everything. Today as never

before the peoples of the world who live under the threat which Washington's hegemonist policy causes, have come to the forefront of world history. The anti-war, anti-nuclear movement is taking vigorous, purposeful action against those who would fan the flames of a new world war. It is capable of eliminating the threat of a nuclear conflict, preserving the peace and, indeed, maintaining life on the planet as we know it. It is this ineradicable desire for life to which the humane and democratic policy of the Soviet State has always been orientated. And it is the deep conviction of the Soviet people that the way to peace lies through detente and cooperation.

## Notes

### Introduction

<sup>1</sup> *Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1981, p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 3, 1984, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> Stanley Hoffman, *Dead Ends. American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War*, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 1983, p. 121.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>5</sup> V. I. Lenin, "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats", *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 179.

<sup>6</sup> "Engels to Friedrich Adolph Sorge in Hoboken, January 6, 1882, Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 416.

<sup>7</sup> "Engels to Joseph Bloch in Königsberg, September 21 (-22), 1890", Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, p. 396.

<sup>8</sup> V. I. Lenin, "Bellicose Militarism and the Anti-Militarist Tactics of Social-Democracy", *Collected Works*, Vol. 15, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 182.

<sup>9</sup> "Engels to Friedrich Adolph Sorge in Hoboken, January 6, 1882", Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, p. 416.

### Chapter I

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, "A Caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism", *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, 26 September 1979.

<sup>3</sup> Peter L. Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change*, Doubleday, Garden City (New York), 1976, p. XIV.

<sup>4</sup> James Petras, "President Carter and the New Morality", *Monthly Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 1977, p. 50.

<sup>5</sup> Walter Lafeber, "Empire Begins at Home", *The Nation*, Vol. 228, No. 22, June 9, 1979, p. 656.

<sup>6</sup> The emphasis on war technology which has always characterized US military doctrine, attests among other things to a traditional weakness in respect of manpower and uncertainty as to troop reliability. Senator Robert Kennedy even admitted that it was wrong to assume that people would risk their lives and meekly put up with deprivations if they were not interested in preserving their own system.

<sup>7</sup> Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1973, p. 188.

<sup>8-9</sup> Bernard Brodie, op. cit., p. 342.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 343.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 347.

<sup>12</sup> Ponomarev B., "Invincibility of the Liberation Movement", *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1980, p. 24.

<sup>13</sup> *Pravda*, 3 March 1980.

<sup>14</sup> O. Edmund Clubb, "The Perils of a Political Foreign Policy", *The Nation*, Vol. 229, No. 19, December 8, 1979, p. 585.

<sup>15</sup> Carl Marcy, *Perceptions: Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union*. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1979, p. 311.

<sup>16</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, "Muscle and Brains", *Foreign Policy*, No. 37, Winter 1979-80, p. 10.

<sup>17</sup> James R. Schlesinger, "A Testing Time for America", *Fortune*, Vol. 101, No. 3, February 11, 1980, p. 247.

<sup>18</sup> In July 1976 a conference was held in Britain to mark the bicentenary of the founding of the United States. At the conference, which was attended by prominent scholars from both Britain and the United States, discussion was held on matters of war and peace as they had affected American history of the past two centuries. The papers presented at the conference, with the exception of those that were of a purely propagandist nature, are of considerable interest; they have been collected in a book entitled: *American Thinking About Peace and War*, Ed. by Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright, The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1978. The factual material contained in this collection together with other sources, has been used by the author in writing the first chapter of this book.

<sup>19</sup> *Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, Ed. by Edward Mead Earls, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1944.

<sup>20</sup> For more detail see Russell Frank Weigley, *The American*

*Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Macmillan, New York, 1973.

21 *The Americans*, 1976, Ed. by Irving Kristol, Paul Weaver, Vol. 2, Lexington Books, New York, 1976, p. 127.

22 The definition of "national security" within the category of "national interests" belongs to Walter Lippmann (*Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1943). A particularly exhaustive study of the problem has been made by the Soviet scholar V.F. Petrovsky: Cf. V.F. Petrovsky, *The Doctrine of 'National Security' in US Global Strategy*, Moscow, 1980 (in Russian).

23 The views of the American political observer, Harold Lasswell to the effect that the "national security" system has produced a "fortress state" ruled by specialists in violence are widely current today among the so-called neorevisionist school.

24 *United States Code*, 1970, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1971, Vol. 11, p. 12182.

25 *Ibidem*.

26 Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, Doubleday, Garden City (New York), 1968, p. 19.

27 *Military Strength and International Relations*, Moscow, 1973, pp. 20-24 (in Russian).

28 V. F. Petrovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

29 American National Security. Policy and Process, Ed. by Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1981, p. 3.

30 Bernard Brodie, *op. cit.*, pp. 342-44.

31 In Soviet literature militarism is defined as "military service in the interests of the parasitic, non-working classes, either in the form of armed violence used by a reactionary minority against a progressive majority, or in the form of military aggression (which has been organized and led by such a minority) by one country against another." Cf. V. I. Skopin, *Militarism*, Moscow, 1957, p. 17 (in Russian).

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33 See Davis B. Bobrow, "Military Research and Development. Implications for the Civil Sector", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March 1973 (The Military and American Society), pp. 117-18; Paul Dickson, *Think Tanks*, Atheneum, New York, 1971; Gene M. Lyons, Louis Morton, *Schools for Strategy. Education and Research in National Security Affairs*, Praeger, New York, 1965; Allan R. Millett, *Academic Education in National Security Policy*, Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, Columbus (Ohio), 1977.

34 Adam Yarmolinsky, *The Military Establishment. Its Impacts on American Society*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971.

35 *American Thinking About Peace and War*, p. 6.

- 36 Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People*, 8th edition, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1969.
- 37 Edmund Ions, "Vigilant Ambivalence: American Attitudes to Foreign Wars", *American Thinking About Peace and War*, p. 94.
- 38 Ibidem.
- 39 *American Thinking ...*, p. 8.
- 40 Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1977, pp. 221-32.
- 41 *American Thinking ...*, p. 9.
- 42 Allan R. Millett, *The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military. A Historical Perspective*, The Merghon Center of the Ohio State University, Columbus (Ohio), 1979.
- 43 *American Thinking ...*, p. 11.
- 44 *American Thinking ...*, pp. 12-13.
- 45 Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, London, 1967.
- 46 *American Thinking ...*, pp. 16-17.
- 47 Henry A. Kissinger notes in one of his works (*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Harper, New York, 1957) that optimism based on technological superiority resulted in forgetting the need to improve strategic doctrine.
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- 49 Barry M. Blechman, Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without Wars: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument*, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1978.
- 50 *American Thinking ...*, p. 29.
- 51 Bernard Brodie, op. cit., pp. 495-96.
- 52 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense. Strategic Programs in National Politics*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1961.
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- 54 *American thinking...*, p. 32.
- 55 Michael Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War*, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 1977, p. 5.
- 56 *American Thinking ...*, p. 63.
- 57 Ibidem.
- 58 *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relation*, 3rd Edition, Ed. by Ruhl G. Bartlett, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1954, p. 385.
- 59 Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1952.

<sup>60</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1949, p 138.

<sup>61</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest*, p. 18.

<sup>62</sup> George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 50.

<sup>63</sup> *American Thinking ...*, p. 44.

<sup>64</sup> Robert H. Puckett, *America Faces the World, Isolationist Ideology in American Foreign Policy*, MSS Information Corp., New York, 1972, p. 13.

<sup>65</sup> Paul Seabury, *Power, Freedom and Diplomacy*, Random House, New York, 1963, p. 47.

<sup>66</sup> *American Thinking ...*, p. 45.

<sup>67</sup> Frank L. Klinberg, "Cyclical Trends in American Foreign Policy Moods and Their Policy Implications", *Challenges to America. United States Foreign Policy in the 1980's*, Ed. by Charles W. Kegley, Patrick J. McGowan, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1979.

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<sup>69</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>70</sup> *American Thinking...*, p. 47.

<sup>71</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *A New Foreign Policy for the United States*, F. A. Praeger, New York, 1969.

<sup>72</sup> *American Thinking ...*, p. 49.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

<sup>74</sup> John S. Pustay, *Counter-Insurgency Warfare*, The Free Press, New York, 1965.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>77</sup> *American Thinking ...*, p. 71.

<sup>78</sup> Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War. The Challenge to American Strategy*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957. p. IX.

## Chapter II

<sup>1</sup> Michael Sherry, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 160. 161.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.



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- 7 Ibid., pp. 182-83.
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- 20 Ibid., pp. 242-46.
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- 22 Dmitri Ustinov, *Serving the Motherland, the Cause of Communism*, Moscow, 1982, p. 43 (in Russian).
- 23 *Dropshot...*, p.5.
- 24 In recent years a considerable amount of literature has appeared in the West on Kim Philby and his work in the British and American intelligence services. The work of the Soviet agent has been given particularly detailed treatment in Bruce Page, David Leitch and Phillip Knightley, *Philby; The Spy Who Betrayed a Generation*, London, 1968.
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- 29 Ibid., p. 41.
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- 35 Ibid., p. 54.
- 36 Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1971, pp. 28-39.

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38 Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, Glenn H. Snyder, *Strategy, Politics and Defense Budgets*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1962, pp. 271-378.

39 John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit., p. 83.

40 Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol I, *Year of Decisions*, Doubleday, New York, 1955, p. 552.

41 John Lewis Gaddis, *The US and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972, p. 264.

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43 John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit., p. 261.

44 Ibid., p. 262.

45 Ibid., p. 263.

46 Daniel Yergin, op. cit., pp. 338-39.

47 Ibid., p. 349.

48 Ibid., p. 350.

49 Ibid., p. 365.

50 John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit., p. 260.

51 Ibid., p. 286.

52 John Lewis Gaddis, op. cit., p. 253.

53 *American National Security...*, p. 64.

54 *Containments Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, Ed. by Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1978, p. 383.

55 The Directive was published in full with a commentary in the collection mentioned in the previous note. Ibid., pp. 385-442.

56 Ibid., p. 401.

57 Ibid., pp. 402, 424.

58 John C. Donovan, *The Cold Warriors. A Policy-Making Elite*, D. C. Heath and Co., Lexington (Mass.), 1974, p. 99.

59 The document is published in full in *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, Book 9, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1971, pp. 171-200.

60 Ibid., pp. 174-78.

61 Ibid., pp. 179-81.

62 Ibid., pp. 182-84.

63 Ibid., p. 185.

64 Ibid., p. 190.

65 Ibid., pp. 192, 195.

66 Ibid., p. 196.

67 Ibid., pp. 197-98.

68 Ibid., pp. 199-200.

69 Michael Sherry, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

70 Allan R. Millett, *The American Political System...*, p. 37.

<sup>71</sup> Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, 1959, p. 108.

<sup>72</sup> Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares*, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1972, p. 171.

<sup>73</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Harper, New York, 1957; Robert Osgood, *Limited War; The Challenge to American Strategy*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1957.

<sup>74</sup> *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1962. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations. US Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1961, p. 25.

<sup>75</sup> During the Second World War General Curtis LeMay commanded the air offensive against Japan. Robert McNamara at this time served in a statistical analysis group studying the effects of the B-29 bombers.

<sup>76</sup> Speaking at a session of NATO in Athens in May 1962 and in Ann Arbor in June of the same year, Robert McNamara stated that it was possible to move from a strategy of destroying enemy cities to a strategy of counterforce, in which the main targets for destruction are the enemy's armed forces and military installations. Essentially, it was a question of first-strike capability, a fact that was pointed out by many of McNamara critics.

<sup>77</sup> *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, p. 6.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>80</sup> Stuart H. Loory, *Defeated, Inside America's Military Machine*, Random House, New York, 1973, p. 110.

<sup>81</sup> *American National Security ...*, p. 166.

<sup>82</sup> Stuart H. Loory, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>84</sup> *American National Security ...*, p. 161.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167.

<sup>87</sup> Douglas MacArthur, *A Soldier Speaks. Public Papers and Speeches*, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1965, p. 356.

<sup>88</sup> William T.R. Fox, "Representativeness and Efficiency: Dual Problem of Civil-Military Relations", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 76, No. 3, September 1961, pp. 354-66.

<sup>89</sup> John F. Kennedy, *Public Papers. 1963*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1964, p. 736.

<sup>90</sup> *American National Security ...*, p. 553.

<sup>91</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment...", *International Security*, Vol. 5, No. 4, Spring 1981, p. 98.

### Chapter III

<sup>1</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The US and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, p. 245.

<sup>2</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 255-56.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 268.

<sup>5</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 197.

<sup>6</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>7</sup> Vincent Davis, *Postwar Defense Policy and the US Navy, 1943-1946*, University of Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1966, p. 250.

<sup>8</sup> P. Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace 1943-1945*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, pp. 1-23.

<sup>9</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 204.

<sup>10</sup> Michael Sherry, op. cit., pp. 207-08.

<sup>11</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 207.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 208.

<sup>14</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>15</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., pp. 209-11.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 214.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 217.

<sup>18</sup> *American National Security...*, p. 253.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>20</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 219.

<sup>21</sup> *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*, pp. 302-11.

<sup>22</sup> Daniel Yergin, op. cit., p. 270.

<sup>23</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 221.

<sup>24</sup> *The Absolute Weapon*, Ed. by Bernard Brodie, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1946.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., pp. 135-36.

<sup>26</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 222.

<sup>27</sup> Michael Sherry, op. cit., pp. 200-01.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 213.

<sup>29</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 226.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p. 228.

<sup>33</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 229.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 238.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., p. 240.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 241.

<sup>38</sup> *Containment: Documents on American Policy...*, pp. 164-69.

<sup>39</sup> Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 251.

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- 41 Ibid., p. 260.
- 42 Ibid., p. 266.
- 43 *Containment: Documents on American Policy...*, pp. 144-60.
- 44 Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 267.
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- 48 Ibid., pp. 284-85.
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- 55 Gregg Herken, op. cit., p. 305.
- 56 Ibid., p. 303.
- 57 Ibid., pp. 315-16.
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Moscow, 1982, p. 66.

79-80 *American National Security...*, p. 241.

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83 Allan R. Millett, *Military Professionalism and Officership in America*, Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, Columbus (Ohio), 1977, pp. 17-22; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1957, pp. 254-69.

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92 Instances have been noted in the press when in the course of presidential tours around the country and particularly during appearances in public the military assistant has been separated by some considerable distance from the President. If the need to give the order had arisen at that moment, there would have inevitably been a delay of several minutes. For example, on one occasion Gerald Ford's military assistant remained on the shore with the journalists while the President himself was at the end of a long pier, cut off from his man by a huge crowd.

93 In August 1943 when the United States was concerned to get the cooperation of Britain and Canada in designing the atomic bomb the Quebec Agreement was signed with Britain, according to which atomic weapons would not be used "without the consent of each side". But in January 1948 a mutual accord was reached whereby all agreements signed in wartime on the use

of atomic energy should be considered no longer in force.

<sup>94</sup> Desmond Ball, "Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?", *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 11, No. 2, February 1981.

<sup>95</sup> Former Defence Secretary James Schlesinger said that although the publicly proclaimed doctrine stressed only strikes against cities, these were not necessarily the targets against which US nuclear forces were aimed. (See US-USSR Strategic Policies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee of Foreign Relations, US Senate, 93rd Congr., 2nd Sess., March 4, 1974, Wash., 1974, p. 8.)

<sup>96</sup> Desmond Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9.

## Chapter IV

<sup>1</sup> American National Security..., p. 98.

<sup>2</sup> Alain Charles Enthoven, K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program*, Harper and Row, New York, 1971, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> James Forrestal was born in 1892 to a staunch Catholic family of Irish descent. He graduated in 1915 from Princeton University and shortly afterwards joined a firm of bankers, Dillon, Read and Co. According to his contemporaries he was exceptionally ambitious and his career was extraordinarily rapid: in 1938 at 46 he was already president of the company. In 1940 he became a presidential aide in the Roosevelt administration, then Deputy Navy Secretary and Navy Secretary in June 1944. By early 1949 Forrestal began to show signs of acute psychological stress. He suffered a complete nervous breakdown accompanied by extreme suicidal tendencies. He did eventually commit suicide by jumping from the window of the naval hospital. As was said at the time in the United States, Forrestal was a victim of the cold war spirit which he himself had done much to inflame. (Arnold A. Rogow, *James Forrestal. A Study of Personality, Politics, and Policy*, The Macmillan Co., New York, 1963.

<sup>4</sup> Douglas Kinnard, *The Secretary of Defense*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1980, pp. 19-20.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 40.

<sup>6</sup> Robert McNamara was born in San Francisco in 1916 and graduated from the University of California in 1937. In 1939 he received a degree from the Harvard School of Business Administration where he specialized in statistical analysis as applied to management. During the Second World War he served on the staff of an Air Force unit. After the war he went to work for the Ford Co., where he rose rapidly up the ladder to become president in 1960—the first person to have held this post who was not a member of the Ford family.

After meeting Kennedy in Washington McNamara agreed to work in the Pentagon. As his deputy he chose the New York lawyer, Roswell Gilpatric, who had been a Defence Department official under the Truman administration. Gilpatric believed that his previous experience would give him an advantage over the new Defence Secretary, but McNamara soon got into the stride of his new post and his deputy's hopes of exploiting his advantage were quickly dashed.

<sup>7</sup> Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security. Reflections in Office*, Harper and Row, New York, 1968, p. X.

<sup>8</sup> Roswell Gilpatric, from January 1961 to January 1964; Cyrus Vance, from January 1964 to June 1967; Paul Nitze, since July 1967.

<sup>9</sup> Douglas Kinnard, op. cit., p. 79.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 81.

<sup>11</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>15</sup> Robert S. McNamara, op. cit., p. 88.

<sup>16</sup> Subsequently the internal reorganization slightly relaxed the system set up under "McNamara's monarchy", but the Defence Secretaries still basically retained the powers and rights which had come about under McNamara, and they showed no inclination to delegate their authority. The main emphasis was still put on programmed management and not on strategic planning.

<sup>17</sup> Douglas Kinnard, op. cit., p. 109.

<sup>18</sup> *The New York Times*, June 17, 1962, p. 26.

<sup>19</sup> G. Trofimenko, *The USA: Politics, War, Ideology*, Moscow, 1976, p. 243 (in Russian).

<sup>20</sup> William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1964, p. 92.

<sup>21</sup> Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security. Reflections in Office*, Harper and Row, New York, 1968, pp. 55-56.

<sup>22</sup> James Schlesinger was the twelfth Defence Secretary of the



United States. Prior to his appointment he had been Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency under Nixon.

He graduated from Harvard in economics and later wrote a book entitled *The Political Economy of National Security. A Study of the Economic Aspects of the Contemporary Power Struggle* (Praeger, New York, 1960). Until his appointment as twelfth head of the Pentagon Schlesinger had been director of strategic studies for the Rand Corporation and at one time consultant for the Bureau of the Budget. As Defence Secretary he considered it essential to restore the prestige of the American military, which had been seriously undermined by the Vietnam War, and generally rid the country of the "Vietnam syndrome". He also believed it was necessary to finally adapt strategic doctrine to the new international situation so as to be in a position to conduct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Finally, he tried hard to change the mood throughout the country in favour of increased military spending so as to strengthen US strategic positions.

<sup>23</sup> *The New York Times*, October 9, 1975, p. 15.

<sup>24</sup> James Schlesinger, "The Military Balance", *Newsweek*, Vol. 87, No. 22, May 31, 1976, p. 8.

<sup>25</sup> Douglas Kinnard, op. cit., p. 189.

<sup>26</sup> Richard M. Nixon, *The Memoirs*, Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1978, p. 1024.

<sup>27</sup> Douglas Kinnard, *The Secretary of Defence*, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 1980, p. 170.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 191.

## Conclusion

<sup>1</sup> *Whence the Threat to Peace*, Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1984, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> *American National Security...*, p. 538.

<sup>3</sup> D. F. Ustinov, op. cit., p. 50.

<sup>4</sup> *Whence the Threat to Peace*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>5</sup> *The Defence Monitor*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1982, p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>7</sup> Tom Gervasy, *Arsenal of Democracy II. American Military Power in the 1980s and the Origins of the New Cold War*, Grove Press Inc., New York, 1981, p. 27.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>10</sup> Tom Gervasy, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>11</sup> G. Trofimenko, op. cit., p. 338.

<sup>12</sup> *The Defence Monitor*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1982, p. 11.

<sup>13</sup> *Pravda*, March 12, 1985.

<sup>14</sup> *Pravda*, April 5, 1984.

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